

PANJWAI MASSACRE TIMELINE

The primary sources used in this December, 2015 timeline are the sworn statements and other evidence obtained by U.S. Army criminal investigators (Military Police soldiers, *aka* CID Special Agents) for CID's 2013 [Report of Investigation](#) (ROI), as released by the Army in mid-2014 to *The News Tribune* newspaper of Tacoma, WA, in response to the newspaper's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request(s), and to the public by *The News Tribune* in March, 2015. The Army withheld 1,300 pages, and heavily redacted the 1,500 pages released, hiding names in particular, so deciphering – by blogger “[pow wow](#)” in collaboration with multimedia journalist [Lela Ahmadzai](#) – preceded the compiling of this timeline and its [illustrated online summary](#).

Table of Contents

(Click page links to quickly reach text sections)

December 14, 2011

[Page 3](#)

U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Robert Bales Reached Village Stability Platform Belamby

December 20, 2011

[Page 12](#)

List Of Weapons Issued To SSG Bales By B Company, 2-3 Infantry

Monday, March 5, 2012

Afternoon | [Page 12](#)

Two IED Explosions Injured VSP Belamby Soldiers And Sailor

Early Evening | [Page 15](#)

Local Men Ordered To Gather To Hear U.S. Special Forces Captain

Thursday, March 8, 2012

8:00 AM-2:00 PM | [Page 17](#)

SSG Bales Joined A Patrol To Forward Operating Base Zangabad, Then Helped Bomb A Tree

Friday, March 9, 2012

5:00 AM-6:00 AM | [Page 19](#)

Video Of War Dead Viewed On The Personal Computer Of SSG Bales

Saturday, March 10, 2012

Evening | [Page 20](#)

SSG Bales Criticized The U.S. Army's Rules Of Engagement

9:00 PM or 10:00 PM | [Page 21](#)

SSG Bales Guard Duty At VSP Belamby Ended

11:00 PM | [Page 22](#)

Movie-Watching, With Drinking, Concluded

11:00 PM-12:00 AM | [Page 24](#)

Special Forces Sergeant First Class Blackshear Awakened By SSG Bales

Saturday, March 10, 2012 – Sunday, March 11, 2012

[Page 25](#)

Guarding Village Stability Platform Belamby

Sunday, March 11, 2012

1:20 AM Page 31	U.S. Guards Heard Sporadic Gunfire Begin North Of VSP Belamby
1:30 AM Page 32	Afghan Guard Saw A U.S. Soldier Enter VSP Belamby On Foot
1:40 AM Page 33	U.S. Guards Heard Sporadic Gunfire End North Of VSP Belamby
2:00 AM Page 34	SSG McLaughlin Saw SSG Bales At VSP Belamby
2:00 AM Page 34	Local Residents Heard Gunfire In Najiban, South Of VSP Belamby
2:30 AM Page 39	Afghan Guard Saw A U.S. Soldier Exit VSP Belamby On Foot
3:00 AM Page 40	Afghan Army Guard Heard Gunfire Outside VSP Belamby
3:00 AM Page 40	The Attack At The Dawood Home Began
3:00 AM Page 45	Afghan Guards Got Word Of VSP Belamby's Gate Activity To The U.S. "Foreign Forces"
3:05 AM Page 48	U.S. Soldiers Scrambled To Respond To The Afghan Report
3:15 AM Page 49	U.S. Guard Heard Gunfire To The South Of VSP Belamby
3:20 AM Page 50	SSG Bales Couldn't Be Found To Conduct Infantry Roll Call
3:30 AM Page 53	Five Alkozai Wounded, From North Of VSP Belamby, Reached FOB Zangabad
3:40 AM Page 56	VSP Belamby Called FOB Zangabad To Request Help Finding SSG Bales
3:40 AM-4:30 AM Page 62	FOB Zangabad Personnel Spoke To Four Alkozai Witnesses And A Relative, As Five Injured Civilians Were Treated
4:36 AM Page 71	FOB Zangabad's Infrared Sensor Operators Located SSG Bales
4:47 AM Page 75	SSG Bales Reached The Gate Of VSP Belamby
10:00 PM-6:00 AM Page 80	Two Aircraft Flew Near VSP Belamby Overnight, KAF Records Later Revealed
6:23 AM Page 81	Special Forces Alerted The U.S. Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID)
8:00 AM Page 82	U.S. Army & ISAF Officers, Still Unaware Of The Murders South Of VSP Belamby, Focused On "Consequence Management"
By Noon Page 85	Vehicles Carrying Bodies Began Parking Outside VSP Belamby's Gate
ADDENDUM Page 97	Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai
ADDENDUM Page 105	Alkozai Ballistics Evidence
ADDENDUM Page 108	The Centralized Afghanistan Government's Investigation(s)



TIME	ACTION	SOURCES
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DECEMBER, 2011

	<p>U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Robert Bales Reached Village Stability Platform Belamby</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>On December 14, 2011, at the beginning of a year-long deployment to Afghanistan, U.S. Army Staff Sergeant (SSG) Robert Bales arrived for a tour of duty at Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belamby – aka Village Security Platform, or Village Security Operation (VSO), Belambai, soon to be more commonly known as Camp or Combat Outpost (COP) Belambai – in Panjwai district of Kandahar province, Afghanistan.</p> <p>Bales deployed (for a fourth time in an overseas combat role)</p>	<p>21 September 2013 First Corrected Final Report of Investigation by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Command, Exhibit 226 (26 March 2012 sworn statement to a CID Special Agent at Fort Bragg, NC by the Army Sergeant EOD team leader who'd arrived at VSP Belamby with SSG Bales in December; that EOD Sergeant - from the 767th Ordnance Company, 192nd Ordnance Battalion, 52nd Ordnance</p>

from Washington state's Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) on December 3rd, 2011, with fellow soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment (2-3 IN) of the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division (3-2 ID). A March 19, 2012 Memo from B Company of the 2-3 IN, to which Bales belonged, states that Bales arrived at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan on December 4th, and on December 7th flew from Manas Air Base to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) in Afghanistan, the large NATO/ISAF (now U.S.) military base located southeast of Kandahar city, arriving the same evening. After some "Receipt, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI)" training at KAF's Special Forces Camp Brown, Bales left for VSP Belamby on December 14, 2011, and reached that Panjwai district VSP, which was due west of KAF by air but more difficult to reach by road, later that day.

A U.S. Army Sergeant (SGT), who was an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team leader, arrived at VSP Belamby with Bales, the EOD SGT told Army CID investigators, having met Bales at Kandahar Airfield just before driving with him to the VSP base at night from KAF.

VSP Belamby was located [about 40 kilometers southwest of Kandahar city](#), in the Zangabad, or Horn of Panjwai, region of northern Panjwai district, about 20 minutes by air from the large KAF military base [to its east](#). The EOD Sergeant told CID that he and Bales arrived at the Special Forces-run VSP Belamby on the 7th or 11th of December, 2011. Army Brigadier General (BG) Ricky Waddell, who conducted an AR 15-6, or Command Climate (CC), investigation immediately after the mass killings (CID received the AR 15-6 report on July 2, 2012, per PDF Page 1355; the public got a [redacted version](#) in 2015), states in his 2012 report to Marine Corps General John Allen, US Forces-Afghanistan Commander, that Bales remained at Kandahar Airfield until December 13, 2011. Waddell's report, citing the B Company Memo, further states that Bales arrived at Kandahar Airfield on the evening of December 7, 2011, and arrived at VSP Belamby on the 14th of December, 2011, where he remained for just under 3 months (89 days).

On December 15 or 20, 2011, VSP Belamby "came under contact" (came under daytime fire from outside the base), when Bales and his squad of troops were present, and they responded for the first time at their new base. No casualties were received by anyone at the base – then, or during patrols in the surrounding countryside and neighborhood – until March 5, 2012.

Some notable and telling context missing from media coverage at the time, but now confirmed by the media-requested

Group - left VSP Belamby in mid-February, 2012; his replacement as EOD team leader was the Navy Petty Officer Second Class who lost a leg on March 5, 2012, as detailed below)

CID Exhibit 172, Page 1 (31 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 27 March 2012 interview by two CID Special Agents of a 767 EOD Army Staff Sergeant, apparently at Camp Morehead in Kabul province, Afghanistan)

CID Exhibit 229 (10 April 2012 sworn statement to a CID Special Agent in West Virginia by a Navy Signals Intelligence Petty Officer Second Class, who was deployed to VSP Belamby from May 30, 2011 until January 24, 2012, which mentions a "VSP Zangabad")

CID Exhibit 225, Pages 2-5 (5 April 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summaries of multiple 28 March 2012 CID interviews of Green Berets from the Third Special Forces Group, Operational Detachment-Alpha 3232, including ODA 3232's Captain, who were running the base in December, 2011 when Bales first arrived at VSP Belamby. All 8 Third Special Forces Group soldiers interviewed that day at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, refused to provide sworn statements to Army CID Special Agents)

August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing transcript, which contains this statement by lead prosecutor Army Lieutenant Colonel Joseph "Jay" Morse, on Page 961: "*Just a thousand meters away at FOB Zangabad*" Army doctors were working on wounded Afghans as Bales was walking back to VSP Belamby

CID Exhibit 92; PDF Page 342 ("*Kuriazai [apparently east of the S. Jan/M. Naim/Nazar M. homes north of VSP Belamby] is the village located outside FOB Zangabad on the North West side,*" according to the March 15th sworn statement of an Army infantry Sergeant First Class based at FOB Zangabad)

A very definitive account of the location of FOB Zangabad relative to VSP Belamby is contained in the Command Climate (CC) investigation, or AR 15-6 report, conducted by US Army Brigadier General Ricky Waddell, in March and

release of the CID Report of Investigation (ROI), the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing transcript, and BG Waddell's AR 15-6 Command Climate report, is the fact that a larger [Forward Operating Base \(FOB\) Zangabad](#), occupied by regular U.S. Army and Afghan soldiers, was located only a mile east of VSP Belamby in March, 2012. Among other things, that unreported context means that VSP Belamby was separated from FOB Zangabad to its east by [little more distance](#) than the VSP was separated from the attacked [Mohammad Wazir home](#) to its southwest.

Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Bales was part of a regular or "conventional" Army Infantry contingent of about 16 soldiers – the 1st and 3rd Squads of 1st Platoon, B Company, 2-3 Infantry, with many soldiers on their first combat deployment – "responsible for providing additional security" to successive Special Operations Forces (SOF) Operational Detachment-A, or -Alpha, (ODA) teams, which operated VSP Belamby with the help of "attachments" or "enablers" like the 2-3 IN soldiers. Each ODA team consisted of 12 Army Green Beret soldiers – who deploy abroad for 6 months at a time. The first team the 2-3 IN supported was ODA 3232, which transferred authority to ODA 7216 on February 1, 2012. The Green Beret ODA teams in turn supported operations conducted by the "Battle Space Owner" (BSO) - the conventional Army 3-21 Infantry command based at the nearby FOB Zangabad – as part of the BSO's campaign plan for that area of Panjwai district.

["ODA 7216" identifies the unit as the sixth team in the first company of the second battalion of the 7th Special Forces Group; "ODA 3232" identifies the unit as the second team in the third company of the second battalion of the 3rd Special Forces Group. "18-series" soldiers are Special Operations Forces. "11-series" soldiers are regular, or conventional unit, Army soldiers.]

The 2011-2012 mission statement for the Special Forces running VSP Belamby – reflecting the "Village Stability Operations" program of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as well as the US military's Congressionally-authorized "Operation Enduring Freedom" (OEF) campaign (which commenced after September 11, 2001 and "surged" in 2009-2010) - reads:

"MISSION: ODA [Redacted/3232] conducts Village Stability Operations IVO [in the vicinity of] Belambai, Panjwai District [Redacted] NLT [no later than] 15 APR 11 IOT [in order to] expand the reach of GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], create an environment inhospitable to insurgent influence and set conditions for development of a

April, 2012, at the request of US Marine Corps General John Allen, Commander of ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan. See Exhibit TTT of the AR 15-6, at PDF Page 399, which states that, immediately upon exiting VSP Belamby, a patrol planned to "follow Route Charlottetown approximately one kilometer to the east until reaching the southwest gate at FOB Zangabad."

Other accounts to CID about the location of FOB Zangabad, relative to VSP Belamby, are listed in the first March 5th Timeline entry below

Exhibit VVV of BG Waddell's AR 15-6 Command Climate (CC) investigation, at PDF Page 401, regarding the Deployment Timeline details of the arrival of Bales in Afghanistan

BG Waddell's AR 15-6 Command Climate (CC) investigation findings at Pages 3 & 25 (PDF Pages 6 & 28), regarding the dates Bales arrived at KAF and VSP Belamby, and when the ODA transition occurred

BG Waddell's AR 15-6 CC findings at Pages 8-9 (PDF Pages 11-12), CC Exhibit B (PDF Pages 93-94), and CC Exhibit SS (16 April 2012 sworn statement at Fort Bragg, NC by an ODA 3232 soldier, at PDF Page 273), regarding the names of COP Suleiman, and the history of VSP Belamby and its personnel

BG Waddell's AR 15-6 CC investigation findings at Pages 30-31 (PDF Pages 33-34), regarding the security role of SSG Bales during shuras

BG Waddell's AR 15-6 CC investigation findings at Page 12 (PDF Page 83), regarding the chain of command for the 2-3 IN "SOF uplift" squads deployed to VSP Belamby

BG Waddell's AR 15-6 Command Climate (CC) investigation findings at Pages 21 & 23 (PDF Pages 24 & 26), regarding the deployment to VSP Ezabad, in Maiwan district, Kandahar province, of both the Platoon Leader (a Lieutenant) and Platoon Sergeant (a Sergeant First Class) of 1st Platoon, B Company, 2-3 IN (to which Bales belonged), and the reasons for that. See also CC Exhibits AAA (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the 1st Platoon

secure environment."

As part of his investigation, Brigadier General Ricky Waddell spoke by phone on April 15, 2012, with Brigadier General [Christopher K. Haas](#), the commander of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A), *"to discuss the objectives of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and its connected Afghan Local Police (ALP) program, and the role of the Infantry Uplift."* This is the first "significant point" Waddell wrote to summarize that phone call:

"BG Haas mentioned the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the connected Afghan Local Police (ALP) program are the number one priority in support of COMISAF's [Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), who was then U.S. Marine General John Allen] campaign plan. The objective of VSO is to mobilize the Afghan population in order to establish security for villages and districts in rural Afghanistan. VSO sets the conditions for this mobilization. VSO and ALP are done in conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Interior that approves the ALP locations and tashkils [staffing and equipment plans]."

A Special Forces commander at the Company level (which operates from an AOB, or Advanced Operations Base, for Special Operations Forces), who was located at Camp Simmons on KAF (the AOB in command of VSP Belamby), here explains to the CC investigation that VSP Belamby hadn't established any ALP (Afghan Local Police) units in its area as of March, 2012 – despite the ALP program being, according to CFSOCC-A Commander BG Haas, *"the number one priority,"* in conjunction with *"Village Stability Operations,"* for the execution of COMISAF General Allen's *"campaign plan"*:

"Q: What was the battle rhythm? How does this compare with the battle rhythm of the other VSPs?"

"A: *VSP Belambai and VSP Talukan are the only two sites where we have not been able to stand up Afghan Local Police. I can't say that their battle rhythm relates to the other VSPs that are less kinetic. These guys are going on patrols to engage with the community and on the way back are fighting to get to their home base. That was the case at Belambai on a routine basis, every time they went out. It happened more often than not. So I can't say their battle rhythm is the same as the other VSPs. Having to deal with the intensity of their environment, set them apart from other VSPs. These sites are in what we call the "shaping phase" of our VSO methodology. They're continuously conducting that shaping effort, while most of the other sites enjoy a more permissible environment*

Team Leader, at PDF Page 300) & Exhibit BBB (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the 1st Platoon Team Sergeant, at PDF Page 306)

CC Exhibit B, at PDF Pages 102-103, regarding the U.S. and ANA personnel assigned to VSP Belamby on the night in question

CC Exhibit E, at PDF Pages 98-99, regarding the Mission statement of the ODA(s) based at VSP Belamby

CC Exhibit D (24 April 2012 Memorandum For Record of BG Waddell's April 15, 2012 phone conversation with BG Chris Haas, at PDF Page 97)

CC Exhibit (29 March 2012 sworn statement by a Special Forces commander at the Camp Simmons AOB, regarding the lack of ALP recruitment by VSP Belamby, at PDF Page 313)

CC Exhibit II? (14 April 2012 sworn statement by SFC X - evidently the acting ODA 7216 Team Sergeant on March 11 - at PDF Page 232)

CC Exhibit KK? (14 April 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 18X Green Beret, at PDF Page 239)

CC Exhibit OO? (10 April 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 communications, or 18E, Green Beret, at PDF Page 256)

CC Exhibit HH (15 April 2012 sworn statement by the ODA 7216 Team Sergeant until his March 5th IED concussion, Master Sergeant Clifford Uhrich, at PDF Page 221)

CC Exhibit XX? (30 March 2012 sworn statement by someone - apparently the Commander of B Company, 2-3 IN - with Administrative Control over 2-3 IN soldiers as part of the Company-level command, then based at SOTF-SE's Advanced Operations Base Trident, a camp within the regular Army's FOB Lagman, Qalat district, Zabul province, at PDF Page 285)

CC Exhibit RR? (29 March 2012 sworn statement by Advanced Operations Base Operations Sergeant Scott Gross, the former Team Sergeant of ODA

to engage the community."

(According to ODA 7216's March 12 acting Team Sergeant, *aka* "SFC X," in an April 14, 2012 sworn statement to the CC investigation, at PDF Page 232, ODA 7216 - *"the most senior ODA"* with *"a lot of experience"* - *"had implemented about 100 ALP on the last tour"* preceding its VSP Belamby assignment.)

Captain Daniel Fields, the ODA 7216 Special Forces Green Beret officer who took command of VSP Belamby on February 1, 2012, added these specifics, in his April 15, 2012 sworn statement to BG Waddell's CC investigation, when asked to describe "the types and frequency of your missions outside the wire":

"Between 3-5 missions per week, ranging from resupply to KLEs [Key Leader Engagements] at [either the village of, or more likely FOB] Zangabad to attempts to engage the local populous."

In April, 2012, for the Command Climate investigation, an 18X (or 18 X-Ray) ODA 7216 Green Beret described VSP Belamby's missions this way:

"Q: Please describe the type and frequency of your missions."

"A: *About 2-3 missions per week. Typically it was a combat reconnaissance patrol to get atmospherics. We talked to locals to try to get them to believe in us and understand what we are doing. We tried to help them better their villages."*

"Q: What areas did you patrol?"

"A: *Western Belambai, Alikozai, and Naji Bien. We went north of Alikozai a couple of times. In all cases, we could be seen from the roof of the OPCEN at Belambai."*

Also in April, 2012, an ODA 7216 Green Beret communications specialist (an 18E, or 18 Echo) described VSP Belamby missions with similar language, in response to a CC investigation question:

"Q: What were the type and frequency of your missions while at the VSP?"

"A: *I'd say the majority of it was to gain atmospherics between the little villages on the north, the south and towards the west. Mainly it was just trying to build atmospherics and trying to build rapport."*

3232, at PDF Page 266)

CC Exhibit HHH? (29 March 2012 sworn statement by a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan commander at Bagram Airfield, at PDF Page 340)

CC Exhibit FF (15 April 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Detachment Commander Captain Daniel Fields, at PDF Page 210)

CC Exhibit QQ? (16 April 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 3232 soldier, referencing a French-Canadian team that preceded ODA 3232, at PDF Page 264)

CC Exhibit K? (7 April 2012 sworn statement by a 2-3 IN soldier regarding the duties of Bales, at PDF Page 116)

CC Exhibit GGGG? (11 April 2012 sworn statement by a U.S. citizen who worked, through contractor "International Management Services," as a civilian interpreter for the Special Forces ODA teams at VSP Belamby, at PDF Page 280)

CC Exhibit Q? (7 April 2012 sworn statement by a 2-3 IN medic, noting that the 2-3 Infantry NCO squad leaders and ODA 7216 members lived apart from the 2-3 IN soldiers, at PDF Page 147)

CC Exhibit (4 April 2012 sworn statement by a 2-3 IN soldier who described 2-3 IN squad members as distant from NCO Bales, at PDF Page 162)

Aerial map distances, and aerial views of the locations of attacked homes and VSP Belamby, made possible by Afghan reporter [Mamoon Durrani](#)'s invaluable on-site Zangabad research

ODA 3232 Captain and Team Sergeant names via CID Exhibit 250, at PDF Page 1184 (an unredacted photograph of a signed January 18, 2012 Certificate of Appreciation issued to SSG Jason McLaughlin by SFODA Team 3232)

(Other soldier names and Bigham testimony via [media reports](#) from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)

A senior commander at Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A), based at Bagram Airfield north of Kabul, gave the CC investigation some context for VSP Belamby's area of operations:

"For western Panjwai, the level of contact in December through March is low relative to the rest of the time of the year in Panjwai during the fighting season (April – Late November). Over the course of the year, western Panjwai and specifically VSPs Belambai and Talukan are the most kinetic locations in Kandahar. That said, Panjwai, central Helmand, select [other] districts in Kandahar have high lethal activity. This is also true of multiple locations in [Regional Command] East; Konar and Paktiya."

BG Waddell's AR 15-6 CC report states that, in late 2010, 3rd Special Forces Group's ODA 3232 scouted for [a site](#) for a new base about a kilometer west of COP Suleiman (itself just southwest of FOB Zangabad), and during 2011 built up the VSP at Belamby, as the ODA transitioned westward from COP Suleiman – with the full transition to the VSP completed only in late November, shortly before the JBLM unit to which Bales belonged arrived in December, 2011. A French-Canadian team apparently had a presence at or near VSP Belamby before ODA 3232 moved there. By June, 2011, the U.S. was operating a checkpoint at VSP Belamby, before it became the small, full-time VSP base it became by the end of 2011.

At the beginning of February, 2012 (the Transfer of Authority took place on February 1st), 3rd Special Forces Group's ODA 3232 was replaced at VSP Belamby by the 7th Special Forces Group's ODA 7216 (both made up of Army Green Beret teams). ODA 3232 Captain Scott Dickson told CID in an unsworn March, 2012 interview that he arrived at VSP Belamby in October, 2011 and *"built up [the location](#)"* with the help of a regular army infantry regiment from Kansas (a clinic – the blue building visible in many photographs – was apparently built across the road from the base in 2011-2012, alongside a school). The ODA 3232 Team Sergeant, Master Sergeant (MSG) Scott Gross, told BG Waddell's CC investigation, in a sworn statement:

"Other units that were attached to me were the 82nd [Airborne Infantry from Fort Bragg, NC], 505th, they were there for about 5 months [in 2011, when the VSP was first established]. Then the 1-16 IN, 2nd Infantry Division [from Fort Riley, Kansas], were there for one month. Then the 2-3 IN [from JBLM] replaced them [in December, 2011]."

Regarding the chain-of-command and duty position of SSG

Bales at VSP Belamby, a 2-3 IN soldier told Brigadier General Waddell's CC investigation:

"Well SSG Bales appointed himself the platoon sergeant, but he actually wasn't. He was a squad leader for 3rd Squad."

[1st Platoon's actual Platoon Sergeant (a 2-3 IN Sergeant First Class) was based at VSP Ezabad in a different district, because the Special Forces had declined an infantry request that he or the Platoon Leader, a 2-3 IN Lieutenant, be deployed to VSP Belamby.]

Bales and his "uplift squad" of 8 soldiers (Bales was officially 3rd Squad's leader, as well as the senior 2-3 IN NCO at VSP Belamby) were also involved in training Afghan police, including at checkpoints, during their first month at the base – in particular, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, or ANCOP, who were housed during January at VSP Belamby's predecessor base – located just about a kilometer to the east of VSP Belamby (slightly southwest of FOB Zangabad), which was variously known as "VSP Zangabad," "The Old School Site," and "Suleiman Makhtab" - at the former site of U.S. Combat Outpost (COP) Suleiman.

As a U.S. Navy Petty Officer Second Class (PO2) - who was a Navy Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Operator at VSP Belamby from its first days under U.S. control (the PO2 was deployed there from May 30, 2011 until January 24, 2012, during the VSP tenure of ODA 3232) - noted in a sworn statement to CID about VSP Zangabad and Bales:

"SSG Bales and his squad were also in charge of training the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) which were located at VSP Zangabad. He was responsible for getting into contact with those guys if and when they were fired upon so that the team could go and provide support if needed. About mid Jan 2012 timeframe VSP Zangabad took contact. Navy Chief Osborne, our interpreter Mustafa and I were on the roof trying to establish communications with the ANCOP. SSG Bales comes running up and yelling for us to hurry and get communications with them. Our location was known for communications problems, it was hard for us to reach the ANCOP, but SSG Bales continued to yell at us to get communications as we were trying. It wasn't until Chief [Redacted/Osborne] told him to chill out and calm down that he did."

A CC investigator asked a U.S. citizen working as a civilian interpreter for the Special Forces at VSP Belamby: "Did SSG Bales work or supervise or interact with the ANCOP?" The

interpreter replied:

"Yes. When the ANCOP was there [at VSP Zangabad, the former COP Suleiman], I think he was the main guy who was supposed to ask them how they were doing. So he would hand me the radio and I would try to communicate every morning. I would talk to them to find out how they were doing and if they needed anything. Also, I would call them whenever we needed them to secure the road."

The CC investigator then asked: "Was he ok with it?" The interpreter replied:

"Yes. He would say to me, 'To call My Boys.' He would go through me, to talk to the ANCOP."

Master Sergeant Clifford Uhrich, the ODA 7216 Team Sergeant with an E-8 ranking who was injured March 5, 2012, told the CC investigation on April 15, 2012:

"When we first arrived, 3rd Group had SSG Bales and [Redacted/SSG McLaughlin?] working with the ANCOP up at the Old School Site. We didn't have much to do with the ANCOP after that [after 3rd Group departed on February 1st]. The ANCOP didn't want to leave their base, and they eventually displaced to another location. We worked primarily with the ANA [Afghan National Army] after that. I didn't feel comfortable having the infantry work with the ANA, so I put my [ODA 7216] guys in charge of that. The infantry had a role, but not the lead role."

Bales and his 2-3 IN squad also accompanied Special Forces soldiers to several meetings (shuras) between Afghan officials or elders and other US soldiers, but only to provide perimeter security, the CC investigation makes clear. ODA soldiers were the ones who directly interacted with Afghans in the shuras, and ODA 7216 apparently attempted to prevent direct interaction between infantry soldiers and adult Afghans.

The regular Army battalion in which Bales served "gave up control of our guys to" the ODA Special Forces leadership (Captain Daniel Fields and his predecessor Captain Scott Dickson) - according to reports of Article 32 hearing testimony by 2-3 IN First Sergeant (1SG) Vernon Bigham - after their deployment to VSP Belamby (and to 13 other Special Forces Detachment bases, where more than 150 B Co soldiers from the same battalion as Bales were deployed as "SOF Uplift" security forces). Bigham's testimony is confirmed by BG Waddell's CC investigation findings concerning the 2-3 IN's so-called "OPCON" (Operational Control) chain of command.

Approximately 38 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers – a rotating platoon from the Weapons Company, 2nd Kandak, 1st Brigade, 205th Corps of the ANA – were assigned to VSP Belamby, where, at their own guard posts, they helped the U.S. soldiers guard the base, in addition to accompanying U.S. soldiers on patrols into the surrounding rural farmland and settlements.

U.S. and Afghan soldiers at VSP Belamby lived in separate areas, and generally seemed not to know each others' names, even when guarding the same small base at the same time. The Special Forces soldiers, most of their attachments, their interpreters, and the 2-3 IN NCOs (including Bales), roomed in converted steel shipping containers – each of which was known as a "CONEX" (container express), or "can," or "CHU" (containerized housing unit) – that stood apart from both the Afghan soldiers and the quarters of the two squads of 2-3 Infantry soldiers on base. The lower-ranking 2-3 IN soldiers had to bunk at first in close quarters in the Operations Center building, while they spent two months building a wooden barracks building, or "B-hut" – apparently with its own Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) room – into which most of the two squads of 2-3 IN soldiers later moved.

A 2-3 IN soldier (who, with Private First Class Derek Guinn, was apparently one of two African-Americans in the two squads of soldiers) told the CC investigation in April, 2012 about his experience with NCO Bales before and after deployment:

"Q. Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

"A. *Honestly, we were a pretty tight group before we left, so we all kept each other's spirits pretty high. As far as in relations to SSG Bales, not so much. He was formerly [before deployment] our platoon sergeant, so we never really worked with him very closely, you know, he was always kind of ordering us around, that kind of thing. But then [before they left JBLM for Afghanistan] he became our squad leader [a position with less authority], we had to work with him more and more, and you could kind of see and feel the distance between our elements of privates and team leaders."*

[Note that BG Waddell's CC investigation was asked by CID and government prosecutors not to question VSP Belamby witnesses about "key warnings and indicators," so that line of inquiry was foreclosed in CC interviews, and with it details of certain behavior that may otherwise have been provided.]

	<p>ODA 7216, and the civilian and U.S. military attachments assigned to it at VSP Belamby (including the 2-3 Infantry squads), consisted, on March 10-11, 2012, of a total of 1 Officer, 1 Warrant Officer, 37 enlisted personnel, and 6 civilians. Specific components included 12 members of ODA 7216, of which only 8 were on base that night (3 were in the KAF military hospital for Traumatic Brain Injury assessment, and another was elsewhere on KAF), 16 regular Army infantry soldiers from 2-3 IN, 5 civilian interpreters, with another on leave, and 11 other specialized personnel enablers, including an Air National Guard Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC, <i>aka</i> a Joint Tactical Air Controller), Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) technicians, an Air Force Senior Airman "weather guy," a cook, and dog handlers.</p>	
	<p>List Of Weapons Issued To SSG Bales By B Company, 2-3 Infantry</p>	<p>Source</p>
	<p>By December 20, 2011, Bales had been issued weapons from B Company's Arms Room.</p> <p>No Heckler & Koch (H&K) 9mm pistol was issued by the B Company Arms Room to SSG Bales.</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 77 (B Co Arms Room Hand Receipt on DA Form 2062, dated 20 Dec 2011, listing the serial numbers of the guns and equipment to be used by SSG Bales)</p>

MONDAY, MARCH 5, 2012

Afternoon	<p>Two IED Explosions Injured VSP Belamby Soldiers And Sailor</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>On Monday, March 5, 2012, reportedly late in the afternoon, a convoy of armored vehicles was traveling west on its return to VSP Belamby – evidently transporting, among others, an ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class, <i>aka</i> "SFC X," who soon became acting Team Sergeant, and another ODA soldier on their return from KAF's Camp Brown, where SFC X had been "drawing money." The convoy had apparently stopped on its way at either or both the Panjwai district center and nearby FOB Zangabad as it returned to the VSP. The last vehicle in the convoy carried both Special Forces/ODA soldiers and 2-3 Infantry "uplift squad" soldiers (2-3 IN First Squad Leader SSG</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 228 (5 April 2012 sworn statement by the Navy Petty Officer Second Class who lost his leg in the second IED explosion)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 156 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by 2-3 Infantry Staff Sergeant Jason McLaughlin)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 123 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 121 (13 March 2012 sworn</p>

	<p>Jason McLaughlin, whose sworn statement provides part of this account, didn't know the last names of two of the Special Forces soldiers riding in that vehicle – a Sergeant First Class and a Staff Sergeant, one of whom was a medic or “Delta”).</p> <p>A 2-3 IN Sergeant was driving the last vehicle, a 2-3 IN Private First Class (PFC) was gunning, and an ODA Master Sergeant – ODA 7216's Team Sergeant Clifford Uhrich – was also on board. A large, apparently command-wire (radio-controlled) Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonated against that vehicle and <i>"the blast blew the vehicle over and breached the hull,"</i> causing possible Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) to all 5 soldiers on board (3 ODA, 2 Infantry) - who were medically evacuated by air from the VSP to the military hospital at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) <i>"but were all okay,"</i> according to SSG McLaughlin. The two infantry soldiers were in fact apparently “fine,” but, according to a 2-3 IN medic who treated all five soldiers:</p> <p><i>"We spent a long time waiting in the Med Shed [Medical Shed] for them to come back [from the site of the explosion]. We knew that some people were more shaken up than others. We knew that a few of the ODA guys had a history of TBI. We were looking for that right off the bat. We pretty much did a head-to-toe on anyone who was out there."</i></p> <p>A member of the 2-3 IN chain-of-command (possibly the Company Commander), who was based at FOB Mogensen, within FOB Lagman, in Zabul province, told the CC investigation:</p> <p><i>"There was an MRAP [Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle] at Belambai that got hit with an IED. We had two soldiers that got evacuated from that incident [Redacted]. They were evacuated for TBI screening. They were in all the proper PPE [Personal Protective Equipment], they were seat belted in the vehicle. As a result, both of those Soldiers were ok. They were a little shaken up, but they were fine. Also in that vehicle was the [ODA] team sergeant [MSG Clifford Uhrich]. He was rung pretty well and an 18 Delta [an ODA medic] who had a little more severe TBI signs."</i></p> <p>A sixth soldier, a Sergeant First Class (SFC), was sickened briefly by diesel fumes when he retrieved the “sensitive” items from the damaged vehicle.</p> <p>The blast occurred at an intersection just east of Belamby village, or about 800 meters east of VSP Belamby – and was thus evidently closer to FOB Zangabad (where the crippled vehicle was apparently taken) than to the VSP – in or near a</p>	<p>statement by an ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 122 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216's Assistant Detachment Commander Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 72, Page 6 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 13 March 2012 interview by a CID Special Agent of the 2-3 IN Sergeant hit by the March 5 IED - who was apparently the driver of the vehicle)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 124 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by an ODA Staff Sergeant)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 122 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard, the Assistant Detachment Commander)</p> <p>Three accounts to CID that note the location of FOB Zangabad, relative to VSP Belamby, with reference to the March 5th IED blasts:</p> <p>CID Exhibit 228; PDF Page 937 (In the Quick Reaction Force, or QRF, response from VSP Belamby to the scene of the first IED explosion on March 5th, the QRF members cleared <i>"approximately 800 meters to the East where the IED blast was on the other part of [] our ODA Team,"</i> according to the April 5-6, 2012 sworn statement of the Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class who lost his leg in the second IED blast)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 123; PDF Page 461 (<i>"It occurred just east of the village of Belambai,"</i> according to the March 13 sworn statement of Daniel Fields, Captain of ODA 7216 at VSP Belamby)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 124; PDF Page 465 (<i>"It happened in between here and FOB Zangabad,"</i> according to an Army 7th Special Forces Group Staff Sergeant, in a sworn statement made at VSP Belamby March 14th)</p> <p>CC Exhibit Q? (7 April 2012 sworn statement by the 2-3 IN medic who helped treat VSP personnel who were hit by the March 5th IED blasts, at PDF Page 149)</p> <p>CC Exhibit YY? (30 March 2012 sworn statement by someone with Administrative Control over 2-3 IN</p>
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village the Afghans reportedly call Mokhoyan.

A Quick Reaction Force (QRF) from VSP Belamby responded to the blast, led by a Navy Petty Officer Second Class (PO2), then the VSP's Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team leader, who was named (or known as) Isaac – according to SFC X, who was in the convoy, but not in the vehicle that was hit, and who soon became acting Team Sergeant. ODA soldiers and 2-3 Infantry soldiers were both part of the QRF. By *"clearing the way approximately eight hundred meters to the East where the IED blast was,"* the VSP QRF reached the 5 soldiers.

Having reached the blast site, the EOD team leader (the Navy PO2) then started to clear a wider area to allow safe recovery of the stricken vehicle. While doing so, the Navy PO2 stepped on an anti-personnel, pressure-plate land mine, which detonated (due to the force of his step, rather than by radio signal), resulting in his medical evacuation and the amputation of his left leg below the knee.

Bales *"wasn't involved in that"* [March 5th IED incident], ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields told CID in his sworn statement. Asked by CID if the IED event affected Bales, SSG Jason McLaughlin replied, in his second sworn statement: *"No, but he was upset he did not go out with the Quick Reaction Force (QRF)."* An ODA 7216 SSG told CID in his sworn statement, in reference to the VSP's responses to the IED explosions: *"[Bales] wasn't on either of those patrols, and he was at the base."*

The Navy Petty Officer Second Class who lost his leg March 5th, while leading the EOD team, had arrived at VSP Belamby at the end of January, 2012. He first met Bales at that time, so they knew each other for just over a month. The CID asked the wounded Petty Officer 2 (*aka* Isaac), on April 5, 2012: "Have you had any contact with SSG Bales since you were injured?"

The Petty Officer 2 replied: *"No."*

A Special Forces soldier with ODA 7216, on his fourth Afghanistan deployment, answered as follows in an April 15, 2012 sworn statement, when BG Waddell's CC investigator asked "Are there any other matters that you think may be important to the investigation?"

"Having read the news, there was something that bothered a lot of guys on Belambai. SSG Bales had said that he witnessed his friend being blown up the day before. First of all, it was almost a week before, and secondly he wasn't on that mission

soldiers as part of the Company-level command, then based at Special Operations Advanced Operations Base Trident, a camp within the regular Army's FOB Lagman, Qalat, Zabul province, at PDF Page 285; includes the detail about the pressure-plate IED)

CC Exhibit (30 March 2012 sworn statement by someone with Administrative Control over 2-3 IN soldiers as part of B Company command, at PDF Page 290)

CC Exhibit (15 April 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 soldier on his 4th Afghanistan deployment, at PDF Page 208)

CC Exhibit (14 April 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 soldier, evidently the acting Team Sergeant SFC, at PDF Page 230)

(Number of US casualties via multiple sworn statements to CID Special Agents by US forces, including CID Exhibit 228, at ROI PDF Page 937, by the Navy EOD team leader who stepped on an IED)

("Isaac" as the name of the Navy EOD Petty Officer 2nd Class, who lost his leg to an IED, from the 14 April 2012 sworn statement to the CC investigation by the ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class who was evidently acting Team Sergeant March 11 - *aka* SFC X - at PDF Page 232, where the name was inadvertently left unredacted)

(Soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)

	<p>– either on the primary or the QRF. That did not sit well with anyone.”</p> <p>March 5's IED casualties were the only American casualties incurred by the U.S. forces at VSP Belamby during the 3 months that SSG Bales was stationed there.</p> <p>As part of his sworn statement to a CID Special Agent, ODA 7216 Chief Warrant Officer 2 (CW2) Lance Allard was asked: “What is your position here?” Allard replied:</p> <p><i>“I am the Assistant Detachment Commander currently filling the intelligence slot and running the entire cell.”</i></p> <p>CID then asked CW2 Allard: “Was there any intelligence to indicate the villagers in Alikozai or Naja Bien were responsible for that IED attack?” CW2 Lance Allard replied:</p> <p><i>“No.”</i></p>	
Evening	<p>Local Men Ordered To Gather To Hear U.S. Special Forces Captain</p>	Sources
	<p>For years, a scattered few media reports (one in Spanish, two in English) alone detailed in public – drawing on local Afghan accounts drowned out by the official denials of distant U.S. military spokesmen – a significant event that took place in the (1-2) hours after the March 5, 2012 IED blasts, or just after evening prayers.</p> <p>Those media articles reported that Mokhoyan villagers – some named, some unnamed – saw Afghan troops helping American soldiers pull 10-15 Afghan men from a mosque and homes in Mokhoyan, near the March 5th IED blast site, so that an American soldier could speak to them about the blasts – which he reportedly did for up to an hour, outside, through an Afghan interpreter, as the men stood or sat on the ground near a wall. When this gathering was reported by Kandahar-based Afghan journalist Mirwais Khan for the <i>Associated Press</i> – more than a week after the massacre, following a press conference by Panjwai residents on March 12, and public statements by tribal elders to President Karzai in Kabul on March 16, that both mentioned this event – a U.S. spokesman denied Pentagon knowledge of any such pre-massacre IED blasts, according to the <i>AP</i>:</p> <p><i>“A Pentagon spokesman, Navy Capt. John Kirby, told reporters</i></p>	<p>The three media reports about a post-IED gathering (a Spanish press services article, and <i>Associated Press</i> and Truthout.com articles):</p> <p>http://www.abc.es/20120313/internacional/abci-testigos-matanza-kandahar-201203130833.html</p> <p>http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10154872/print</p> <p>http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/9294-evidence-mounts-that-afghan-massacre-was-linked-to-special-operations-forces-response-to-improvised-explosive-device</p> <p>CC Exhibit HHHH (summary of an 11 April 2012 interview by BG Ricky Waddell of a civilian Category I interpreter, regarding what he saw east of VSP Belamby on March 5th during and after the IED explosions, at PDF Page 464)</p> <p>With regard to interpreter (linguist) categories, Footnote 31 on Page 12 of BG Waddell's CC Investigation Report</p>

that U.S. officials had no indication that such a bombing happened. He also disputed a claim by villagers that U.S. troops lined them up against a wall after the roadside bombing and told them that they would pay a price for it."

According to at least one other media report, however, 7 months later, in November, 2012, *both* March 5 events were confirmed by the sworn testimony of an American soldier at the Bales Article 32 hearing (apparently the transcript of that 2012 Article 32 hearing has still not been publicly released).

In addition to reports of multiple sworn accounts at the Article 32 hearing by U.S. soldiers confirming the IED blasts – about which many soldiers had given sworn statements to CID, and as a result of which 5-6 soldiers had been admitted to KAF's military hospital, before spokesman John Kirby claimed Pentagon ignorance – U.S. Army 7th Special Forces Group E-8 Master Sergeant Clifford Uhrich, one of the soldiers reportedly hit by the first IED, *"said he understood that 20 local men had been rounded up near a mosque and questioned about what they knew"* [regarding the March 5 IED explosions that hit the Petty Officer 2 and Army soldiers] - according to Kim Murphy of the *Los Angeles Times*, in her report from the November, 2012 hearing summarizing the testimony she'd heard.

All three of the Special Forces soldiers in the IED-crippled vehicle, including MSG Clifford Uhrich (the ODA 7216 Team Sergeant), were evidently still under observation at the military hospital on the Kandahar Airfield military base the night of the March 10-11 killings.

There also seems to be public confirmation now by a VSP eyewitness of the March 5th gathering of local men post-IED, and, significantly, the first identification of the U.S. "commander" who two unnamed Afghan witnesses, cited in media reports, said they saw speaking to the Afghan villagers. That identification came from a Category I – meaning a citizen or resident of the U.S. or an allied nation – civilian interpreter based at VSP Belamby (who went to the site of the IED blasts to interpret for the Special Forces), during a Command Climate investigation interview on April 11, 2012 with BG Waddell himself, according to Waddell's brief summary of that interview:

"Immediately following the IED incident on 5 March, [Redacted, a Category I civilian interpreter] accompanied the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to the site to interpret for the ODA. During this incident, he witnessed the ODA Team Leader, [Redacted/Captain Daniel Fields] speaking to the local villagers about supporting the government."

Findings, at PDF Page 15, notes that: *"CAT I linguists are either citizens or permanent residents of the US or 5 eyes partner nations"*

(Soldier names and MSG Uhrich testimony via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)



THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012

8:00 AM to 2:00 PM	SSG Bales Joined A Patrol To Forward Operating Base Zangabad, Then Helped Bomb A Tree	Sources
	<p>SSG Bales traveled to and from FOB Zangabad on Thursday, March 8th, as part of a dismounted (foot) patrol from VSP Belamby that was accompanied by two "RG" mine-resistant armored trucks, in one of which Bales traveled – as described by the plan of operations approved by the Advanced Operations Base (AOB) for ODA 7216 at Camp Simmons, KAF:</p> <p><i>"AT 0800D, PATROL WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER TO THE EAST UNTIL REACHING THE SOUTHWEST GATE AT FOB ZANGABAD. UPON ARRIVAL AT FOB ZANGABAD, PATROL WILL CALL TIME OUT."</i></p>	<p>CC Exhibit TTT (CONOP for March 8, 2012 patrol, at CC PDF Pages 399-400)</p> <p>August, 2013 Bales Sentencing Hearing Transcript, various pages</p> <p>Aerial map distances, and aerial views of the locations of attacked homes and VSP Belamby, made possible by Afghan reporter Mamoon Durrani's invaluable on-site Zangabad research</p>

WHILE TIMED OUT, ODA LEADERSHIP WILL MEET WITH BSO [BATTLE SPACE OWNER] LEADERSHIP TO DISCUSS FUTURE OPERATIONS. UPON COMPLETION, PATROL WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE IN THE SAME MOVEMENT FORMATION TO VSP BELAMBAI."

According to the Timeline of the AOB-approved plan, that 1 KM walk took 1 hour to complete each way, meaning that the VSP patrol, including SSG Bales, was scheduled to be inside FOB Zangabad from 9:00 AM until 1:00 PM on Thursday, March 8, 2012, while the ODA leadership was meeting with (conventional Army) FOB leadership.

One of the objectives of that trip to FOB Zangabad, if an unsworn, un-cross-examined statement Robert Bales made at his August, 2013 sentencing hearing (Transcript Page 926) is to be believed, was to salvage parts from the VSP truck or MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle) that was crippled by the first March 5th IED explosion, and had apparently been taken to FOB Zangabad after the blast, not to VSP Belamby (in part because the FOB was as close, or closer, to the site of the explosion as the VSP). Bales told his sentencing jury/military panel that *"we parted it out as much as we could, you know, we removed the remote weapons station, took wiring harnesses out of the truck to try to get spare parts."*

So that work could account for some or all of the time that Bales spent on-site at FOB Zangabad that day. Subsequently, on the way back to the VSP that afternoon, the Special Forces and 2-3 Infantry soldiers on the patrol apparently collectively decided to take down a large tree along the road that they suspected of being used as a marker tree for the detonation of command-wire IEDs, such as the first one that hit the VSP convoy three days earlier. When their chainsaw couldn't handle the tree, they blew it up, instead, at the suggestion of an ODA 7216 engineer, Bales claimed at his sentencing hearing. Then the last truck in that day's patrol – with Bales aboard, and driven by PFC Derek Guinn until Bales angrily replaced him – dragged the tree into the VSP, after some tense delay because the tree had fallen the wrong way, blocking the road. Bales also claimed (Transcript Page 930) that later, possibly on Saturday, March 10th, he spent up to six daylight hours cutting up that tree before it was burned – although it was *"too big to put in our little fire pit"* in the main VSP compound – in *"the huge burn pit at the other place over on the other side"* – apparently meaning the walled open area (including a relatively-new firing range) that was connected to the main VSP Belamby compound by an opening large enough for vehicle access just northeast of the U.S. Operations Center.

	<p>The explosive(s) that the U.S. soldiers used to topple that large tree on March 8th may explain the confusion in media reports about the timing of the IED blasts (media accounts, including from the Article 32 hearing, generally list March 8th as the day of the blasts). It appears now that there was actually a U.S.-generated blast or blasts on March 8th in the same vicinity, subsequent to the original March 5th IED blasts that struck the VSP convoy and the leg of the Navy Petty Officer 2.</p>	
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FRIDAY, MARCH 9, 2012

Between 5:00 AM and 6:00 AM	Video of War Dead Viewed On The Personal Computer Of SSG Bales	Sources
	<p>The U.S. Army's Criminal Investigation Laboratory used computer forensics to examine multiple hard drives belonging to the Bales family. The personal Hewlett-Packard (HP) laptop computer of Robert Bales was the laptop Bales tried to destroy upon his return to VSP Belamby near dawn on March 11th. While under guard in the Medical Shed, or MedShed, Bales asked for, and was given, his personal HP laptop, and apparently operated the computer for a period of time before shutting it down. After using the laptop, Bales tried to damage it by breaking off its screen and stepping on it. <i>"Due to the physical damage"</i> to that laptop, <i>"the system clock could not be verified,"</i> the Army lab reported, while noting that the laptop's <i>"time zone was set to Pacific Standard Time."</i> All times the lab lists for the HP laptop's hard drive reflect Pacific Standard Time (the time at JBLM in Washington state) – or 12.5 hours earlier, in March, than local time at VSP Belamby in Kandahar province, Afghanistan. <i>"The last shutdown date [for Digital Evidence Exhibit 30.1, the Bales HP laptop's hard drive] was 03/10/2012 05:13:39 PM" PST,</i> the lab stated – or, if the system clock was in fact accurate despite the damage to the computer, about 5:45 AM, local Kandahar time, on March 11, 2012.</p> <p>On the hard drive of the HP laptop belonging to Robert Bales, the Army lab <i>"found seventeen (17) videos of dead bodies/human remains in a war zone. These videos appear to have been created in February 2007. A keyword search conducted during the examination showed these videos were</i></p>	<p>CID Exhibit 291 (28 June 2012 Computer Forensics Exam Digital Evidence Report from the US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory; see #3, #6, and #7 under Results of Examination, and the Digital Evidence Exhibit List on Page 4)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 23 (Evidence Custody Document No. 227-12, listing the damaged HP laptop, Item Number 1, that CID obtained "From a trash bag on the floor inside the medical shed on VSP Belamby")</p> <p>CID Exhibit 237 (Evidence Custody Document No. 170-12, listing the electronic media by Item Number, including the 500 GB External Seagate Hard Drive, that CID obtained from "Various locations, Bldg 2613, Kattawa Village, JBLM")</p> <p>CID Exhibit 20 (11 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report of their Recovery Scene Examination of the VSP Belamby Medical Shed)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 21 (11 March 2012 CID Photograph Packet documenting the Medical Shed scene, including photos of the damaged HP laptop at PDF Pages 83-86)</p>

	<p><i>knowingly in the possession of the user as the filenames were located in media player library files. In addition, the video 'CLIP0030.ASF' was viewed on 03/08/2012 at 04:44:17PM PST" - or, if the system clock was accurate, at about 5:15 AM, local time at VSP Belamby, on Friday, March 9, 2012.</i></p> <p>[February, 2007 was just after the January 28-29, 2007 "Battle of Zarqa" in Iraq, at which Robert Bales was present, as Major Brent Clemmer (starting on Transcript Page 839) and Sergeant First Class Timothy Farris (starting on Transcript Page 889) testified for the defense at the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing. At least 250 Iraqis – men, women, and children – were killed during that battle, in a village, or at some sort of entrenched base-compound fighting position, and most of the Iraqi victims' bodies were burned or mutilated during the overnight bombardment by U.S. air and ground forces.]</p> <p>The Army forensics report states that the same 17 video files of [presumably Iraqi] war dead found on the Bales HP laptop were found on a 500 GB external Seagate hard drive (Digital Evidence Exhibit 155) that CID obtained from the temporary living quarters of the wife of Robert Bales, at JBLM in Washington state, on March 16, 2012. In addition to the 17 videos, the Seagate external hard drive found at JBLM contained "133 pictures" of "dead bodies/human remains in a war zone."</p>	
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SATURDAY, MARCH 10, 2012

Evening	SSG Bales Criticized The U.S. Army's Rules Of Engagement	Sources
	<p>Bales was discussing the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the U.S. military in Afghanistan, near the small VSP Belamby fire pit (next to the Operations Center) on the evening of March 10th, when a Special Forces Sergeant First Class (a SFC apparently known as "Iggy," from the 7th Special Forces Group's Group Support Battalion) approached Bales, and joined in the conversation. They continued the discussion for about 10 minutes, and agreed that the ROE were now too restrictive, a fact about which "everyone was frustrated," Iggy told CID. That SFC handled a dog housed at VSP Belamby. Two</p>	<p>CID Exhibits 114 & 319 (11 March 2012 and 8 November 2012 sworn statements by the Sergeant First Class from the Group Support Battalion of the 7th Special Forces Group)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 321 (An 8 November 2012 sketch drawn by the same Special Forces Group Support Battalion Sergeant First Class, showing the locations of the small fire pit and dog kennel relative to the Operations Center</p>

	<p>weeks earlier, Bales was loaned a Heckler & Koch 9mm pistol owned by the same SFC, to carry as protection against any insider attacks by their Afghan Security Forces colleagues. The SFC personally trained Bales in the pistol's use before loaning it to him, after a Special Forces teleconference directed that all extra sidearms be shared with infantry soldiers, upon completion of a firing-range class.</p> <p>As that dog-handling SFC soldier from the Group Support Battalion of 7th Special Forces Group told CID in his second sworn statement, made November 8, 2012, at a Best Western hotel in Peru, Indiana:</p> <p><i>"I can't remember the exact time frame that I gave BOB the [Heckler & Koch 9mm] weapon, but I remember the day prior to the incident involving him, I saw him at the fire pit on the VSO [VSP Belamby] and when I approached him I remember him discussing the Rules of Engagement. It was a topic that most of us talked about a lot, because of how it's changed since like 2008. It's more restricted on what someone can do and everyone was frustrated about it."</i></p> <p>The senior NCO of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, First Sergeant (1SG) Vernon Bigham, who knew Bales well from JBLM, testified as follows at the Article 32 hearing, according to Kim Murphy of the <i>Los Angeles Times</i>:</p> <p><i>"[SSG] Bales expressed a distinct difference between how 3rd Group operated and how 7th Group operated, and he actually liked working under 3rd Group better, and that's because 3rd Group was more aggressive, and 7th Group was more passive?"</i> the prosecutor inquired.</p> <p>Bigham agreed."</p>	<p>at VSP Belamby)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 33 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by 2-3 Infantry Sergeant and squad leader David Godwin)</p> <p>(Bigham's name and testimony via media reports from the November, 2012 Article 32 hearing)</p> <p>("Iggy" name via CID Exhibit 33, a 13 March 2012 sworn statement by 2-3 Infantry SGT Godwin)</p> <p>NOTE: CID caught SGT Godwin lying to them during a 13 March 2012 interview (see CID Exhibit 44, Pages 3-4) that took place after Godwin's 12 March 2012 sworn statement (CID Exhibit 75), but before his 13 March 2012 sworn statement (CID Exhibit 33). Both SGT Godwin and SSG McLaughlin had their belongings searched, and on March 13 were flown by CID from VSP Belamby to Kandahar Airfield for further investigation. By November, 2012, both infantry soldiers had been demoted (Godwin to Corporal, McLaughlin to Sergeant)</p>
9:00 PM or 10:00 PM	SSG Bales Guard Duty At VSP Belamby Ended	Sources
	<p>There are at least four sworn statements to CID Special Agents stating the time that SSG Robert Bales was on guard duty at VSP Belamby the night of Saturday, March 10, 2012, on the roof of VSP Belamby's U.S. Operations Center. Two of the statements say that Bales guarded the base from 8:00 PM to 9:00 PM, local time (2000-2100, per the Private First Class on guard duty with Bales, and a Specialist who relieved them). The other two statements say that Bales was on guard duty from 9:00 PM to 10:00 PM (2100-2200, per Sergeant David</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 80 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by a 2-3 Infantry Private First Class who had guard duty with Bales that evening)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 79 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by a 2-3 Infantry Specialist who had guard duty after Bales, and was briefed by him about events observed during the preceding hour of guard duty)</p>

	<p>Godwin, who Bales relieved, and per ODA Staff Sergeant Derek King, who didn't know who was on guard duty with Bales that night, but told CID <i>"I know that [Bales] was on guard from 2100-2200"</i>).</p> <p>Apparently due to that conflict in timing (CID had received the 4 differing accounts by March 14), CID on March 17 had a VSP Belamby Sergeant question all the VSP soldiers to reconstruct who was on each guard shift the night of March 10-11. The result was written down and photographed. However, that photograph, shown in CID Exhibit 191, has had all the names redacted from it, so the public record remains unclear. [The correct hour of the last Bales guard shift may be included in the 30 pages of Stipulated Facts – facts uncontested by either side – that were read aloud during the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing, pursuant to the plea deal agreement. However that 2013 Stipulation of Facts, which the Army released to the media by 2015, apparently has yet to be released to the public by the media.] The CID Agent's Investigation Report that revealed these details does clarify that every guard shift on the Operations Center roof (where the primary American guard post at VSP Belamby was evidently located) lasted one hour, while one soldier had a 12-hour (sleeping or on-call) shift inside the Operations Center.</p> <p>Whether at 9:00 PM or 10:00 PM, Bales was clearly relieved on schedule, March 10, from his final shift of VSP Belamby guard duty, after one hour on the Operations Center roof.</p> <p>CID asked the 2-3 Infantry Specialist (SPC), who relieved Bales from Operations Center roof guard duty that night, whether U.S. soldiers "can see the front gate from the roof" of the Operations Center. The SPC replied: <i>"We can't see the gate itself but you can see the road in front of the gate."</i></p>	<p>CID Exhibit 33 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by 2-3 Infantry Sergeant David Godwin)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 52 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA Staff Sergeant Derek King)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 182, Page 4 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of the guard roster reconstruction conducted on March 17th)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 191 (A redacted photograph of 17 March 2012's reconstructed guard roster for the night of March 10-March 11)</p> <p>(Soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)</p>
11:00 PM	Movie-Watching, With Drinking, Concluded	Sources
	<p>3rd Squad Leader and self-appointed acting Platoon Sergeant SSG Bales, 1st Squad Leader SSG McLaughlin, and substitute 3rd Squad Leader SGT David Godwin parted ways after drinking Jack Daniels whiskey mixed with Diet Pepsi, and Captain Morgan rum (both provided by Godwin), while they watched the Denzel Washington movie "Man on Fire" in McLaughlin's room, starting at about 9:00 PM March 10th. McLaughlin was scheduled for guard duty at 3:00 AM and by 11:00 PM wanted to get some sleep. Godwin indicated that Bales may have joined the other two while the movie was underway, or at</p>	<p>CID Exhibits 115 & 156 (11 March 2012 and 13 March 2012 sworn statements by SSG McLaughlin)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 33 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by SGT Godwin)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 228 (5 April 2012 sworn statement by the Navy Petty Officer Second Class who lost his leg in the second IED explosion)</p>

about 10 PM, particularly if his guard duty ended then, rather than at 9 PM. McLaughlin told CID that Bales began watching the movie with them at 9:00 PM. Godwin told CID that at 11:00 PM neither Bales nor McLaughlin *"appeared to be intoxicated."* McLaughlin told CID that when Bales left McLaughlin's room *"I would say he had a good buzz. He wasn't stumbling or slurring his words."*

NOTE: Bales and David Godwin had been acquainted since 2008, and previously served together in Iraq. Jason "Mac" McLaughlin had been acquainted with Bales for about a year and a half (and had apparently shared a room with Bales when they first arrived at VSP Belamby). CID caught SGT Godwin lying to them during a 13 March 2012 interview (see CID Exhibit 44, Pages 3-4) that took place after Godwin's 12 March 2012 sworn statement (CID Exhibit 75), but before his 13 March 2012 sworn statement (CID Exhibit 33). Both SGT Godwin and SSG McLaughlin had their belongings searched, and were flown by CID from VSP Belamby to Kandahar Airfield on March 13 for further investigation. By the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing, both 2-3 Infantry soldiers had been demoted (Godwin to Corporal, McLaughlin to Sergeant), apparently for admittedly drinking alcohol while in Afghanistan, in violation of a military order (CENTCOM General Order Number 1B). CPL Godwin (and perhaps SGT McLaughlin) reportedly received immunity from military prosecutors for his Article 32 testimony. By the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing, both McLaughlin and Godwin had returned to civilian life.

SSG McLaughlin was asked by CID to describe the appearance of SSG Bales, and described Robert Bales this way:

"Male, White, 5', 8", 220 pounds, balding reddish blond hair, red beard, about [redacted]."

The Navy Petty Officer Second Class and Explosive Ordnance Disposal team leader who lost his leg in the March 5th pressure-plate IED explosion, was asked by CID to describe both SSG McLaughlin and SGT Godwin.

The IED-wounded PO2 EOD team leader described SSG Jason "Mac" McLaughlin as:

"5 foot 9 inches, Caucasian, dark hair, high and tight haircut with a beard, skinny, athletic, in shape."

The same IED-wounded PO2 EOD team leader described SGT David Godwin as:

("Isaac" as the name of the Naval EOD Petty Officer 2nd Class, who lost his leg to an IED, from the 14 April 2012 sworn statement to the CC investigation by the ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class who was evidently acting Team Sergeant - aka SFC X - at PDF Page 232, where the name was inadvertently left unredacted)

The news article from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing, by Adam Ashton of *The News Tribune*, which reported that *"soldiers at the [VSP Belamby] outpost had been growing beards, and the [2-3 IN] sergeant should have had a month's worth of growth on his face"*:

<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/crime/article24740128.html>

CC Exhibit LLLL (Central Command General Order Number 1B, or GO-1B, forbidding the consumption of alcohol in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at PDF Pages 468-473)

(Soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)

	<p>A "big guy, 6 foot 2 inches, 220-230 lbs, I think that he was from [Redacted] he had just come back to country because his baby had just been born."</p> <p>(All the soldiers at VSP Belamby had been growing beards for at least a month, according to a media report from the Article 32 hearing.)</p>	
<p>Between 11:00 PM and 12:00 AM</p>	<p>Special Forces Sergeant First Class Blackshear Awakened By SSG Bales</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeant First Class (SFC) Clayton Blackshear reportedly testified in November, 2012 that SSG Bales entered his room, while Blackshear was trying to sleep, sometime before midnight on March 10. <i>"A figure came in and sat down on the chair. I recognized the figure ... it was Sgt. Bales,"</i> he said, according to Kim Murphy of the <i>Los Angeles Times</i>.</p> <p>Bales reportedly began complaining about the lack of response to the IED attack on the VSP Belamby convoy the preceding Monday, March 5 (<i>"He expressed quite a bit of concern about, I guess, the [camp's] actions after the incidents that we hadn't done enough, or wanted to do more to try to find the people that were responsible,"</i> Blackshear said, according to Kim Murphy), and said that he wanted Blackshear's Special Forces job, and more responsibility on patrols. <i>"He basically didn't care if he made it back home to them,"</i> Blackshear also testified, summarizing Bales complaining about his family life to Blackshear, according to Kim Murphy's report for the <i>Los Angeles Times</i>.</p> <p>Bales and Blackshear reportedly spoke for about 10 minutes. Blackshear also reportedly received immunity from military prosecutors for his Article 32 testimony, before testifying that he often had a couple of drinks before bedtime, despite his combat deployment in an Islamic country, and sometimes ground up and snorted Valium because he had trouble sleeping.</p>	<p>Media reports of Blackshear's November 5, 2012 testimony at the Bales Article 32 hearing</p> <p>CID Exhibit 81 (12 March 2012 sworn statement that seems to be by ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class Clayton Blackshear, that doesn't mention the late-night March 10 conversation he had with Bales)</p> <p>(Blackshear's name via media reports from the Article 32 hearing)</p> <p>Blackshear's LinkedIn page: https://www.linkedin.com/pub/clayton-blackshear/70/563/580</p>



SATURDAY EVENING, MARCH 10, 2012
to
SUNDAY MORNING, MARCH 11, 2012

	<p style="text-align: center;">Guarding Village Stability Platform Belamby</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Sources</p>
	<p>There are a number of important photographs of VSP Belamby left unredacted in CID's now publicly-released (if heavily-redacted) Report of Investigation (ROI), and in BG Waddell's redacted AR 15-6 Command Climate (CC) report. However, very few written descriptions of the precise location of the pertinent ANA guard tower(s) and VSP gate are contained in the released ROI and AR 15-6. The CID photographs may confuse, more than clarify, with regard to the precise location of the guard tower and gate at which ANA guards witnessed</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 126 (14 March 2012 CID Photo Packet, with an index, documenting certain locations at VSP Belamby, as of about 11:00 AM that day per CID Exhibit 111, Page 16)</p> <p>CC Exhibit CCCC, Enclosure 4 (27 March 2012 photos of VSP Belamby taken by BG Waddell's investigation team during a site visit, at PDF Pages 426-437)</p>

	<p>activity that night. But after studying the sworn statements, and the CID and CC photographs of the base, as well as media footage taken in and around the VSP that day, these seem to be accurate statements or observations about VSP Belamby at that time:</p> <p>The only vehicle gate into or out of the VSP (excluding the opening at the northeast side of the base into a connecting walled compound to the east) appears to be near the southwest corner of the compound, in the southern wall that fronts on the east-west gravel road that's known to the U.S. Army as Route Charlottetown or Route Charlotte Town. The gate's location was diagonally across the main VSP from the primary U.S. guard post, located on the roof of the U.S. Operations Center (more or less the base HQ, as one soldier described it), which was located close to the northeast corner of the main compound. The distance between the two (the southern gate and the U.S. Operations Center) was apparently about a football field (or about 100 meters) in length.</p> <p>The ANA-occupied part of the walled VSP compound was the eastern side of the southern half, abutting Route Charlottetown – and ANA structures may have been among those in the center of the southern half of the compound, as well, still east of the VSP Belamby gate and entryway.</p> <p>On the flat roof of a two-story building on the eastern side of its section, next to an Afghan flag, and north of the public road, the ANA had a covered, sandbagged wooden guard tower that gave a clear view of the road in front of the base, particularly toward the east (see Exhibit 126 at PDF Page 476).</p> <p>A short distance to the south and west of the two-story building, on top of gravel-filled Hesco barriers making up part of the southern wall of the VSP, was an uncovered ANA guard post next to another Afghan flag (see Exhibit 126 at PDF Page 478 and PDF Page 488). That post, right on the public road, gave a clear view of that (gravel) road east and west, and could see pretty clearly, to its west, where the south-facing VSP gate intersected with that road. However, from this location, Hesco barriers at the gate seem to entirely block the view of the gate barrier itself (see Exhibit 126 at PDF Page 473; and the Army and media photos linked in Sources). It appears that anyone entering or leaving the gate would not have heard guards at this ANA location (and vice versa) unless they were shouting quite loudly, and might not have been visible at all at night to the guards at this post, if someone on foot stayed close to the wall of the VSP while walking west from the gate (or east toward the gate).</p>	<p>Aerial map distances, and aerial views of the locations of attacked homes and VSP Belamby, made possible by Afghan reporter Mamoon Durrani's invaluable on-site Zangabad research</p> <p>CID Exhibit 123 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by the Special Forces Commander of ODA 7216, Captain Daniel Fields)</p> <p>CC Exhibit (15 April 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields, at PDF Page 213)</p> <p>(ODA 7216 Captain's name via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 5 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of ANA 205th Battalion Private Naimatullah's 12 March 2012 interview by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, as interpreted by a civilian working for ODA/Special Forces)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 127 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by a civilian Afghan interpreter working for ODA 7216)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 46 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by a 2-3 IN Specialist in 3rd Squad)</p> <p>CC Exhibit Q? (7 April 2012 sworn statement by a 2-3 IN medic noting that VSP Belamby had never received incoming fire at night, throughout the time both ODA 3232 and ODA 7216 had run the VSP, at PDF Page 149)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 73 (Evidence Custody Document No. 159-13, detailing the 21 pieces of evidence taken from Robert Bales on March 11, 2012)</p> <p>CC Exhibit CCCC (8 April 2012 Memorandum For Record, containing a Summary of Site Visit, to VSP Belamby, by BG Waddell and his investigation team, at PDF Pages 423-424)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 122 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard, in which he states that, at about 4:15 AM, while Bales was AWOL and Allard was preparing a QRF patrol to search for him, he and three ANA soldiers and an interpreter searched <i>"the building right across the road from the VSP site, which is a clinic</i></p>
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The blue building, across the public road, whose eastern edge is due south of the VSP Belamby gate is evidently the "clinic" and school apparently built or renovated by VSP Belamby troops during 2011-2012 (see CID photos in Exhibit 126 at PDF Page 488 and PDF Pages 491 & 492). VSP Belamby itself had only recently been carved out of agricultural fields next to some pre-existing walls and buildings (which were re-purposed and supplemented or surrounded by earth-filled Hesco barriers, trucked-in containers and Army-built barracks).

Barely visible in CID photographs (but somewhat more visible in one Army CC photo and some media footage) is what appears to be a guard post, or some similar sort of structure, adjacent to the west side of the VSP gate, with some overhead protection (metal and/or wood; see CID Exhibit 126 at PDF Page 473, just to the right of the right-side redaction, and CID PDF Page 488). That location appears to be within Hesco barriers just to the west of the gate, probably at ground level near the road, and would permit the sort of detailed observations of gate activity that the ANA guards reported that night. That gate structure can be seen more clearly in Command Climate Exhibit CCCC at PDF Page 434 – which is a photo taken from the uncovered ANA post that was apparently manned that night, looking toward the VSP gate to its west. That gate location would likely enable a guard to see someone coming onto the road from an "alley," or from the north-south road just to the west of the VSP's nearby western wall – which guards in the ANA post further east (or on the two-story ANA building) seem unlikely to have been able to clearly discern at night (the gate itself was unlighted, according to BG Waddell's findings).

The CID photos reveal that sets of cameras were placed at two of these locations during (at least) daylight hours. Two (side-by-side) cameras are visible at the uncovered ANA post on the southern wall east of the gate (see Exhibit 126 at PDF Pages 472 & 478), and two cameras (one above the other) are visible on the southern wall just east of and adjacent to the gate, where there was no guard post (see Exhibit 126 at PDF Pages 492 & 491). (CID index descriptions of the VSP photos in Exhibit 126 note that the cameras at the ANA post are placed there only during daytime, but do not include that information in the description of the gate-cameras photo. The CC report indicates that all such cameras may have been used in the daytime only.)

Although seemingly logical, given known facts, the focus of the VSP photos in the redacted CID Report of Investigation, and the details from BG Waddell's CC investigation both indicate that ANA guard Naimatullah and later ANA guard Tosh Ali were

and madrassa that the prior team had started and completed since our arrival")

CID Exhibit 203 (28 March 2012 sworn statement by a U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer at Fort Gordon, Georgia, noting that VSP Belamby "was a grape field" - as well as an orchard, based on pre-2011 [aerial photos](#) - before being bulldozed for a military base by the joint campaigns of NATO-run ISAF, and the U.S. Congress via Operation Enduring Freedom)

Five photographs that show the limited view of the VSP Belamby gate as seen from within the lower ANA guard post that was apparently manned the night of March 10-11, 2012:

http://www.corriere.it/gallery/esteri/03-2012/afghanistan-soldati-usa-strage/01/afghanistan-vittime-strage_959cac22-6ba6-11e1-a02c-63a438fc3a4e.shtml#2

http://i.huffpost.com/gadgets/slideshows/213693/slide_213693_772978_free.jpg

http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2012/03/11/world/asia/12afghanistan-ss-8.html?_r=0

http://images2.corriereobjects.it/gallery/Esteri/2012/03_Marzo/afghanistan-soldati-usa-strage/01/img_01/afg_03_672-458_resize.jpg?v=20120311193435

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/march_27_2012_view_showing_the_distance_between_manne_d_ana_post_and_vsp_belamby_gate_from_usarmy_ar_15_6_report.jpg

not posted on the west side of the VSP gate itself that night.

A manned guard location west of the VSP gate might have explained why no US soldiers on the Operations Center roof that night seem to have reported hearing shouts from across the base by Afghan guards. At the gate itself not much of a shout would be necessary to get the attention of someone at the gate, and the gate is lower and further from the Operations Center than the ANA guard posts east of the gate.

A gate-guard location would also seemingly align with ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields's description of the gate and guard post in his sworn statement to CID (unless, that is, an American had walked by the ANA guard post from the east or southeast, rather than from the west):

"PFC [Redacted/Guinn] stated that the ANA told him that an American had walked by the southern ANA guard tower outside the compound and then walked into the compound."

And would align with the ODA 7216 interpreter's sworn statement. He said, in English:

"...the guard who saw the exit...told me that the guard before him...told him that [Redacted/Naimatullah] saw an U.S. soldier come in from the west side street."

And would align with this part of ANA guard Naimatullah's interpreted account, as summarized by CID:

Naimatullah "provided a verbal statement that he was working on shift between 2400-0200, 11 Mar 12, when at about 0130 he saw a Soldier coming from the alley outside of the gate."

However, and significantly, a (ground-level) gate-guard location does *not* appear to align with this part of Private Naimatullah's interpreted account, given a bit later in the same interview, in which Naimatullah:

"stated he was in the guard tower per his protocol, and not at the gate."

When asked by CID "What tower did you and the ANA soldier go into [to talk to guard Tosh Ali after he reported an exiting soldier]," the civilian ODA interpreter replied in English:

"The tower close to the gate, at south corner of the ANA Comp[ound]."

A gate-guard location would also seemingly conflict with the

most descriptive of four accounts to CID, given by a US Army Specialist (of 3rd Squad, 2-3 IN) on March 12, when CID asked "Who mans the gate?":

"Afghan National Army (ANA) members man the gate until about 0500 [5:00 AM] everyday. There were also two ANA towers that watch the road named Charlotte Town. One watches the east and one watches the west."

Then the same 3rd Squad Specialist added:

"I heard that one tower saw an American come [in] the gate with a pistol and leave the gate with a pistol and a rifle."

CID had that US Army Specialist clarify that there is no other way in or out of the VSP, except by going over the walls – most of which had concertina wire on them (some held in place by sandbags). The CID photos reveal that it probably wouldn't have taken much to find a place to get over a wall without much effort, while avoiding the wire and any guards along the south side of the base.

The gate itself, based on the CID photos taken March 14, 2012, and March 11 Afghan media footage, had only a wooden bar with concertina wire wound around it blocking access to the road. If a soldier stepped over that, or went over a wired wall, instead of going around the gate barricade, or going over a wall without wire, it might cause a tear in the crotch of their pants like the tear that fellow soldiers reported seeing, and CID documented in text and a (redacted) photo, in the pants of Bales upon his pre-dawn return. The Evidence Custody Document detailing the clothing and equipment taken from Bales upon his return to the VSP described the condition of the pants Bales was wearing this way:

"Pants; OCP pattern; size large-long; the left front pocket contained a matchbox containing foreign language on the front and "Made in Pakistan" on the back, the matchbox contained approximately 11 un-struck matches; there was a large tear along the seam near the groin area; there was red in color stains located near and around the groin area, the front of the right and left legs, and on the buttocks area."

A 2-3 IN medic, interviewed in April, 2012 for the Command Climate investigation, obviously thought that the VSP's perimeter was no serious bar to a soldier wishing to leave, and also seems to describe a guard post right at the gate:

"When they built that base, they built it to keep people out, not to keep people in. If someone wants to leave that base,

you can probably leave that base at any point in the perimeter. Some places are easier than others. If you went to the northwest, northeast or southwest corners of the compound, you could get out pretty quick over the corners. When we originally got here, our burn pit was on the northwest corner. Now that is gone, [redacted.] Same thing with the northeast. In the southwest corner, you have the ANA on the gate but behind that you have the ramp that we pull the RGs [armored trucks] up on. It would be pretty easy to get over that."

The observations herein seem to be basically confirmed by Exhibit CCCC of BG Waddell's Command Climate investigation, in which his Site Visit Summary states:

"The gate itself at the ECP [Entry Control Point] is a wooden beam, wrapped in barbed wire. According to [Redacted,] on the night of the incident a person could have walked around the beam on either the east or west side. If the person chose to stick closely to the west wall of the gate, and exited on the west side of the beam, that person would be difficult to see from either the OPCEN roof or the ANA tower, particularly in the dark [See Photo 10]."

Finally, a sworn account given to the CC investigation by the "Team Leader" - or ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields - contains this April 15, 2012 exchange with a CC investigator:

"Q: How could someone have left the compound without being seen?"

"A: We didn't put Afghans on the gate at night. *That was a risk that I assumed based off of the enemy TTPs [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures]. We had never seen anything at night, and [redacted] I put ANA in the tower instead, where they still had visibility of the gate."* [Last clause hand-written.]

"Q: So somebody could have left through the gate at night by sneaking past the ANA?"

"A: Yes. *They are focused outward primarily."*

[As Captain Fields references in his first answer, neither ODA 3232 nor ODA 7216 had ever received incoming fire at night targeting VSP Belamby.]

If there was in fact no one manning the guard post (or at ground-level) at the VSP gate itself that night, it appears, based on the descriptions above and other details, that the "tower" in use that night was the uncovered ANA post more or

	<p>less in the center of the southern wall of the main VSP compound, east of the south-facing VSP Belamby gate.</p> <p>As BG Waddell concluded, on Page 34 of his AR 15-6 report (PDF Page 37):</p> <p><i>"The guard mount and other procedures were not sufficient to prevent a person from leaving the VSP, which was considered a non-existent threat."</i></p>	
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SUNDAY, MARCH 11, 2012

1:20 AM	U.S. Guards Heard Sporadic Gunfire Begin North Of VSP Belamby	Sources
	<p>Two U.S. Army soldiers (2-3 IN PFC Damian Blodgett and 2-3 IN PFC Derek Guinn), who were on guard duty from 1:00 AM until 1:50 AM on the roof of VSP Belamby's Operations Center, began to hear shots being fired north of the base at about this time (northeast and <i>"relatively close,"</i> per Guinn; about 400 meters north, per Blodgett). When the firing commenced, Blodgett reported the gunfire to the Army Specialist on overnight guard duty inside the Operations Center.</p> <p>In a still-unexplained timing conflict, a U.S. Army 2-3 IN Specialist on <i>"a sleeping post"</i> at the VSP during the night of March 10-11 told CID in an interview, as summarized, that he was awakened <i>"and was informed there was shooting off of VSP, but stated none of the gunfire was directed at the VSP"</i> - at <i>"2300,"</i> or 11:00 PM, March 10th, not at about 0130 the morning of March 11th. No follow-up, or sworn, statement by that Army Specialist seems to be included in CID's Report of Investigation.</p> <p>CID instead simply noted that no routine record of that type of incident report was made or maintained by VSP Belamby's Operations Center, according to a VSP soldier (apparently ODA 7216's Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard):</p> <p><i>"...it was identified the guard shifts do not record any significant activity, such as the gunshots reported by the Soldiers, as those types of incidents occurred often."</i></p> <p>As noted above, VSP Belamby itself had never been fired upon during the night.</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 76 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by PFC Blodgett)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 116 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by PFC Guinn)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 44, Page 1 (12 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a brief CID interview of the 2-3 Infantry Specialist who was on overnight guard duty inside the Operations Center March 10-11)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 10 (5:50 PM, 12 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a conversation, apparently with ODA 7216 CW2 Lance Allard, stating that <i>"it was identified the guard shifts do not record any significant activity, such as the gunshots reported by the Soldiers, as those types of incidents occurred often."</i>)</p> <p>CC Exhibit Q? (7 April 2012 sworn statement by a 2-3 IN medic noting that VSP Belamby had never received incoming fire at night, throughout the time both ODA 3232 and ODA 7216 had run the VSP, at PDF Page 149)</p> <p>(Soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)</p>

1:30 AM	Afghan Guard Saw A U.S. Soldier Enter VSP Belamby On Foot	Sources
	<p>Afghan National Army (ANA) Private (PVT) Naimatullah (<i>aka</i> Nematullah), who was on guard duty in an ANA guard post from 12:00 AM to 2:00 AM that night, told CID that he saw an American soldier walk into the south-facing gate of VSP Belamby <i>"from the alley outside of the gate"</i> (or <i>"from the west side street,"</i> per an Afghan interpreter for the Special Forces in a sworn statement in English). According to <i>"protocol,"</i> Naimatullah was on guard duty <i>"not at the gate"</i> but in an Afghan-manned guard tower, he told CID – if not at the gate, then evidently at the uncovered post that's east of the south-facing VSP gate. That ANA post was south of the U.S. Operations Center building, and near the center of the southern wall of the VSP compound, beside the east-west road running along the VSP's southern wall.</p> <p>At the Bales Article 32 hearing in November, 2012, Naimatullah reportedly testified, by live-feed from Kandahar city, that he checked his watch when the soldier entered and is sure of the time. According to an account by Kim Murphy of the <i>Los Angeles Times</i>, Naimatullah testified, as interpreted, that:</p> <p><i>"I was shocked and also I was nervous. I can't believe that the guy was coming this way."</i></p> <p>Naimatullah <i>"yelled"</i> at the soldier (several times, to tell him to stop, according to reports of his Article 32 testimony), but the soldier (who <i>"seemed nervous"</i> and was hurried, according to reports of Naimatullah's Article 32 testimony) only replied with something in English that the Afghan didn't understand, then said <i>"sengay"/"sanga yee"</i> (<i>"how are you"</i> in Pashto), and kept going into the base. Naimatullah said the soldier was wearing <i>"full equipment,"</i> including body armor and night-vision goggles, and carrying a rifle (according to Naimatullah's CID statement; other, second-hand accounts say that Naimatullah saw only a pistol on that soldier).</p> <p>Naimatullah did not recognize or name the soldier to CID, noting that <i>"he could not see well at night because it was dark."</i> Naimatullah guessed the soldier's height to be average, or (by standing up and demonstrating) about 5 feet, 10 inches, and said he was <i>"big."</i> If Naimatullah was asked whether the soldier was bearded, the CID Special Agent's summary doesn't record Naimatullah's answer. Naimatullah told CID that the soldier he relieved at midnight did not report seeing anyone leaving the gate during the preceding 10:00 PM–Midnight shift.</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 5 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of ANA 205th Battalion Private Naimatullah's 12 March 2012 interview by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, as interpreted by a civilian working for ODA/Special Forces)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 127 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by a civilian ODA 7216 interpreter)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 183 (two photos of a hand-drawn sketch of VSP Belamby for purposes of assigning overnight guard duty at the VSP on March 17)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Pages 6-7 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of the Afghan interpreter's 12 March 2012 interview by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 7 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 12 March 2012 interview of the ANA soldier on 10:00 PM–Midnight guard duty, by a CID Special Agent)</p> <p>(Naimatullah's name and interview with reporter Yalda Hakim via a March 27, 2012 broadcast by Australian TV program DatelineSBS)</p> <p>(Tosh Ali's name and testimony detail via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)</p>

	<p>Naimatullah told journalist Yalda Hakim in March, 2012 that he also reported what he'd seen to the Afghan duty/patrol officer, who told the Americans (<i>aka</i> the "foreign forces"), according to Naimatullah, as translated by Australian public television's DatelineSBS program:</p> <p><i>"I called out to the duty officer, he was walking just outside and he ran up to me and I told him that the American had just entered the base and he went to notify the foreign forces."</i></p> <p>CID asked the civilian interpreter (one of five on the base), who eventually alerted the Americans to the gate activity, whether he'd been told "about the Soldier leaving the first time" and he said he hadn't been. The Afghan guard on the 10:00 PM–Midnight shift in the ANA tower told CID he saw no soldiers entering or leaving the base, and heard no gunshots on his shift. Unlike the U.S. guards just north of his position, Naimatullah reportedly heard no gunshots while in the (lower) ANA tower from 12:00 AM to 2:00 AM, and told CID that he saw nobody <i>leave</i> the gate while he was on guard duty that night.</p> <p>When he was relieved at 2:00 AM, Naimatullah briefed his replacement, ANA Private Tosh Ali, about the American soldier he'd seen coming into the base, and told Private Ali to be "<i>on the lookout</i>," according to reports of Tosh Ali's Article 32 testimony.</p>	
1:40 AM	<p>U.S. Guards Heard Sporadic Gunfire End North of VSP Belamby</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>Every 6-7 minutes (per Guinn), or every few minutes (per Blodgett), since about 1:20 AM, (per Blodgett), or 1:15 AM (per Guinn), the U.S. rooftop guards continued to hear clusters of 2-3 gunshots somewhere north of the base. After seeing nothing with their night-vision equipment, including thermal (infrared) imaging, and hearing a 4th round (per Guinn) of shots at about 1:40 AM, or a total of about 20 shots (per Blodgett), Guinn fired a 20-second 203 parachute (illumination) flare (with an M203 grenade launcher) toward the north to try to identify a shooter. They still saw nothing, but after the flare was sent up the shooting "<i>immediately</i>" stopped (after a total of 8-20 shots, by their count).</p> <p>The soldiers were relieved from duty at 1:50 AM, and told the new guards (a PFC and a Private Second Class or PV2) about the gunfire they'd heard (those guards in turn told the soldiers</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 76 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by PFC Blodgett)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 116 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by PFC Guinn)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 121 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by the ODA 7216 E-7 Sergeant First Class who was apparently acting Team Sergeant)</p> <p>(Soldier names and thermal imaging/20-second detail via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)</p>

	<p>who relieved them, including SSG McLaughlin, about the 1:20-1:40 AM gunfire). Neither U.S. soldier reported seeing anyone leave or enter the gate during their guard shift.</p>	
2:00 AM	<p>SSG McLaughlin Saw SSG Bales At VSP Belamby</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>At about 2:00 AM, SSG Bales entered SSG Jason McLaughlin's "CONEX" room - a "Container Express," or converted shipping container, also known as a "Can" or "CHU" (Containerized Housing Unit) - and turned on the light, waking the sleeping McLaughlin. (McLaughlin's alarm was evidently set for 2:30 AM, and woke him again after this 2:00 AM visit for a 3:00 AM guard shift.)</p> <p>According to McLaughlin, Bales <i>"said he had been to Alokazi and that he had killed some Military aged males. I didn't believe him and so he held his weapon [his rifle, per CID] up to my face and told me to smell it. I did and it had smelled like it had been fired but I ignored it. He said he was going to Naji Bien next"</i>.</p> <p>At 2:00 AM Bales was wearing the Heckler & Koch pistol he'd been loaned, and carrying his M-4 rifle, which had, among other gear, an attached tactical light, that gives off a white light, McLaughlin told CID. McLaughlin suspects that Bales took two or three 40mm rounds from McLaughlin's 203 grenade belt, hanging near the door, when Bales came into his room at about 2:00 AM. After Bales came in and awoke McLaughlin, Bales stayed in the room for <i>"about 10 minutes,"</i> McLaughlin told CID.</p> <p>McLaughlin also told CID that <i>"Alokazi is one of the villages that helps us."</i></p>	<p>CID Exhibits 115 & 156 (11 March 2012 and 13 March 2012 sworn statements by SSG McLaughlin)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Pages 4-5 & 11-12 (Agent's Investigation Report summaries of 11 March 2012 and 13 March 2012 interviews of SSG McLaughlin)</p> <p>(Soldier name via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)</p>
2:00 AM	<p>Local Residents Heard Gunfire In Najiban, South Of VSP Belamby</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>On-camera footage recorded March 11, 2012, by multiple Afghan reporters and photographers (the only media at the scene that day), documents an adult female neighbor of Mohammad Wazir of Najiban, explaining, in Pashto, what she'd heard that night. (Wazir's home was located about 1 KM</p>	<p>Newspaper accounts, and published media footage from that day</p> <p>Two <i>Reuters</i> stories quoting Agha Lala as an eyewitness to multiple soldiers in Najiban:</p>

southwest of VSP Belamby.) The woman is rarely named in English-language media accounts briefly quoting her, but was sometimes identified as "Gul Bashra." Mohammad Wazir told 2470media journalist Lela Ahmadzai in 2015 that the woman's name is actually Gul Bahar, and Wazir apparently told CID in 2012 that she's a relative of his. Gul Bahar, and her unnamed teenage son, who's also seen on-camera March 11 (wearing a watch), accompanied some of the bodies of Wazir family victims to the gate of VSP Belamby that day, where they were interviewed and photographed by members of the Afghan media who'd reached the base from Kandahar city.

Gul Bahar, in Pashto, told Afghan reporters on March 11 that she awoke, as planned, at 2:00 AM (she held up two fingers to indicate the time) for her "fasting breakfast," according to a BBC translation of her Pashto-language account. Only after she was awake and had turned on a light did she notice noises outside, she said. According to the BBC translation, Gul Bahar continued by saying:

"I told my son not to speak because the Americans are here. They were telling us to be quiet, and not to come out. When he kicked the door, my door had a stone so it didn't open. They moved from my door, and went next door and the first thing they did was to shoot the dog, and then there was a muffled bang inside the room – but who could go and see."

"Next door" was apparently the [Mohammad Wazir home](#), where a puppy was shot, but survived, per Mohammad Wazir in a 2012 2470media interview. Gul Bahar also told the Afghan reporters (as helicopters can be heard flying low overhead, presumably arriving at or departing from VSP Belamby), that she heard two helicopters at the time of the attack. According to another partial translation of her account, Gul Bahar was familiar with US patrol tactics, including the use of dogs like those kenneled at VSP Belamby:

"Their dogs check us and their helicopters are always there and check us. But this is our country and we can say nothing. We are leaving our own country and place because of them. Our doors are broken. That was not one person, there were many. There were many footprints. I could not go outside or I too would have been fired upon."

A male adult named Agha Lala was also quoted as a Najiban witness, by *Reuters* on March 11th - but was evidently never interviewed again, before Lala was reportedly killed in an automobile accident on June 30, 2012:

"I watched them from a wall for a while. Then they opened fire

<http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE82A02V20120311>

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/11/us-afghanistan-usa-witnesses-idUSBRE82A0A420120311>

Agha Lala was identified in 2012 from a photo or video, by surviving family members of some of the victims, via Afghan reporter Mamoon Durrani

CID Exhibit 321 (8 November 2012 hand-drawn sketch of part of VSP Belamby, by a Group Support Battalion Special Forces Sergeant First Class who handled a dog, that includes the location of VSP Belamby's dog kennel)

CID Exhibit 111, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report list of the sequence of events that had been reported to SOTF-S's TOC at Kandahar Airfield's Camp Brown by 8:30 AM on March 11th)

CID Exhibit 72, Pages 1 & 2 (Agent's Investigation Report documentation of an 11 March 2012 Collection of Evidence, detailing 21 pieces of evidence, including clothing and weapons, taken from the person of Robert Bales upon his return to VSP Belamby that morning - among which neither a radio, nor eyeglasses, nor body armor *aka* an IOTV, are included)

CID Exhibit 73 (Evidence Custody Document No. 159-13, detailing the 21 pieces of evidence taken from Robert Bales on March 11, 2012)

CID Exhibit 204 (2 April 2012 Agent's Investigation Report of CID's Crime Scene Examination of the Mohammad Wazir home, south of VSP Belamby)

CID Exhibits 205 & 206 (CID's April 2, 2012 Crime Scene Sketches of the Mohammad Wazir home and Rooms 1, 3, and 4, at ROI PDF Pages 714-722; and CID's April 2, 2012 Photo Packet of the Wazir home, at ROI PDF Pages 723-764)

CID Exhibit 207 (Evidence Custody Document No. 201-13, listing the pillow fabric, shell casing, hair, and bloodstain swabs CID obtained at the Mohammad Wazir home on April 2, 2012)

CID Exhibit 305 (25 October 2012 US

on me. The bullets hit the wall. They were laughing. They did not seem normal. It was like they were drunk."

Agha Lala – who can be seen on video and photo footage taken at the Wazir home that morning, and who attended the video-recorded Kabul meeting with President Karzai the following Friday, March 16th, where Lala can be seen seated in the back row, wearing a watch – also told an Afghan reporter for *Reuters* that he was *"awoken by gunfire at about 2 a.m."*

No witnesses to the attack at the Wazir home, nor any Wazir neighbors, were apparently ever interviewed by U.S. Army CID agents. The only Article 32 testimony about the deaths of 11 people at the Wazir home that night came from Khamal Adin (or "Kamaludin"), a Kandahar city cousin of Mohammad Wazir, who was called by Wazir after the attack, and reached the scene (which is at least half an hour by car from Kandahar city) while Wazir, perhaps accompanied by his sole surviving child (Habib Shah), was still on his way back to Najiban from Wazir's brother's home in Spin Boldak, near the Pakistan border. Khamal Adin testified at the August, 2013 sentencing hearing, on Transcript Page 670, that *"the sun wasn't even up yet when I arrived."*

Yet the U.S. military – specifically, the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) for Special Operations Task Force-South (SOTF-S) at Kandahar Airfield, ODA 7216's higher, or battalion-level, command, and therefore presumably also the Special Forces soldiers at VSP Belamby who answered to that command HQ – evidently didn't receive the first, unconfirmed report of murder victims at the Mohammad Wazir home (south of the base) until 8:20 AM on March 11th – at least four hours after the killings.

Army criminal lab DNA and ballistics evidence places Robert Bales at the scene of the 11 Wazir family murders:

1. The blood of one of the Wazir family females ("Unknown Female #1") was found on the left boot, right boot, pants, boxer shorts, M203 grenade belt (as seen in the photo at ROI PDF Page 278), shirt, and right and left gloves that Robert Bales was wearing when he was taken into custody at the VSP Belamby gate on March 11, as well as on equipment Bales was carrying, including on 3 ammunition magazines, a Heckler & Koch pistol, a grenade launcher, and his M4 rifle. The blood of the same "Unknown Female #1" was found in bloodstains on the walls of Rooms 1, 3, and 4 of the Mohammad Wazir home, which CID agents swabbed on April 2nd during their first and only ("expedient," but very well photographed and

Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory DNA Report and DNA Exhibit List, revealing, among other things, that bloodstains from "Unknown Female #1" were found on swabs from the walls of three rooms at the Mohammad Wazir home)

CID Exhibit 337 (21 February 2013 US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory DNA Report and DNA Exhibit List, revealing that bloodstains from "Unknown Female #1," found at the Wazir home, were also found on the clothing and gear of Robert Bales)

CID Exhibit 315 (06 November 2012 US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory Firearms Interim Report detailing the ballistics evidence discerned from the submitted weapons and spent ammunition)

CID Exhibit 199 (Evidence Custody Document No. 200-13, describing the three 5.56mm rifle shell casings, two burned interconnected metal rings, and small, 2" x 1.5" plastic crate that the Afghan National Army retrieved in Najiban on March 11, and gave to CID on March 26, 2012)

CID Exhibit 182, Page 5 (27 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of the turnover of ANA-collected ballistics evidence to CID on March 26, 2012)

CC Exhibit (14 April 2012 sworn statement by one of the two NCOs acting as ODA 7216 Team Sergeant after MSG Uhrich's post-IED evacuation, at PDF Page 254, regarding ANA soldiers periodically scavenging spent ammunition brass to sell)

CID Exhibit 293, Pages 1-2 (24 July 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of the collection of evidence provided by Massouma Dawood and Mohammad Wazir)

CID Exhibit 294 (Evidence Custody Document No. 598-12, listing a pillow obtained from Massouma Dawood, and four cloths – parts of three blankets and a head scarf – obtained from Mohammad Wazir, apparently via Mullah Baraan, on July 14, 2012)

CID Exhibit 309 (30 October 2012 US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory Trace Evidence Corrected Report,

	<p>documented) examination of the crime scenes.</p> <p>2. Empty rifle and pistol shell casings were collected at the scenes of the crime March 11 by both the Afghan Uniform Police – a total of 12 spent rifle shell casings, of which 7 were burned, and 5 pistol casings, of which 2 were burned, which were transferred to CID by the AUP on March 12 – and the Afghan National Army – a total of three spent rifle shell casings, plus "two [connected, burned] <i>metal rings and a small plastic crate,</i>" all from Najiban (and evidently all from the Wazir home), which were transferred to CID by the ANA on March 26.</p> <p>[On April 2nd, U.S. Army CID agents collected 1 burned rifle shell casing lying in the yard of Mohammad Wazir's home (see ROI PDF Page 764), 1 pistol shell casing on the floor of the cow shed at Sayed Jan's Alkozai home (see ROI PDF Pages 858 & 859), and 1 pistol bullet lodged in a wall of Room 2 at Mohammad Naim's Alkozai home.]</p> <p>The 7 burned rifle shell casings, and 2 burned pistol casings that the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) apparently collected at the Wazir home (6 of the rifle casings were collected from the floor of Room 4, as seen on media-recorded video footage) and turned over to CID on March 12, accompanied 5 rifle shell casings and 3 pistol shell casings that the AUP apparently collected at an Alkozai home or homes.</p> <p>Afghan policemen and soldiers thus retrieved 20 pieces of ballistics evidence and U.S. CID soldiers retrieved 3 pieces of ballistics evidence that were later examined by the U.S. Army's Criminal Investigation Laboratory.</p> <p>A Firearms Examiner at the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory reported to CID that, of those 23 pieces of ballistics evidence – sixteen 5.56mm rifle casings (10 of them from the Wazir home), and six 9mm pistol casings (2 of them from the Wazir home), plus one 9mm bullet – all but one (the bullet in the wall) were fired by a Robert Bales weapon carried that night (his M4 rifle, or the H&K 9mm pistol that he had been loaned). The bullet in the wall at Naim's had "<i>insufficient individual characteristics to identify or eliminate Exhibit 14 [the H&K pistol Bales carried] as having fired</i>" it.</p> <p>A possible explanation for the admittedly-limited amount of ammunition evidence received by CID from the Afghan National Army comes from an ODA 7216 NCO who shared acting Team Sergeant duties with SFC X after their ODA Team Sergeant was hurt March 5. That NCO told the CC investigation, with reference to his ODA's difficulty working</p>	<p>revealing a fiber match between the cape-blanket that Bales wore to the VSP on March 11, and a pillow that CID agents found at the Mohammad Wazir home on April 2nd)</p> <p>CC Exhibits (a 29 March 2012 sworn statement that describes where Advanced Operations Bases are in the Special Forces chain-of-command, at PDF Page 311, and a 31 March 2012 sworn statement that describes how Special Operations Task Forces operate above the Advanced Operations Bases and below the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force command, at PDF Page 325)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 293, Pages 1-2 (Agent's Investigation Report of an interview that appears to be a 24 July 2012 account referencing Gul Bahar, given by Mohammad Wazir, as summarized by CID: "<i>The woman pictured on the back of a truck gesturing toward a small child (deceased) in a truck is one of his relatives and she is not at the same place now. Mr. [Redacted/Wazir?] stated it would be hard to meet her or talk to her. Her family moved because of the conflict in the area. They moved to an area where phone contact is not available.</i>")</p> <p>This is likely the photo referenced in that 24 July 2012 Mohammad Wazir interview: http://media.silive.com/advance/photo/2012/03/10674889-standard.jpg</p>
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with the ANA: *"I'll give you a couple of examples; whenever we'd get into fire fights, there would be ANA soldiers with empty mags [ammunition magazines]. Others running around trying to pick up brass, because they would sell the brass at the bazaar."*

3. Robert Bales was wearing a "cape" (Exhibit 19 - the "Blanket" - on the DNA Exhibit List at ROI PDF Page 1492) over his clothes when he was taken into custody at the VSP gate - evidently to try to evade balloon-mounted ("PGSS") surveillance cameras, and/or detection when each of 3-7 illumination flares was fired overhead toward the south by VSP soldiers from about 4:00-4:45 AM. An Army lab forensic biologist detected no blood on that cape-blanket. Massouma Dawood and one other [Redacted] family told CID that they did not recognize the dark purple-green and black weathered cloth (likely a doorway curtain) - seen at PDF Page 282 of CID's ROI Exhibit 74 - as from their homes. It's not clear from the redacted ROI if Mohammad Wazir was asked, or, if he was, if he recognized the cape-cloth as from his home (the second paragraph of CID Exhibit 261 reveals that a male, possibly Wazir, from one family did not recognize the cape-blanket). But a pillow that CID agents found and photographed April 2nd (see ROI PDF Page 759) on the floor of the room at the Wazir home where bodies were burned (Room 4) contained a purple-green nylon fiber *"consistent with the known green/purple nylon fibers composing the fabric of Exhibit 19"* (the cape or "blanket" that Bales wore on his return to the VSP that morning), reported the Army lab. (The blood of "Unknown Female #1" was also found on that Wazir family pillow.) As a result, the Army Trace Evidence Corrected Report of October 30, 2012 concluded:

"Therefore, the nylon fiber from Exhibit 165 [the Wazir pillow seen on the floor in the CID photo at ROI PDF Page 759] could have originated from Exhibit 19 [the cape or "blanket" seen in the CID photo at ROI PDF Page 282]. The characteristics of the recovered fiber indicate exposure to extreme weathering."

(The Army lab also found five different kinds of fibers on the same Wazir Room 4 pillow that matched fibers - meaning the fibers *"could share a common source"* - found on the pants, shirt, and gloves Bales was wearing.)

It thus seems highly likely that Robert Bales covered himself with a cloth that he stole from the Mohammad Wazir home, a kilometer south/southwest of VSP Belamby, before making his way back north that morning sometime after 4:00 AM.

2:30 AM	Afghan Guard Saw A U.S. Soldier Exit VSP Belamby On Foot	Sources
	<p>Afghan National Army (ANA) Private Tosh Ali (<i>aka</i> Tash Ali) was the Afghan soldier who replaced Naimatullah in the ANA guard post, somewhere near the south-facing VSP Belamby gate, at 2:00 AM. Ali's guard shift lasted from 2:00-4:00 AM. When Ali came on duty, PVT Naimatullah briefed him about the American soldier he'd seen entering the base at 1:30 AM, and reportedly warned Ali to be <i>"on the lookout."</i></p> <p>At 2:30 AM, Tosh Ali saw an American soldier leaving the base through the south-facing gate near the guard post he was in. According to reports of Tosh Ali's Article 32 testimony, by live-feed from Kandahar city, the soldier was "laughing." Tosh Ali also yelled at the soldier to get his attention and to tell him to stop, but the American said only "sengay" ("How are you?" in Pashto) and kept walking – reportedly toward an alley and past a tree and then out of sight.</p> <p>ANA Private Tosh Ali told CID that he couldn't shoot at the American soldier to warn him to stop because he would get in trouble with the Americans and his Afghan leaders if he did so.</p> <p>Tosh Ali contacted his chain-of-command to report what he'd seen. According to his March, 2012 interview with Yalda Hakim of Australian public television's DatelineSBS program, as interpreted:</p> <p><i>"He started to walk off. When he started to move away I called a patrol and told them that an American has left the base. The patrol called the platoon commander and the platoon commander notified the foreign forces."</i></p> <p>Based on that account, it seems likely that the "platoon commander" notified was the ANA Sergeant who went to wake up the civilian interpreter, and came with him to knock on the U.S. Operations Center door at 3:00 AM, as detailed below.</p> <p>Tosh Ali told CID that he <i>"believed"</i> the soldier he saw was wearing his <i>"full kit"</i> - including his rifle, body armor/bullet-proof vest, and weapons. He described the soldier as <i>"big,"</i> and noticed that he had a beard. (All of the soldiers at VSP Belamby had been growing beards for at least a month, according to a media report from the Article 32 hearing.) Like Naimatullah, Tosh Ali did not name the soldier to CID, and apparently didn't recognize him. After his shift was over, Tosh Ali evidently stayed near the gate, and witnessed the return of</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 6 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of ANA 205th Battalion Private Tosh Ali's 12 March 2012 interview by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, as interpreted by a civilian working for the ODA/Special Forces)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 127 (14 March 2012 sworn statement, in English, by a civilian Afghan interpreter working for ODA 7216)</p> <p>The news article from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing, by Adam Ashton of <i>The News Tribune</i>, reporting that <i>"soldiers at the [VSP Belamby] outpost had been growing beards, and the sergeant should have had a month's worth of growth on his face"</i>. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/crime/article24740128.html</p> <p>(Tosh Ali's name and testimony details via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing.)</p> <p>(Naimatullah's name and part of Tosh Ali's account via a March 27, 2012 broadcast by Australian public television program DatelineSBS)</p>

	<p>Bales. Again he thought he saw body armor, which he said he watched other US soldiers remove from Bales. (U.S. soldiers testified that Bales was not wearing body armor on his return, and no body armor was photographed or entered into evidence by CID.)</p> <p>As indicated above, no US guards on the roof of the Operations Center that night seem to have told CID that they heard an Afghan guard yelling in the ANA guard post – at 1:30 AM, when US guards were hearing gunfire north of the base, or at 2:30 AM when Tosh Ali yelled toward the gate, or at any other time during the night.</p>	
3:00 AM	Afghan Army Guard Heard Gunfire Outside VSP Belamby	Sources
	<p>Half an hour after ANA guard Tosh Ali saw an American soldier exit the base through the south-facing gate of VSP Belamby, he heard <i>"a single shot outside of the gate,"</i> he told CID, according to CID's summary of his interpreted interview. According to reports of Tosh Ali's Article 32 testimony, via video-feed from Kandahar city in November, 2012, Private Ali heard the "gunfire" or "shots" at about 3:00 AM. If Private Tosh Ali reported the gunfire to his chain-of-command, that's not noted. The direction of the gunfire Tosh Ali heard, if known, does not seem to have been publicly documented.</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 6 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of ANA 205th Battalion Private Tosh Ali's 12 March 2012 interview by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, as interpreted by a civilian working for the ODA/Special Forces)</p> <p>(Tosh Ali's name and testimony details via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing.)</p>
3:00 AM	The Attack At The Dawood Home Began	Sources
	<p>There are two known witnesses who have given accounts to the U.S. Army of the attack at the isolated Dawood home, located about 700 meters south of VSP Belamby and about 500 meters northeast of the Wazir home. One witness is Massouma, whose husband Mohammad Dawood was murdered that night. The other witness is the Dawoods' oldest child, Hekmatullah "Khan" Gul, who heard his father being shot just outside their bedroom that night.</p> <p>Pre-teen Khan gave sworn testimony about his father's death, by video-feed at the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing, and in person at the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing at JBLM in Washington state. Before that, on June 14, 2012, Khan was interviewed by a US Army CID Special Agent in Kandahar city (an interview that was apparently witnessed by Khan's</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 265, Pages 1 & 2 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of Massouma Dawood's 14 June 2012 interview, through an interpreter, by U.S. Army CID Special Agent Leona Mansapit)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 265, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of Mohammad Dawood son Hekmatullah "Khan" Gul's 14 June 2012 interview, through an interpreter, by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, at Mandigak Palace - the provincial police headquarters - in Kandahar city)</p> <p>Aerial map distances, and aerial views of the locations of attacked homes and VSP Belamby, made possible by Afghan</p>

	<p>uncle Mullah Baraan, of Kandahar city, who took in his brother's family). CID's summary of Khan's interpreted June, 2012 interview – which aligns with the few brief media reports of Khan's 2012 Article 32 testimony, and with the transcript record of his brief 2013 sentencing hearing testimony – is quoted below.</p> <p>Massouma Dawood has never publicly testified in the Bales case, for unknown reasons. However, Massouma too was interviewed, through an interpreter, on June 14, 2012 by a US Army CID Special Agent in Kandahar city. That CID agent, Leona Mansapit, relayed Massouma's June account to the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing, apparently at the request of the defense. At the same hearing in November, 2012 at which Special Agent Mansapit conveyed Massouma's June account, Dawood's brother Mullah Baraan testified, by video-feed, apparently at the request of the prosecution, although Baraan was not a witness to his brother's murder (Baraan was at his home in Kandahar city the night of the attack).</p> <p>Baraan's Article 32 testimony reportedly contradicted a key part of Massouma's June, 2012 testimony, as relayed at the November hearing by Mansapit, as well as the CID account and reported Article 32 testimony of his young eyewitness nephew Hekmatullah "Khan" Gul. Baraan's own multiple, consistent accounts to the media that year also contradict what he reportedly told the Bales Article 32 hearing. Later, in an April, 2013 interview with the <i>Associated Press</i>, Mullah <i>"Baraan denied that [Massouma] ever reported seeing many soldiers outside,"</i> according to <i>AP</i> reporter Kathy Gannon's May 16, 2013 article detailing her April interview of the family in Kandahar city. That statement by Baraan aligns with the reports of Baraan's Article 32 testimony, but contradicts all the other 2012 accounts he and others gave – to President Karzai, to the media, to CID, and in sworn testimony – about what witnesses saw at the Dawood home that night.</p> <p>As summarized by CID Special Agent Leona Mansapit in a same-day CID report, here's most of what Massouma Dawood told the U.S. Army in her June 14, 2012 Kandahar city interview, as interpreted:</p> <p><i>"She [Massouma, widow of Mohammad Dawood/Dawud] stated the night of the incident Mr. DAWUD was feeling sick and she made some potato soup which they ate for dinner. After the evening prayer, they went to sleep. She described that her children were sleeping on the floor closest to the door and she and Mr. DAWUD were farthest away next to the baby swing. She stated about 0300, the room became lit up by an</i></p>	<p>reporter Mamoon Durrani's invaluable on-site Zangabad research</p> <p>CID Exhibit 208 (2 April 2012 Agent's Investigation Report of CID's Crime Scene Examination of the Mohammad Dawood home, south of VSP Belamby)</p> <p>CID Exhibits 209 & 210 (CID's April 2, 2012 Crime Scene Sketches of the layout of the Mohammad Dawood home, and of Room 2, where the family was sleeping, at ROI PDF Pages 770-772; and CID's April 2, 2012 Photo Packet of the Dawood home, at ROI PDF Pages 773-800)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 128 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by a JTAC Technical Sergeant from the Air National Guard's 123 Special Tactics Squadron)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 124 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 Staff Sergeant, involved in training ANA soldiers, who launched at least 3 illumination rounds starting at about 4:00 AM)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 84 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Sergeant Ross O'Rourke, who helped fire 5-7 illumination flares from the VSP, starting at about 4:00 AM)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 72, Pages 1 & 2 (Agent's Investigation Report documentation of an 11 March 2012 Collection of Evidence, detailing 21 pieces of evidence, including clothing and weapons, taken from the person of Robert Bales upon his return to VSP Belamby that morning - among which neither a radio, nor eyeglasses, nor body armor <i>aka</i> an IOTV, are included)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 73 (Evidence Custody Document No. 159-13, detailing the 21 pieces of evidence taken from Robert Bales on March 11, 2012)</p> <p>CID Exhibits 33 & 75 (13 March 2012 and 12 March 2012 sworn statements by SGT David Godwin, detailing what SSG Bales was wearing and carrying when Godwin told him, from about 10 feet away at the gate of VSP Belamby that morning, to <i>"Stop, drop all weapons and equipment, and put your hands up"</i>)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 305 (25 October 2012 US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory</p>
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unknown light. This woke Mr. DAWUD and her up. She stated there were two men, one was standing at the door and the other approached her husband. The man was holding up a rifle with a yellow light attached on top of it. The man told Mr. DAWUD to get up and was asking about where was the Taliban. She stated Mr. DAWUD kept telling him that there were no Taliban in their home. She stated the man pulled Mr. DAWUD outside and when she tried to follow the other man standing at the door pointed his rifle at her and told her to stay back. The man took her husband outside and after they left she peeked through the curtains that covered her doorway. She stated she saw the men, one holding Mr. DAWUD and the other asking him questions about Taliban. She stated the man asking questions then pointed a pistol at Mr. DAWUD's head and shot him from the right lower part of his head. She stated he fired one shot, and she saw Mr. DAWUD fall to the ground. Mrs. [Redacted/Massouma Dawood] stated as this was happening she heard what sounded like a helicopter hovering close over her home because everything was shaking. She stated she also heard what sounded like other Soldiers searching through the other adjacent rooms within the compound. She stated they sounded like they were speaking English and they were talking amongst each other. She stated after they shot Mr. DAWUD, the same man came back in and she moved to the back to where she was sleeping. She stated later she found a boot print on the floor of her home because the man had stepped in Mr. DAWUD's blood. She stated her seven month old baby was on the floor and she had to block the man because he almost stepped on him. She stated he grabbed her hair close to her scalp and hit the back of her head on the wall then pushed her onto the baby swing and let her go.

[...]

She remembered seeing flares shooting up three times and saw the light coming through the curtains at the door. She stated he was there for about 30 minutes and left outside. She stated she saw there were many Soldiers walking around inside her compound where her home was at and they were all speaking English. She stated they left her compound and she went to check on Mr. DAWUD which she found to be deceased. She stated she sustained a large bump on the back of her head from when the man pushed her head on the wall. She described him as a large man, built, really tall, green eyes, big nose, red face, and gray colored clothing. She stated he was wearing the same type of military uniform that the Americans wear out here, but gray in color. She stated he was not wearing a cape or anything like that. She described him as having some sort of pouches on the front and back of him, like some sort of case, and there was something on his left shoulder that had a very long stick coming out of it and it was

DNA Report and DNA Exhibit List)

(CID Special Agent Leona Mansapit's name and testimony details and other soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing.)

This March 11, 2012 photograph, by Afghan reporter [Mamoon Durrani](#), of the interior of Room 2 (the bedroom) of the Mohammad Dawood home, showing bloodstains, Afghan investigators, Mohammad Dawood's mother-in-law Haji Annay (as named to 2470media by Dawood's brother Mullah Baraan in 2015), and a clock on the wall, with its hands at 7:10 o'clock:

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/7_10_am_photo_by_reporter_mamoon_durrani_of_the_dawood_family_bedroom_and_wall_clock_after_the_3_am_murder_of_mohammad_dawood_march_11_2012.jpg

moving around a lot (She was describing a radio with an antenna typical of what U.S. Soldiers carried). She stated the man had one pistol and one rifle. She could not describe the other man that she saw. Mrs. [Redacted/Massouma Dawood] stated the entire event lasted about 30 minutes.

[...]

She stated she found a shell casing lying in the blood on the ground where Mr. DAWUD was shot. She stated the shell casing appeared to be bent and was somewhat long. She stated the shell casing was also placed in the plastic bag and buried with her husband. She stated the pillow that she rested her deceased husband's head on was still in her possession; she had washed it once, but was willing to provide it to this office. She stated about 0500, she went to her neighbor's house looking for help but no one was around. She then sent her son to get help. Additionally, Mrs. [Redacted/Massouma Dawood] stated about 10 minutes after the Soldiers left she heard more gun shots that were off in the distance, but she did not know which direction they were coming from. She stated she heard the gun shots as single shots, and it did not sound like a machine gun. When asked about a picture left at her home that was recovered by this office, she stated it was of Mr. DAWUD. S[pecial] A[gent] [Redacted] presented a picture of a sheet collected from SSG BALES that he had used as a cape when he was found. Mrs. [Redacted/Massouma Dawood] stated the sheet did not look familiar and was not from her home."

Importantly, with reference to Massouma's stated timing of 3:00 AM for the start of the 30-minute attack at her home, a [clear photograph](#) taken that morning by Afghan reporter [Mamoon Durrani](#) reveals that there was a large clock on the wall of the room where the Dawood family slept, with the baby cradle visible in the back left of the (CID-measured 9-foot-wide by 20-foot-long) room. In the photograph, which shows the hands of the clock at 7:10, Afghan investigators are present and examining visible blood stains from the murder of Mohammad Dawood, with Massouma's mother (who was both the mother-in-law and aunt of Mohammad Dawood) sitting on the floor in the background.

[Mullah Baraan told 2470media's [Lela Ahmadzai](#) in 2015 that Massouma's mother, known to them as Haji Annay, was not present during the attack, but instead relayed what happened, as best she could, to the Afghan media who visited the Dawood home that day. Baraan also told 2470media for the first time, having apparently never mentioned it before in English-language accounts, that a visiting cousin of the six Dawood children – a daughter, age and name unmentioned, of an older Dawood brother – was with the Dawood family in the

room during the attack, but that no one else was sleeping in the Dawood room or home that night.]

Although it's unclear exactly when Massouma saw *"flares shooting up three times and saw the light coming through the curtains at the door,"* whether she saw the flares before, during, or after the 30-minute attack at her home, it's notable that sworn statements to CID by U.S. Army soldiers at VSP Belamby state that multiple illumination flares were fired by them toward the south that morning. Specifically, to help locate Bales after he was found to be missing at about 3:30 AM and a subsequent search of the base confirmed his absence, at least three, and perhaps as many as seven, illumination rounds were fired up from the VSP Operations Center roof – evidently starting at about 4:00 AM – mostly aimed toward the south (where shots had recently been heard), until Bales was spotted (apparently north and west of the Dawood home, wearing a cape made of cloth evidently stolen from the Mohammad Wazir home), at which time the flares were aimed above Bales, as he walked north toward the VSP, until about 4:45 AM.

The U.S. Army CID agent's summary of the June 14, 2012 interview of Mohammad Dawood's oldest son Hekmatullah, as interpreted, follows; Hekmatullah's CID account aligns with his mother's CID interview, and with his own sworn Article 32 testimony, and, like his mother's, contradicts his non-witness Uncle Baraan's Article 32 testimony about the soldier(s) that Hekmatullah and his mother saw:

"[H]e [pre-teen Hekmatullah "Khan" Gul, the oldest of 6 children of Mohammad and Massouma Dawood] and his family were sleeping in their room when he was awoken by a person who came through the doorway and stepped on his stomach when he entered. [Redacted/Khan] thought two people entered the room and woke up his father. [Redacted/Khan] stated there were red colored lights on their guns. [Redacted/Khan] said his father was taken to the doorway, outside the curtains and shot. [Redacted/Khan] said there were two curtains over the doorway, one inside and one outside. [Redacted/Khan] heard one shot and heard his father fall to the ground. He did not see the shooting because the man pulled the curtain closed when he went out. The man had a pistol out prior the shooting.

After the shooting the man had a rifle with a light on it. The man returned to the room and went by the baby swing (cradle) and wanted to see what was inside. His mother showed him the baby. The man hit his mother's head against the wall and knocked a mirror and other things off of the

	<p><i>makeup table before he left. After the man left, [Redacted/Khan] and his mother turned on the lights and helped his mother bring his father into the house. His father had a large hole in the front of his head and his brain was on the ground. [Redacted/Khan] stated that there were no lights on in the room during the incident other than the light on the man's rifle. [Redacted/Khan] saw lights outside the room and thought there may have been more people outside. [Redacted/Khan] described a man with a red face, wearing glasses, grayish colored clothing, and a grayish colored hard hat. When he was shown Agent [Redacted] helmet with cloth cover, he said it was like that, but was grayish in color and the surface looked hard. He did not notice any facial hair on the man, but stated that his shoes felt hard when he was stepped on. The family cried until morning and then [Redacted/Khan] stated his mother sent him to a neighbor's house for help. The neighbor, [Redacted,] wasn't home, but his son, [Redacted,] was there."</i></p> <p>Significantly, multiple U.S. soldiers told CID, and CID's evidence collection documents, in photographs and text, that Bales wasn't wearing body armor on his return to the VSP that morning, and neither a radio nor eyeglasses were taken from him. See CID Exhibit 73 (beginning at ROI PDF Page 260) for a detailed list of the 21 items that Bales was wearing or carrying south of the VSP, and the photograph of a bearded Bales, without eyeglasses, taken upon his return to the VSP, at CID Exhibit 45 (ROI PDF Page 182).</p> <p>No forensic evidence from the Dawood scene seems to be linked to Robert Bales. The ammunition that killed Mohammad Dawood was evidently buried with him, unexamined. Months later a bloodstained pillow from that home was examined for DNA evidence (after being washed), but apparently no male bloodstains were found on it, although it was used to support the body of Mohammad Dawood that night, his widow Massouma told CID.</p>	
3:00 AM	Afghan Guards Got Word Of VSP Belamby's Gate Activity To The U.S. "Foreign Forces"	Sources
	<p>At 3:00 AM, 1st Squad Leader SSG Jason McLaughlin, and a 2-3 Infantry PFC who was a medic, began their hour of guard duty on the roof of VSP Belamby's Operations Center. McLaughlin told CID that he soon <i>"noticed two ANA soldiers walking toward the cans (rooms). I was wondering why they were on</i></p>	<p>CID Exhibits 115 & 156 (11 March 2012 and 13 March 2012 sworn statements by SSG McLaughlin)</p> <p>CID Exhibits 116 & 129 (12 March 2012 & 14 March 2012 sworn statements by PFC Guinn)</p>

our side of the compound. They went and got the interpreter..." (That civilian Afghan interpreter, who gave CID a sworn statement in English, indicated that a single "commo guy" ANA Sergeant – the interpreter couldn't remember his name – knocked on his door to wake him so that they could tell the Americans what the ANA Privates on guard duty had been reporting.)

After being relieved from his eventful rooftop guard duty at 1:50 AM, PFC Derek Guinn was inside the Operations Center using the phone around 2:30 AM, presumably in the Computer Room, which was apparently the original Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) room on the base. Another soldier, a Specialist, had the overnight on-call, or sleeping, guard shift inside the Operations Center.

While Guinn was still in the Operations Center, he heard knocks on the "front door" of the Operations Center. PFC Guinn opened the door. Outside on the deck were the civilian Afghan interpreter and one or two Afghan National Army soldiers (other accounts, including another by Guinn, and the Afghan interpreter's, indicate that in fact just one Afghan soldier was with the Afghan interpreter at that time, not two). Guinn asked them what was up. The interpreter told Guinn what he'd just been told by the ANA Sergeant accompanying him, about the gate activity witnessed by ANA Privates Naimatullah and Tosh Ali, during separate guard shifts that night in an ANA guard post, south of the US Operations Center, and therefore closer to the south-facing VSP Belamby gate.

At 3:00 AM, Private Tosh Ali was still at his post in that ANA tower (and hearing gunfire, as detailed above), on a 2:00-4:00 AM shift. After the Afghan interpreter informed PFC Guinn – and then shouted the information up to the two US guards on the Operations Center roof – the Afghan interpreter and the ANA Sergeant went to the ANA post to have Tosh Ali tell the interpreter directly what Ali had seen, and what the preceding guard, Naimatullah, had reported seeing during his Midnight-2:00 AM guard shift in the same tower or post.

Before asking for Tosh Ali's account (and presumably shortly after the 3:00 AM gunfire that PVT Ali heard, which the interpreter didn't mention to CID), the interpreter used "NVG" (night-vision goggles or equipment) "*and checked around very accurately*" for any movement outside the base "*but saw nothing.*"

NOTE: The account that PFC Derek Guinn says he heard from the civilian ODA interpreter differs from the accounts that the two roof-top guards gave to CID, and from the accounts that

CID Exhibit 182, Pages 3-4 (Agent's Investigation Report of CID's 18 March 2012 and 20 March 2012 follow-up interviews of PFC Guinn)

CID Exhibit 127 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by a civilian Afghan interpreter working for ODA 7216)

CID Exhibit 111, Pages 4-5 & 11-12 (Agent's Investigation Report summaries of 11 March 2012 and 13 March 2012 interviews of SSG McLaughlin)

CID Exhibit 49 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by the PFC who left guard duty at 1:00 AM, and the Operations Center Computer/MWR Room sometime after 2:30 AM)

CID Exhibit 121 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class, aka SFC "X," evidently the acting Team Sergeant)

CID Exhibit 123 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by the Special Forces Detachment Commander of ODA 7216, Captain Daniel Fields)

CID Exhibit 124 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 Staff Sergeant who trained the ANA)

(Tosh Ali name, and other soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing.)

Private Naimatullah and the interpreter gave to CID. After Guinn gave an account to CID in a March 12th sworn statement that matched what the others said, a CID agent re-interviewed Guinn at 9:00 AM on March 13 to clarify the part of his statement that described the shots he'd heard north of the base while on guard duty that night.

In the course of that March 13th re-interview, Guinn evidently mentioned that he'd actually been told by the civilian interpreter that there were "a couple" of soldiers who came into the gate (at 1:30 AM) and one soldier who left the gate (at 2:30 AM). Guinn told CID that he'd only realized his mistake while talking with other soldiers and observing the behavior of SGT Godwin after Guinn's first (March 12) statement had been submitted to CID. On March 14, Guinn provided a second sworn statement to correct his March 12th account. Subsequently, Guinn maintained his second sworn account in two additional CID interviews, conducted on March 18th and 20th, which were CID efforts to ensure that an imprecise translation or use of language wasn't the cause of the discrepancy about the number of soldiers. Guinn also reiterated his second account under oath at the Bales Article 32 hearing in November, according to media reports.

On March 12, Guinn told CID:

"They said that one American had walked into the gate and shortly after the same individual left back out."

But on March 14, Guinn told CID:

"[Redacted/The civilian interpreter] told me that there were a couple of people that came in the gate and one person left back out."

When asked what made him remember this information, Guinn said:

"I never forgot it, but after SSG BALES was the only person missing, I just assumed it was one person."

Then Guinn reiterated:

"[Redacted/The civilian interpreter] said that the[] ANA told him there were a couple of guys that walked into the gate and one that walked out."

3:05 AM	U.S. Soldiers Scrambled To Respond To The Afghan Report	Sources
	<p>By about 3:05 AM, SSG Jason McLaughlin and the PFC medic with him on the Operations Center roof were alerted, by PFC Derek Guinn, and the civilian ODA interpreter (who shouted the news up to the US guards after he spoke with Guinn), that ANA guards had seen activity at the VSP gate earlier that night, and that a U.S. soldier, as they were hearing the ANA report, was evidently absent without leave somewhere off the base. SSG McLaughlin, who was also PFC Guinn's First Squad leader, told Guinn to awaken VSP Belamby's commanding officer – Captain Daniel Fields, of the 7th Special Forces Group's Operational Detachment Alpha 7216 – which Guinn ran to do.</p> <p>Captain Fields told CID that Guinn woke him at 3:10 AM. Fields then told Guinn to wake up a Sergeant First Class from ODA 7216 (name redacted and unknown, so described as “SFC X” for clarity; SFC X was apparently the acting ODA Team Sergeant). SFC X told Guinn to awaken SSG Bales and have him conduct a roll-call, or accountability check, of all of the infantry soldiers (because Bales was the senior NCO in charge of, or representing, the 2-3 Infantry “SOF uplift squad[s]” on the base).</p> <p>Guinn (and another infantry PFC who heard the news from Guinn upon leaving the Computer Room at the Operations Center, where he'd been speaking to his wife on Skype) went to the room of SSG Bales – where the light was on but Bales was nowhere to be seen. Bales's weapons were missing too, but his bullet-proof vest/body armor (also known as his Improved Outer Tactical Vest, or IOTV) was in his room, according to the PFC who'd just left the Operations Center Computer Room (that PFC was one of the guards on the Operations Center roof from Midnight-1:00 AM that night).</p> <p>About 10 minutes after the civilian ODA interpreter arrived at the ANA guard tower, having just spoken with PFC Guinn and the rooftop guards, ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields came into the ANA tower to hear the interpreter's account, and told the Afghans to do a head-count of their soldiers. Captain Fields told CID that he was at first “<i>very skeptical</i>” of Guinn's report, because of its ANA source, but his concern shifted, after talking to the ANA guard(s) and interpreter, to the possibility that an “<i>infiltrator</i>” may have entered the base, which is why he ordered the Afghans to conduct a roll-call of their men. When two more US soldiers (a Special Forces Staff Sergeant, who routinely worked with and trained the ANA, accompanied</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 123 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by VSP Belamby's Commanding Officer, ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields)</p> <p>CID Exhibits 115 & 156 (11 March 2012 and 13 March 2012 sworn statements by SSG McLaughlin)</p> <p>CID Exhibits 116 & 129 (12 March 2012 & 14 March 2012 sworn statements by PFC Guinn)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 121 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class, aka SFC “X,” evidently the acting Team Sergeant)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 49 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by the Private First Class who was awake and in the Computer Room when the Americans learned of the gate activity from the ANA, went to check for Bales in his room, and had guard duty from Midnight-1:00 AM that night)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 127 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by a civilian Afghan interpreter employed by ODA 7216)</p> <p>BG Waddell's AR 15-6 Command Climate (CC) investigation findings at Pages 21 & 23 (PDF Pages 24 & 26), regarding the deployment to VSP Ezabad, in Maiwan district, Kandahar province, of both the Platoon Leader (a Lieutenant) and Platoon Sergeant (a Sergeant First Class) of 1st Platoon, B Company, 2-3 IN (to which Bales belonged), and the reasons for that. See also CC Exhibit AAA (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the 1st Platoon Team Leader, at PDF Page 300) & Exhibit BBB (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the 1st Platoon Team Sergeant, at PDF Page 306)</p> <p>(Soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)</p>

	<p>by an Infantry Specialist, possibly the one on overnight Operations Center on-call duty) soon came into the ANA tower to speak to the interpreter, too, the interpreter had them come with him to the Afghan workers' room to observe the headcount there, which accounted for all of the Afghan soldiers. The ODA SSG <i>"had the ANA open up all locked doors and allow me to search them."</i> While they were at the ANA (or on the south/southeastern) side of the base, a U.S. Infantry Sergeant joined them and told them that Bales was missing.</p> <p>Upon being awakened by PFC Guinn just after 3:10 AM, SFC X, worried that someone had been <i>"kidnapped,"</i> went <i>"immediately"</i> to the Operations Center, where he (as well as Captain Fields at some point) also told SSG McLaughlin (still on guard on the roof, presumably) to conduct a roll-call of all of the men on base from the 2-3 IN. That's apparently when McLaughlin himself ran to check on the whereabouts of Bales.</p> <p>Staff Sergeant McLaughlin, leader of 1st Squad, told CID that he soon awoke Sergeant Godwin (who'd been acting as leader of 3rd Squad for Bales, who'd chosen a role akin to Platoon Sergeant for himself), to tell him to conduct the 3rd Squad roll-call – although Private First Class Guinn told CID that he was the one who awoke Godwin, by order of SSG McLaughlin, as detailed below. (The actual Platoon Sergeant for the 1st Platoon, 2-3 Infantry squads at VSP Belamby – a Sergeant First Class – was stationed at VSP Ezabad. An Infantry request to deploy the Platoon Leader or the Platoon Sergeant to VSP Belamby with their 2-3 IN squads was turned down by the Special Forces.) SGT Godwin told CID that a Private (name redacted) woke him, after Bales was already known to be missing from his room.</p>	
3:15 AM	U.S. Guard Heard Gunfire To The South Of VSP Belamby	Sources
	<p><i>"At about 0315,"</i> just <i>"a few minutes"</i> before PFC Guinn came back to tell the roof-top guards (the medic PFC and presumably still SSG McLaughlin) that Guinn couldn't find Bales, <i>"we heard gun fire coming from the south towards the town of Naja Bien,"</i> the medic told CID. The medic thought that 2-3 shots were fired, closer to the base than was usual.</p> <p>McLaughlin told CID that he didn't hear any gunfire that night on guard duty, although the guards he'd relieved had told him about the gunfire the guards before them had heard;</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 48 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by a Private First Class medic, who was on the Operations Center roof from 3:00 AM until about 3:30 AM that night)</p> <p>CID Exhibits 115 & 156 (11 March 2012 and 13 March 2012 sworn statements by SSG McLaughlin)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 126 (14 March 2012 CID Photo Packet, with an index, documenting certain locations at VSP</p>

	<p>McLaughlin may have been elsewhere by 3:15, however, responding to orders from SFC X and/or Captain Fields to conduct a roll-call of all infantry soldiers on base.</p> <p>The medic then started scanning the surrounding area with "the thermals" (infrared night-vision equipment) to see if he could spot anyone outside the VSP, but saw nothing.</p> <p>At 3:30 AM, the medic was relieved early from roof-top duty so that he could join in a search of the base for the missing Bales, which was being organized as the rest of the base was being awakened for roll-call, or accountability, checks and to help with the search. The medic told CID:</p> <p><i>"About four or five [of] us searched the compound. We searched from the north end to the south end then from east to west. The only place we did not search was the ANA compound that is located on the west."</i></p> <p>(Based on the CID and CC photos of the base, the medic is referring to ANA structures on the central part of the southern part of VSP Belamby's main compound, more or less south of the Helicopter Landing Zone.)</p>	<p>Belamby, as of about 11:00 AM that day per CID Exhibit 111, Page 16)</p> <p>CC Exhibit CCCC (27 March 2012 photos of VSP Belamby taken by BG Waddell's investigation team during a site visit, at PDF Pages 426-437)</p>
3:20 AM	SSG Bales Couldn't Be Found To Conduct Infantry Roll Call	Sources
	<p>By about 3:20 AM, PFC Guinn (and/or the PFC who'd also checked the room) had reported to SSG McLaughlin that they couldn't find Bales – after checking Bales's room, the restroom, the Operations Center, the MWR room (presumably meaning the 2-3 IN "B-hut" MWR room and/or the Operations Center Computer Room) and then the Operations Center roof – at which point McLaughlin told Guinn to wake up SGT David Godwin, Guinn told CID.</p> <p>McLaughlin told CID that he too soon ran to Bales's room, accompanied by a Sergeant First Class, and saw that Bales wasn't there and that his M4 rifle and borrowed Heckler & Koch pistol were missing.</p> <p>At about 3:25 AM, Captain Fields returned to the Operations Center, after speaking with the civilian interpreter and soldier(s) in the ANA guard post, and told SFC X what he'd learned. At that point SSG McLaughlin "returned" and reported as follows to SFC X and Captain Fields, according to SFC X:</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 49 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by the PFC who left guard duty at 1:00 AM and the Operations Center Computer Room sometime after 2:30 AM)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 116 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by PFC Guinn)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 129 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by PFC Guinn)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 53 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by the 2-3 IN Specialist who approached CID to tell them that the hair of SGT Godwin was wet at about 3:30 AM on March 11)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 72, Page 5 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a joint 12 March 2012 interview of four B Co, 2-3 IN soldiers with suspicions about the behavior or involvement of David Godwin and Jason "Mac" McLaughlin)</p>

"I have accounted for everyone except SSG BALES. We checked his room[,] and his weapon and some [ammunition] magazines are gone."

McLaughlin also told SFC X that SSG Bales's *"kit was there"* in the room – meaning that Bales wasn't wearing his full kit south of the VSP, which ANA PVT Tosh Ali told CID he thought he saw Bales wearing when Bales was apprehended later that morning – although ammunition magazines were missing from it.

SSG McLaughlin then told SFC X (as well as the Captain, then or soon thereafter) about part of the 2:00 AM Bales visit to McLaughlin's room. This information caused SFC X to start wondering whether Bales might have been sleepwalking, rather than kidnapped. As he did in his first sworn statement to CID, McLaughlin did not disclose to SFC X or to Captain Fields that Bales had told McLaughlin that he'd just killed people in Alkozai. SFC X described McLaughlin as *"panicking"* during this time period.

After hearing McLaughlin's report, SFC X *"immediately"* went door-to-door, at about 3:30 AM, to wake up all of the Special Forces soldiers (normally 12 men, but 8 that night, because 3 were in the hospital at KAF being monitored for TBI after the IED blast, and 1 was at KAF for another reason), and to ask whether anyone had seen Bales; while doing so, SFC X obtained 100% accountability of *"ODA and [non-infantry] attachments."* SFC X also told everyone to start looking for SSG Bales (by searching the base), and returned to the Operations Center to report to Captain Fields.

By about 3:45 AM, after FOB Zangabad had been called by Captain Fields, and Special Operations Task Force-South's Battle Captain at KAF's Camp Brown had been alerted to the situation, SFC X told a group of soldiers to get into full kit and prepare to leave the base on a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) patrol to search for Bales – which Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard was organizing – and then had an interpreter bring both Afghan National Army guards (Naimatullah and Tosh Ali) to him so that he could talk to them directly, SFC X told CID:

"When they arrived I asked the first one, who had guard between 0000 and 0200 local, if at any point he had seen more than one person around the gate [.] He said no and that he only saw one US soldier come in by himself. The other one stated that during his shift from 0200 to 0400 he only saw one US soldier leaving the gate and that he said hello in English and Sangai in Pashtu which means, how are you doing. There

CID Exhibits 115 & 156 (11 March 2012 and 13 March 2012 sworn statements by SSG McLaughlin)

CID Exhibit 122 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard, the Assistant Detachment Commander)

CID Exhibit 121 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class, *aka* SFC "X," evidently the acting Team Sergeant)

CC Exhibit F, at PDF Pages 102-103, regarding the U.S. and ANA personnel assigned to VSP Belamby on the night in question

(Soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)

was no doubt in their minds he was an American."

While they were explaining this to SFC X, the guards, the interpreter, SFC X, and the ANA Platoon Sergeant "walked to the front gate" SFC said. SFC X reiterated to CID that:

"I specifically asked them, at any point did they see more than one person, and they said [no]. I asked them this because I wanted to know if someone had taken one of our guys."

SFC X (who was evidently ODA 7216's acting Team Sergeant) added:

"Initially, I thought that insurgents had infiltrated the gate and taken one of our guys. [...] Once I talked to the ANA guards and they claimed that at no point there was more than one person, my reaction shifted toward the fact that maybe he was a sleepwalker."

SFC X described Bales this way, in response to a CID question:

"He was a passive leader. He never disagreed with anything that ODA members told him. He was always standing by and waiting for guidance from the ODA. He was very disciplined tactically. He never showed signs of aggression."

The PFC who'd been using Skype, before hearing Guinn's news about the gate activity, also reported back to the roof about the absence of Bales, and was then instructed to "search the whole camp through and through." After their search failed to find anyone, the PFC reported to the roof again (by now, apparently, to new guards), at which time, he told CID, the PFC "was instructed to go down and get in full kit so that we could go on a patrol to look for SSG Bales."

PFC Guinn told CID on March 14 that "initially when I woke [SGT Godwin] up I told him about the situation [Redacted/the Afghan interpreter] told me that two people had come inside the gate and another one went back out."

Uncharacteristically, said Guinn, Godwin didn't immediately come out of his room (in one of the "cans") when Guinn woke him, and when he did, Godwin stumbled into the door of the 2-3 IN squad barracks, or "B-hut," with his face and hands wet, Guinn said. Another soldier (a Specialist) told CID in a follow-up interview that Godwin's hair was wet at that time (about 3:30 AM). Then, when SGT Godwin saw that all of the infantry soldiers in his 3rd Squad, except for Bales, were gathered in the barracks meeting room (apparently with at least some of the 1st Squad soldiers too, for a total of 13-16 conventional Army

	<p>soldiers), Godwin told the soldiers <i>"to go to bed."</i> Godwin's actions, and the fact that two other soldiers said they smelled alcohol on SGT Godwin during that roll-call, made Guinn suspicious, Guinn told CID.</p> <p>Guinn's suspicions were shared by a Specialist, another Private First Class, and a Private, all from the same B Co, 2-3 IN unit as Bales. All four soldiers voluntarily approached a CID agent on March 12 to explain that they <i>"had concerns about there possibly being more than one American that left the VSP."</i></p>	
3:30 AM	<p>Five Alkozai Wounded, From North Of VSP Belamby, Reached FOB Zangabad</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>As first publicly detailed in media reports from the Bales Article 32 hearing held at Washington state's JBLM in November, 2012 – the Army withheld from public view the official transcript of the hearing – five wounded Afghan civilians were driven by a family member, in a borrowed white vehicle, to nearby Forward Operating Base (FOB) Zangabad that night.</p> <p>The five shooting victims – two of them, including the lone adult, too wounded to talk – arrived at FOB Zangabad, located just about a kilometer east of VSP Belamby, at or shortly after 3:30 AM, multiple U.S. soldiers told CID agents in sworn statements, CID's Report of Investigation reveals. All five wounded lived in a cluster of 3 homes located about 600 meters (0.60 KM) north of VSP Belamby. Those homes are known to their residents as "Ibrahim Khan Houses," according to surviving family members, and are apparently part of a larger nearby Alkozai settlement or village. (The U.S. military, as with every home in the vicinity, had numbered those homes, assigning #17 to the Sayed Jan home, and #16 to both the Mohammad Naim and Nazar Mohammad homes; the numbered homes are visible just south of an east-west gravel road labeled "Alpha Road" on Army Green Beret aerial maps photographed for the CID ROI, at PDF Pages 1180 and 1122.)</p> <p>The five wounded Alkozai civilians brought to FOB Zangabad by driver Faizullah Naim were adult Mohammad Naim, Faizullah's father, shot several times in the jaw and chest; Mohammad Naim's teenage daughter Parmina, shot several times in the chest and groin; Mohammad Naim's pre-teen son Sadiqullah, shot through the ear by a bullet that fractured his skull; teenager Rafiullah, Naim's neighbor to the west, shot in both thighs and possibly a finger; and Zardana, Rafiullah's 7-year-</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 58 (16 March 2012 sworn statement by the First Lieutenant Battle Captain from the conventional 3-21 IN HQ at FOB Zangabad that night)</p> <p>The aerial map locations of attacked homes and VSP Belamby were made possible by the invaluable on-site Zangabad research of Afghan reporter Mamoon Durrani</p> <p>Detail of injuries to the Sayed Jan family cow from an October, 2012 interview of Rafiullah by Lela Ahmadzai of 2470media.com</p> <p>CID Exhibit 54 (15 March 2012 sworn statement by a civilian MPRI Law Enforcement Professional, or LEP, at FOB Zangabad, responsible for looking into and reporting findings about <i>"such critical incidents."</i> An LEP report is <i>"always completed concerning such incidents"</i> and entered into the <i>"CIDNE data base,"</i> according to this LEP's sworn statement)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 261, Pages 2-3 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 30 May 2012 interview of Rafiullah by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, assisted by a female interpreter, at the Mandigak Palace - the headquarters of Provincial Chief of Police Raziq - in Kandahar city)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 315 (06 November 2012 US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory Firearms Interim Report detailing the ballistics evidence discerned from the submitted weapons and spent</p>

old sister, shot in the head.

Faizullah Naim did not live at the attacked [Ibrahim Khan Houses](#), and wasn't notified of the shootings at his father's home by phone, but in person by one or more of his brothers, who ran, and/or drove a motorbike, from the Naim home to knock on Faizullah's door in another nearby settlement – exact location unknown.

FOB Zangabad's Battle Captain, a 3-21 IN First Lieutenant (1LT), was notified by FOB security at 3:30 AM that an individual was standing to the northwest of the FOB's northern Entry Control Point (ECP) *"watching the tower."* Soon thereafter *"a group of Afghan civilians were observed pushing [a] vehicle to the north along our east wall to the ECP"* the Battle Captain told CID. The Battle Captain was soon informed by a roving U.S. guard, who moved to the ECP at the Battle Captain's request, that the vehicle was carrying five wounded Afghan civilians. The Battle Captain then alerted the base medics, and FOB Zangabad's 3-21 Infantry Executive Officer (XO), a Major, was notified – after 3:45 AM, but by 4:00 AM, the Major told CID. The Battle Captain's sworn statement then notes:

"Shortly after the medics arrived I received a call from VSP Belambay ODA, CPT [Redacted/Fields,] notifying me that their ANA guards reported that 1x US had walked off the VSP but ODA had not confirmed the report at that time. CPT [Redacted/Fields] requested I move the PGSS balloon to their area focusing to the south to see if we could see anything while he confirmed the report. It was at this time I notified CPT [Redacted/Fields] that 5x Afghan civilian casualties had arrived at FOB Zangabad. I directed the PGSS to move to the Belambay area focusing on the south of VSP Belambay looking for 1x US soldier. I also notified the [Battalion Executive Officer] for the possible missing soldier and he advised me to start a 100% accountability of the [Battalion]. I called the companies and initiated 100% accountability and then called [Brigade] to inform them of the possible missing soldier."

Evidently that order for a Battalion-wide 100% accountability check wasn't given until after 4:30 AM. The 3-21 Infantry Executive Officer at FOB Zangabad (the Major) was interviewed by CID on March 16th, and CID's summary of that interview states that the XO learned at 3:45-4:00 AM that civilians were seeking aide at the front gate of FOB Zangabad. Then, as summarized by CID, the XO said:

"MAJ [Redacted/the XO] stated he knew there were no patrols out that night and was skeptical about how they may have

ammunition)

August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing transcript, which contains this statement by lead prosecutor Army Lieutenant Colonel Joseph "Jay" Morse, on Transcript Page 961: *"[J]ust a thousand meters away at FOB Zangabad" Army doctors were working on wounded Afghans as Bales was walking back to VSP Belamby the morning of March 11*

CC Exhibit TTT, at PDF Page 399, which states that, immediately upon exiting VSP Belamby, a patrol was authorized to *"follow Route Charlottetown approximately one kilometer to the east until reaching the southwest gate at FOB Zangabad."*

CID Exhibits 212, 213, & 214 (CID's 2 April 2012 Crime Scene Examination of the Sayed Jan home; CID's Crime Scene Sketches of the layout of the home, including 3 sketches showing where evidence was found in Khudaydad's Room 1; one sketch of Room 6, the cow shed; and CID's 2 April 2012 Photo Packet of the Sayed Jan home, all at ROI PDF Pages 811-859)

CC Exhibit OOO (31 March 2012 sworn statement by FOB Zangabad's 3-21 IN Battalion Surgeon Captain Dillon, at PDF Page 366)

CID Exhibit 111, Page 22 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 16 March 2012 interview of Major [Redacted], 3-21 Infantry's Executive Officer at FOB Zangabad)

CC Exhibit (14 April 2012 sworn statement by one of the two NCOs acting as ODA 7216 Team Sergeant after MSG Uhrich's post-IED evacuation, at PDF Page 254, regarding ANA soldiers periodically scavenging spent ammunition brass to sell for income)

CID Exhibit 250 (CID photographs of aerial-photo maps - showing the numbers 16 and 17 on Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai, on the south side of "Alpha Road" - that were in the possession of SGT Godwin and/or SSG McLaughlin, at ROI PDF Pages 1180 and 1122)

CID Exhibit 37 (11 March 2012 initial one-page report by the Afghan Uniform Police about the killings, as translated)

been injured. About 0430-0445, 11 Mar 12, MAJ [Redacted/the XO] was notified a Soldier was reported missing from VSP Belambai and ordered a 100% accountability of all Soldiers on FOB Zangabad. MAJ [Redacted/the XO] stated he never received any information pertaining to more than one Soldier being involved in the shooting. MAJ [Redacted/the XO] stated he had not tied together what exactly happened until the ODA reported they found their missing Soldier and he was covered in blood. MAJ [Redacted/the XO] stated he was also not aware of any ODA missions the morning of 11 Mar 12, which they are normally notified of."

If the two US soldiers on roof-top guard duty at VSP Belamby between 1:00 and 1:50 AM that night in fact heard gunfire due north of the VSP, rather than northeast of the base (as one guard thought), and further away than they thought (about 600 meters, rather than "about 400 meters," or "relatively close"), the 8-20 shots they heard being fired – based on the total shots each guard estimated to CID for the sporadic gunfire they both heard from 1:20-1:40 AM – might have been some or all of the shots fired at residents of Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai.

If so, however, left unexplained is why an attack that, by implication, ended at 1:40 AM, about 600 meters north of VSP Belamby, and a little over 1 KM distant from FOB Zangabad, resulted in the arrival at the FOB of five bleeding victims more than an hour and a half later, at 3:30 AM – beyond the "golden hour" window of time in which the U.S. military strives to treat its battlefield casualties – assuming their injuries were in fact received by 1:45 AM that night.

BG Waddell's CC investigation asked the 3-21 IN Battalion Surgeon at FOB Zangabad, whose trauma team helped him treat the Alkozai shooting victims, about their seemingly delayed arrival:

"It appears that it was somewhere between an hour and a half and two hours from the time of the incident at Alkozai to the arrival of the patients at Zangabad. Could you tell if the patients had bled out a lot during that time?"

The 3-21 IN Battalion Surgeon, Captain Dillon, replied on March 31, 2012, at CC PDF Page 366:

"My training is as a family physician, so I am by no means an expert in determining how long someone has been without medical care. Given the amount of time that transpired, I would have expected the patients to have been much more seriously injured and in more profound shock from their blood

CID Exhibit 40 (Undated two-page report by the Afghan Uniform Police about the killings, received by CID on March 12, 2012, as translated)

CID Exhibit 111, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report list of the sequence of events that had been reported to SOTF-S's TOC at Kandahar Airfield's Camp Brown by 8:30 AM on March 11")

	<p><i>loss. Given the condition of the patients when they arrived, I did not think it had been hours; I thought it had been minutes."</i></p> <p>Faizullah Naim testified at the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing, at Transcript Page 629, that it's a 15-25 minute walk from the Naim home to Faizullah's home. (Media reports describing the November, 2012, Article 32 testimony, by video-feed from Kandahar city, of another Faizullah brother, teenager Quadratullah Naim, state that Quadratullah grabbed a motorcycle after the attack to drive to Faizullah's home for help.) A U.S. civilian Law Enforcement Professional at FOB Zangabad, who spoke with driver Faizullah through an interpreter that morning, did note in his sworn statement that Faizullah <i>"reported that he has taken wounded persons to FOB Zangabad in the past and that is why he brought them here this time."</i></p> <p>The Special Operations Task Force-South (SOTF-S) Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at Camp Brown on Kandahar Airfield was informed at about 3:50 AM that five wounded <i>"local nationals"</i> had arrived at FOB Zangabad.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">—————</p> <p><i>See the Addendum, at the foot of this Timeline, for more on the still-confusing sequence of events at Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai; for some details of the ballistics evidence that places Robert Bales in at least the cow shed of the Sayed Jan (Rafiullah) home that night; and for Alkozai-connected discrepancies in the undocumented, hastily compiled, incomplete crime-scene summaries, that seem, based on the public record, to be the final written investigative report(s) compiled by Afghan authorities (national police and army officials) - upon whom U.S. Army officers and investigators heavily relied to identify massacre casualties.</i></p>	
3:40 AM	VSP Belamby Called FOB Zangabad To Request Help Finding SSG Bales	Sources
	<p>Shortly after 3:35 AM, by which time ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields had learned that SSG Bales was missing, and had heard from SSG McLaughlin about part of the 2:00 AM conversation between McLaughlin and Bales, Fields placed a call to the nearby FOB Zangabad, and spoke with the conventional 3-21 IN Battle Captain First Lieutenant there. Fields asked the Battle Captain to focus FOB Zangabad's Persistent Ground</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 123 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by VSP Belamby's Commanding Officer, ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 22 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 16 March 2012 interview of Major [Redacted], 3-21 Infantry's Executive</p>

	<p>Surveillance System (PGSS) – or balloon-mounted “force protection” cameras – on the vicinity of VSP Belamby, particularly south of the base. The direction of the surveillance was apparently derived from the information of SSG Jason McLaughlin, who told the Captain that Bales had announced that he was headed next to Najiban. The 2-3 IN medic on rooftop guard duty who heard shots being fired at about 3:15 AM, toward Najiban, no doubt influenced the direction chosen for the surveillance, as well. Captain Daniel Fields told CID in his sworn statement:</p> <p><i>"My initial thoughts were that this guy must have been sleep walking, and that was actually the report I passed on to FOB Zangabad when I asked them for PGSS support."</i></p> <p>CID asked Captain Fields: “Are any of the Soldiers on the compound authorized to leave on their own?” Fields replied:</p> <p><i>"Absolutely not."</i></p> <p>CID then asked the Captain: “Was SSG Bales allowed to leave the compound that night?” Fields again replied:</p> <p><i>"Absolutely not."</i></p> <p>During the call with the Battle Captain in which Captain Fields requested surveillance help, the FOB Battle Captain informed Fields that five wounded Afghans had arrived for treatment at FOB Zangabad shortly after 3:30 AM. The Battle Captain then directed the FOB's PGSS operators <i>"to move to the Belambay area focusing on the south of VSP Belambay looking for 1x US soldier."</i></p> <p>In response to a CID question, the Battle Captain at FOB Zangabad that night – a 3-21 IN First Lieutenant – provided some PGSS details:</p> <p>"Q: What is a PGSS balloon?"</p> <p>"A: <i>I don't know what it [PGSS] stands for but I know that it is the large balloon we have in the sky and we have at least 7 or 8 kilometers full motion video. We also have infrared capabilities."</i></p> <p>Notably, interviews with the PGSS operators on March 16th, as summarized in CID Exhibit 111, Pages 19-20, indicate that before Captain Fields called the FOB for help, the FOB's PGSS operators had already been asked by the FOB's Tactical Operations Center <i>"to search the Belambai area neighborhoods for any movement."</i> This seems to be because, as the FOB</p>	<p>Officer at FOB Zangabad)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Pages 19-20 (Agent's Investigation Report summaries of 16 March 2012 interviews of the two FOB Zangabad PGSS operators)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 94 (16 March 2012 sworn statement by a Sergeant Major with HHC, 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment at FOB Zangabad)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 58 (16 March 2012 sworn statement with FOB Zangabad's HHC Battle Captain, a First Lieutenant)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 128 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by the Air National Guard 123 Special Tactics Squadron Technical Sergeant who was a Joint Terminal Attack Controller, or JTAC - also known by others as a Joint Tactical Air Controller - at VSP Belamby)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 124 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by an ODA 7216 SSG who trained the ANA, and fired at least 3 illumination flares from the VSP starting at about 4:00 AM)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 84 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Sergeant Ross O'Rourke, who helped fire 5-7 illumination flares from the VSP, starting at about 4:00 AM)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 119 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class James Stillwell, a medic newly arrived at the VSP)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 58 (16 March 2012 sworn statement by a 3-21 Infantry Battle Captain at FOB Zangabad, First Lieutenant [Redacted])</p> <p>CID Exhibit 265, Pages 1 & 2 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of Massouma Dawood's 14 June 2012 interview by U.S. Army CID Special Agent Leona Mansapit, as interpreted)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 172, Page 2 (Agent's Investigation Report detailing the data that CID received on 30 March and 31 March, 2012, from Kandahar Airfield, after FOB Masum Ghar had purged theirs, regarding flights near VSP Belamby that night)</p> <p>CC Exhibit EEE (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the Night Battle Captain</p>
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<p>Zangabad Battle Captain reveals in his sworn statement to CID (CID did not elicit further information on this point):</p> <p><i>"I asked the LEP [Law Enforcement Professional] to clarify the location of the attack [that had caused the injuries to the 5 civilians then at FOB Zangabad] so we could move the PGSS to that location. In the beginning the location of the attack and w[h]ere the TOC [the FOB's Tactical Operations Center] observed the car coming from were contradicting."</i></p> <p>CID did ask the FOB Battle Captain, as part of the same March 16th sworn statement, if he knew where the "3 civilians that were killed" resided. The Battle Captain replied:</p> <p><i>"They were also near VSP Belambay. [...] The reports we obtained were from Belambay Circle, maybe 100 or 200 meters east of VSP Belambay."</i></p> <p>The other PGSS operator told CID March 16th, as summarized: <i>"...they couldn't determine where exactly [the wounded civilians] came from."</i></p> <p>So, pending confirmation of the location of the attack, and/or the whereabouts of the soldier(s), from conscious witnesses Rafiullah, Sadiquillah, and/or Habibullah (an un-injured witness, and brother of Faizullah, who accompanied the wounded to the gate of the FOB, and reported three dead at Ibrahim Khan Houses, north of VSP Belamby), the FOB Zangabad PGSS cameras were evidently used in the meantime to scan on and around Belamby village, starting shortly after 3:30 AM. The approach of the Faizullah-driven vehicle to FOB Zangabad from the south and east, when the shooting occurred to the northwest of FOB Zangabad – a still-unexplained contradiction – evidently contributed to the confusion about where the five civilians had been attacked.</p> <p>However, by about 3:45-3:55 AM, Captain Fields had called FOB Zangabad to ask for PGSS coverage to locate a possible missing VSP soldier, and the FOB had ordered its civilian-operated PGSS cameras to focus on the countryside south of VSP Belamby as Fields requested.</p> <p>A Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Technical Sergeant (TSGT) with the Air National Guard's 123rd Special Tactics Squadron, who was attached to ODA 7216 at VSP Belamby, told CID that he too contacted FOB Zangabad for PGSS assistance that morning, after he was awoken at about 3:30 AM by SFC X (who told the TSGT that Bales was missing), and had dressed and reported to the Operations Center (opcen/OPCEN):</p>	<p>Officer In Charge, March 10-11, 2012, at the Operations Center of Special Operations Task Force-South, Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, at PDF Page 329)</p> <p>CC Exhibit FFF (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the Night NCO In Charge, March 10-11, 2012, at the Operations Center of Special Operations Task Force-South, Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, at PDF Page 333)</p> <p>(Soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)</p>
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"When I got to the opcen I asked Capt. [Redacted/Fields] if he requested any aircraft to assist with the search. I also asked for a sitrep so I could brief aircraft on the situation as they arrived overhead. Capt. [Redacted/Fields] told me all we [k]new at this point was that someone had left the front gate, returned and then left again and that Ssg Bales was nowhere to be found. I contacted the JTACs at FOB Zangabad via radio who stated they would assist with the search – with the PGSS balloon. They also stated they had five people report to the[ir] front gate saying an American had shot them. I suggested to Capt. [Fields] that we start firing 60mm mortar Illumination rounds to assist with the search. He agreed so I proceeded to the OPCEN rooftop with SSG [Redacted] to assist with the mortars and deconflict with any aircraft that came into the area. After firing a few illumination mortars I thought I heard helicopters so I exited the roof to retrieve my radios. After a few minutes the JTAC's contacted me and stated the PGSS balloon had spotted one person walking from Naja Bien towards our VSP."

One of two ODA 7216 Green Berets who fired the 60mm illumination mortars (apparently from about 4:00 AM to 4:45 AM) with the help of the TSGT was evidently SGT Ross O'Rourke, who also spent time guarding Bales upon his return, and was the soldier who gave Bales his HP laptop when he requested it. SGT O'Rourke told CID that, upon first being awoken by SFC X and told that SSG Bales was missing:

"I immediately grouped up with SFC [Redacted] and SGT. [Redacted] and searched the NE side of our camp, down the SE side. We then entered the ANA section and searched their rooms and common areas. After that I went to the South ANA post and the ANA guard urgently motioned to me, so I got an interpreter and was informed that a U.S. soldier had left the gate with a weapon. I immediately went and told our Captain [Redacted/Fields] who was already aware of this information. I went to the roof of our operations center with SSG. [Redacted] and we fired several flare mortar rounds, mainly towards the south. As I was told that someone heard shots in that direction. I came down from the roof and shortly after witnessed SSG. Bales enter the operations center with a few U.S. soldiers escorting him, and holding weapons."

CID asked SGT O'Rourke "How many flares did you and SSG [Redacted] fire off?" O'Rourke replied:

"About 5-7 illumination flares."

The other ODA 7216 soldier – a Staff Sergeant – who fired the

illumination flares with the help of the TSGT told CID that, after being awakened by SFC X, and learning "a few minutes later" that someone was missing [he apparently learned it was Bales from two infantry soldiers who helped him search the ANA compound]:

"Myself and SPC [Redacted] with a interpreter went over to the ANA compound and did a sweep of the area. During the sweep SGT [Redacted] came over to assist. I had the ANA open up all locked doors and allow me to search them. Once I had cleared the ANA compound I went back to the OPCEN and had heard that 4 to 5 wounded had gone to FOB Zangabad that were local villagers that were claiming to have been shot by one American. I was told to go to the roof top of the OPCEN and start shooting illumination rounds from the 60mm mortar. Some time later PGSS from FOB Zangabad said they had located one person going north on no name road. I continued firing illumination rounds south towards no name road until I heard that the person was on the road coming towards the front gate."

That ODA 7216 SSG told CID that he searched the ANA compound "because I deal with the ANA the most and train them, so I figured it would be me that went over there because they see me all the time." When asked if there was anything else that he'd like to add to his statement, the ODA 7216 SSG told CID something that he'd heard from a soldier who met Bales at the gate, that doesn't seem to have been mentioned by others:

"Yeah, I talked to [Redacted/CW2 Lance Allard?] afterward who was at the gate when he received SSG BALES and he [Redacted] told me that BALES thought that his own Soldiers had ratted him out for being gone and that if he knew he was going to get caught he would have kept going."

A similar Bales comment was heard by another Special Forces soldier, Sergeant First Class James Stillwell, a medic who'd arrived at VSP Belamby only the previous Monday (on March 5, the day of the IED explosions). As part of his sworn statement, CID asked ODA 7216 SFC Stillwell (who guarded Bales for about 30 minutes that morning, and offered Bales breakfast): "You also mentioned SSG BALES made the comment asking how you knew he was gone, what can you tell me about that?" SFC Stillwell answered:

"He obviously assumed he would not get caught. I just remembered something else that he said too. The junior 18B [Special Forces Weapons Sergeant] was up on the roof dropping illumination rounds in the air and lighting up the area

directly over us [between about 4:00 and 4:45 AM]. After BALES got back at some point, I don't remember when, he said 'when I saw the illum rounds, I knew I was fucked'."

As noted above, about 45 minutes after Captain Fields called the FOB for PGSS surveillance help – or sometime after 4:30 AM but by 4:45 AM, according to the 3-21 IN XO's interview – FOB Zangabad's Executive Officer ordered a Battalion-wide accountability check. A 3-21 IN Sergeant Major at FOB Zangabad told CID that he heard a radio message from the Battalion TOC at about 4:30 AM while he was at the FOB Aid Station, which twice stated that the Brigade had directed all units to conduct accountability of all personnel, due to the missing U.S. soldier.

Both actions (PGSS camera coverage south of the VSP, and the Battalion-wide roll-call) were taken more than an hour after witnesses heard the 2:00 AM beginning of gunfire near the Wazir home, and after the half-hour 3:00 AM attack at Massouma Dawood's isolated home had ended, according to Massouma's CID account. (If Massouma Dawood's timing is accurate, at about the same time that the VSP called the FOB for PGSS surveillance help, which would've been *"about 10 minutes after the Soldiers left"* the Dawood home, she was hearing more gunshots somewhere in the distance – direction unknown.)

The gunshots that Massouma Dawood heard in the distance after the attack at her home had ended would've been shortly before illumination flares began to be fired toward the south from the roof of VSP Belamby's U.S. Operations Center at about 4:00 AM.

Based on his sworn statement to CID, it was not long after 4:00 AM, or soon after VSP flares began to illuminate the countryside, that the Air National Guard JTAC Technical Sergeant at VSP Belamby – whose "basic responsibilities" were *"terminal control for air to ground munitions[,] aircraft position and altitude management and sensor management"* – left the VSP Belamby Operations Center roof to retrieve his radios because he thought he heard *"helicopters."* (The JTAC went to the Operations Center roof, while illumination rounds were being fired, in part to *"deconflict with any aircraft that came into the area."*)

[Presumably neither the JTAC thinking he heard helicopters, nor the two aircraft (Flights GM35 and GM37) that flew somewhere within 5 kilometers of VSP Belamby that night – according to a search of Kandahar Airfield records conducted after a Task Force Wings regular Army Captain at KAF "stated

	<p>he was sure there [were no flights or missions]" in the VSP Belamby area overnight – had anything to do with the "incident" SOTF-S's Operations Center had <i>"going on with another unit that we had not been able to bring up on the radio for about 5 hours,"</i> somewhere in SOTF-S's area of operations the same night – March 10-11, 2012. At any rate, Army CID agents evidently didn't question SOTF-S about the particulars of the "incident" that led to an unnamed Special Forces unit maintaining radio silence for five hours (the same night as the other so-called "incident" CID was investigating), to the surprise and concern of the unit's Battalion-level chain-of-command at Kandahar Airfield.]</p> <p>Starting at 3:45-3:55 AM, FOB Zangabad's PGSS cameras continuously scanned south of VSP Belamby, searching for movement or heat signatures, until a soldier was located in a field by the PGSS-mounted infrared camera just as a VSP Quick Reaction Force search party was preparing to leave the base to search for Bales.</p> <p>The PGSS operators then followed the soldier – who turned out to be Bales, and whose helmet and Night Observation Device (NOD) could be detected, along with his rifle – as he walked north through the farm fields, avoiding the road. Bales intermittently dropped to the ground as he walked, evidently to try to avoid detection when a VSP illumination flare was fired overhead, and held a heavy curtain-cloth around himself, apparently to try to avoid detection by the same PGSS infrared sensor that in fact detected his helmet and rifle, and followed him as he walked north and then east to the south-facing gate of VSP Belamby.</p>	
3:40 AM to 4:30 AM	FOB Zangabad Personnel Spoke To Four Alkozai Witnesses And A Relative, As Five Injured Afghan Civilians Were Treated	Sources
	<p>While FOB Zangabad's PGSS cameras were searching the countryside south of VSP Belamby, three of the wounded witnesses from Alkozai (Rafiullah, Sadiqullah Naim, and Parmina Naim, all shot at the central Mohammad Naim home of Ibrahim Khan Houses, north of the VSP) were conscious enough to give brief interviews at FOB Zangabad, as they were being treated, about how they were shot.</p> <p>Rafiullah was the most stable, and had seen more than the other two (at his grandfather Sayed Jan's home and at the</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 111, Pages 21-22 (Agent's Investigation Report summaries of the 16 March 2012 interviews of two Afghan "A-Team Security" guards at FOB Zangabad's Entry Control Point, as interpreted)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 44, Pages 9-10 (Agent's Investigation Report of the 16 March 2012 interview of an Afghan "A-Team Security" guard at FOB Zangabad's Entry Control Point, who helped search the Alkozai wounded, as interpreted)</p>

neighboring Naim home), and was therefore interviewed the most about what he'd seen. [In fact, teenager Rafiullah was later repeatedly resorted to by CID, to the exclusion of as many as 25 uninjured Naim family members, including adult wives, who were present that night (at least one of whom may have known the time of the attack, unlike Rafiullah), for evidence of what happened at the Naim home.] The other two wounded witnesses, Rafiullah's 7-year-old sister Zardana, and the lone adult, Mohammad Naim, were either unconscious or unable to respond to any questions due to the severity of their injuries. The five wounded were accompanied into FOB Zangabad by Faizullah Naim – one of Mohammad Naim's adult sons, who lived elsewhere and thus didn't witness the attack – who drove the borrowed vehicle that brought the five wounded to FOB Zangabad just after 3:30 AM that morning.

On a motorbike preceding, by about 15 minutes, the vehicle carrying those five Alkozai wounded, was Faizullah's brother Habibullah Naim, another adult male relative of three of the wounded, and an eyewitness (along with his never-interviewed wife) to the attack at the central Naim home. Habibullah, possibly a father of five, spoke to at least three US soldiers the day of the massacre (including two at the FOB Zangabad gate and, later, a CID agent, apparently at VSP Belamby), publicly spoke for the Naim family at the meeting that President Karzai held in Kabul on March 16th, and was quoted in a media report published on March 23rd. But by the time of the Bales Article 32 hearing in November, Habibullah was dead, having been killed by a U.S. helicopter airstrike in the intervening months.

By October 5, 2012, Afghan reporter [Mamoon Durrani](#) had learned about Habibullah's death from family members, and shared the news on twitter.com that day, or this information would likely never have reached beyond Kandahar. In 2015, Rafiullah's father Samiullah confirmed to Lela Ahmadzai of 2470media.com that Habibullah was killed in 2012 (reportedly on Tuesday, September 25), while he was tending irrigation machinery (probably putting oil in a water pump) supplying the garden near his home, or former home. The U.S. military apologized for killing Habibullah, according to a November, 2012 media report that happened to quote his relative Abdul Baqi, but – as is the dehumanizing U.S., and often Afghan, norm when Afghan deaths are reported in the media – didn't name the Afghan victim, or explain the circumstances of his death. Abdul Baqi is a nephew of Habibullah's father Mohammad Naim – the wounded adult whom Habibullah helped transport to FOB Zangabad on March 11th.

Mohammad Naim, testifying in person at the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing, noted the impact of the later loss of

CID Exhibit 111, Page 22 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of the 16 March 2012 interview of Major [Redacted], the Executive Officer of 3-21 IN, FOB Zangabad, who apparently was not asked to provide CID with a sworn statement)

CID Exhibit 111, Page 2 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of the 11 March 12 interview of Habibullah Naim by a CID Special Agent, apparently at VSP Belamby, as translated by a civilian ODA interpreter)

The first report of the death of Habibullah Naim came from Afghan reporter Mamoon Durrani of Kandahar city, on October 5, 2012:

<https://twitter.com/MamoonDurrani/status/254117942910930944>

<https://twitter.com/MamoonDurrani/status/254213863069847553>

Abdul Baqi detail via this November, 2012 *Al Jazeera* report:

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/11/2012111021051759278.html>

CID Exhibit 261, Page 2 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of the 29 May 2012 interview of Sadiqullah by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, assisted by a female interpreter, at the Mandigak Palace - the headquarters of Provincial Chief of Police Raziq - in Kandahar city)

CID Exhibit 247, Page 2 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 19 April 2012 interview of Rafiullah by a CID Special Agent utilizing photographs of the crime scenes)

CID Exhibit 261, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 29 May 2012 interview of Mohammad Naim by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, assisted by a female interpreter, at the Mandigak Palace - the headquarters of Provincial Chief of Police Raziq - in Kandahar city)

CID Exhibit 217, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of the Mohammad Naim home crime scene examination CID conducted on April 2, 2012)

his son and massacre witness Habibullah in the U.S. airstrike, as well as the lingering effects of his own severe injuries in the notorious March 11th killings, at Transcript Page 19, as interpreted:

"My life has changed dramatically. I used to have a land; I was a landlord. I had a garden; I was to make 30,000 to 40,000 rupees, Pakistani Rupees, for money [less than \$500 U.S. dollars]. Since then, I have no earnings. I had a son who used to go to that garden. And since my incident, he was also shot, killed; not even a gardener wants to go work over there in our land. So my life has been changing."

Habibullah Naim (who was apparently the only uninjured witness at the FOB that night) and four other Afghans (apparently friends or neighbors who accompanied the Alkozai wounded) were held at the gate of FOB Zangabad that morning, and – unlike Habibullah's brother Faizullah Naim (the driver of the white vehicle, but not an attack witness) – weren't permitted to accompany the five Afghan shooting victims when they were transported into the FOB's trauma center for treatment by U.S. Army doctors and medics.

A civilian interpreter working at FOB Zangabad for a 3-21 IN U.S. Army Sergeant Major (SGM), spoke that morning with two of the Afghans inside the FOB (the driver Faizullah Naim, and wounded teenager Rafiullah), and provided a sworn statement to CID, in English, which included two unusual statements in response to a CID Special Agent's questions. [This interpreter mentioned to CID that two (Pashto-to-Dari?) interpreters working for the (Dari-speaking?) Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) were also interviewing the wounded (Pashto-speaking) Afghans as they were being treated at FOB Zangabad's Battalion Aid Station.]

The SGM's interpreter was admittedly skeptical that the U.S. was responsible for the shootings – and told Faizullah as much, he told CID in English, noting that *"I come from America."*

According to the sworn statement of a U.S. civilian Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) at FOB Zangabad, the SGM's interpreter told the LEP – just outside the FOB Aid Station, where the victims were being treated, sometime after 4:00 AM – that (non-witness) Faizullah Naim *"is talking all kinds of shit, saying that the Americans did this."* The LEP told CID that the interpreter (who apparently spoke to Faizullah alone at some point, with no U.S. soldier present) *"went on to tell how he reprimanded [Redacted/Faizullah,] telling him why it was impossible that the Americans did this because they never conduct operations using just one man."*

CID Exhibit 219 (Photographic Packet containing an index and most of the photographs taken by CID during its April 2, 2012 crime scene examination at the Mohammad Naim home)

CID Exhibit 54 (15 March 2012 sworn statement by a U.S. civilian MPRI Law Enforcement Professional, or LEP, at FOB Zangabad, responsible for looking into and reporting findings about *"such critical incidents."* An LEP report is *"always completed concerning such incidents"* and entered into the *"CIDNE data base,"* according to this LEP's sworn statement)

CID Exhibit 94 (16 March 2012 sworn statement by 3-21 IN Sergeant Major [Redacted] at FOB Zangabad)

CID Exhibit 138 (16 March 2012 sworn statement, in English, by a civilian interpreter "from America," who was working at FOB Zangabad for 3-21 IN Sergeant Major [Redacted])

CID Exhibit 262 (16 May 2012 sworn statement by a Captain at the NATO ROLE 3, Multinational Medical Unit at Kandahar Airfield)

CID Exhibit 122 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard, the Assistant Detachment Commander, noting that Bales was taken into custody by CID and flown to Camp Brown at KAF)

CID Exhibit 59, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of the 12 March 2012 medical records of the five Alkozai wounded)

CID Exhibit 52 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 SSG Derek King, who, for 3 hours on March 11, guarded Bales alone in the Operations Center's "ASO" intelligence room – and who was present when Sergeant O'Rourke earlier handed Bales his HP laptop computer in the Medical Shed, at the request of Bales, and thus heard, while King and apparently O'Rourke stood just outside the Medical Shed, Bales break his HP computer)

CID Exhibit 91 (15 March 2012 sworn statement by Specialist Eddings, an S-2 female Human Intelligence soldier at HHC, 3-21 Infantry Battalion, 1-25 Stryker Brigade, who was awoken at

	<p>As the 3-21 IN Sergeant Major put it to CID:</p> <p><i>"The interpreter [Redacted] was talking to him [Faizullah/the relative of the wounded] and the relative told him that the Americans did it. [Redacted/The interpreter] told me that he told him that he was from America and that the Americans would not do it. After I heard on the radio traffic about the US Soldier missing I had [Redacted/the interpreter] ask the relative if he knew where the US Soldier went. The relative said that he did not know, but the people at the front gate might know, then I have SPC [Redacted/Eddings] go get SFC [Redacted] and had them go to the front gate to see if they could figure out where the US Soldier went."</i></p> <p>In reply to a CID question, the SGM added:</p> <p><i>"The individual [Faizullah] that we were talking to said the Americans did it."</i></p> <p>CID then asked: "To your knowledge was it clarified if it was one or more than one American?" The SGM replied:</p> <p><i>"No I did not ask and I don't believe anyone else asked either."</i></p> <p>While detailing what non-witness driver Faizullah told him inside the FOB that morning, the SGM's interpreter also told CID, in English:</p> <p><i>"He [Faizullah] said that so many were injured over there, but he just brought his family."</i></p> <p>Faizullah Naim actually brought his three wounded relatives and their western neighbor's two wounded grandchildren – all shot at the Mohammad Naim home – to the FOB. Two other young children, from the attached home abutting Naim's on the east (Robina/Noorbinak – a child interviewed by Australian TV, who testified about the murder of her father Nazar Mohammad at the Article 32 hearing, but was apparently never interviewed by CID – and another girl, apparently one of Robina's two surviving sisters) are known or reported to have been wounded at Ibrahim Khan Houses that night, but it's not clear if they, or that location, account for the SGM interpreter's "so many were injured over there, but" interpretation of Faizullah's statement.</p> <p>Then, regarding what wounded teen witness Rafiullah told him, apparently about the attack at the home of Rafiullah's grandfather Sayed Jan (west of Naim's), the SGM's interpreter</p>	<p>about 3:30 AM to help wounded female teenager Parmina - shot in the chest and groin - accept medical care from male U.S. Army personnel at FOB Zangabad that morning)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 92 (15 March 2012 sworn statement by a SFC from the HHC, 3-21 IN, 1-25 Stryker Brigade at FOB Zangabad, who was awoken at 4:15 AM by Specialist Eddings, and spoke to Habibullah Naim at the northern ECP gate)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 21 (A CD containing March 11 CID photos of the VSP Belamby Medical Shed and contents, including the damaged Bales HP laptop at PDF Pages 83-86; see also CID Exhibits 20, 22 & 23)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 56 (15 March 2012 sworn statement by the FOB Zangabad 3-21 IN Battalion Surgeon Captain Dillon)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 198 (24 March 2012 sworn statement by the 1-25 SBCT Brigade Surgeon Major Travis Hawks)</p> <p>CC Exhibit 000 (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the 3-21 IN Battalion Surgeon, Captain Dillon, at PDF Page 366, re the Air Force Pave Hawk detail)</p> <p>A Friday, March 16, 2012 meeting held by President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, where one witness (Habibullah Naim), and survivors and elders from other affected families gave video-recorded Pashto-language statements (Habibullah Naim spoke at the 57-minute mark of this recording): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbueAcJYMZo&feature=related</p> <p>CID Exhibit 1, Page 2 (13 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report, noting when CID agents first reached VSP Belamby March 11, and when Bales was handcuffed and transported from VSP Belamby to Kandahar Airfield's CID Office)</p> <p>With regard to the differences between interpreter (linguist) categories, see Footnote 31 on Page 12 of BG Waddell's CC Investigation Report Findings, at PDF Page 15</p> <p>(Name of Specialist Eddings via CID Exhibit 54, the LEP's sworn statement)</p>
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	<p>told CID:</p> <p><i>"He [Rafiullah] said that [the soldier he saw] was in a uniform wearing a cloth over his head and face like a mask. I asked him how could you see he was an American and told him that he could be anybody. He [Rafiullah] said he could see the trousers were a uniform."</i></p> <p>In multiple media interviews, Rafiullah, as interpreted, simply states that the soldier he saw at his grandfather's home was bare-headed, or wearing no helmet. In the SGM interpreter's account, however, no distinction seems to be made between the two homes where Rafiullah encountered a soldier, so it's possible that this description applies to the soldier that Rafiullah may have seen, as well as heard, at the neighboring Naim home, where Rafiullah ran from his grandfather's home to hide during the half-hour attack, and where he and others were eventually shot (and, in the case of Rafiullah's grandmother Nikmarghah, killed) in Room 2.</p> <p>In what was likely either the first or second interview of Rafiullah conducted at FOB Zangabad that morning (the SGM's interpreter may have spoken to Rafiullah first), Rafiullah told the LEP's Category II interpreter (a citizen or permanent resident of the U.S. or its allies, eligible for a security clearance), as summarized by the LEP for CID:</p> <p><i>"In the second Aid Station tent [at FOB Zangabad] was located the fifth patient [Redacted/Rafiullah,] son of [Redacted/Samiullah] and brother of [Redacted/Zardana] (patient number four, paragraph 8). He stated that he lived with his father in the Village of Kodozai (a subsection of Alkozi) in the compound of [Redacted.] [Redacted/Rafiullah] claimed that he was sleeping when he awoke to gunfire inside the compound. He said that it was approximately 0230 to 0245 hours when he awoke, but could not explain how he knew the time. [Redacted/Rafiullah] said that he got up to run outside when he saw a single gunman shooting his "machinegun." He also saw one dead person in the yard. He could not see the gunman because of a very bright light coming from the weapon which blinded him. [Redacted/Rafiullah] said that the gunman also had a pistol on his side. Shots were fired at him as he ran from this building, across a narrow path "used for motorcycles," and into the next structure [the Mohammad Naim home]. According to [Redacted/Rafiullah,] the gunman chased after him firing several rounds from his "machinegun." Inside the second structure, the gunman started shooting other people. Sometime during this event, [Redacted/Rafiullah] was injured. During the interview, I, LEP [Redacted,] did not see where [Redacted/Rafiullah] was</i></p>	<p>(Names of Major Hawks and Captain Dillon via the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing transcript and, for Hawks, Article 32 media reports)</p>
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wounded, but assumed it must have been somewhere on his lower legs. According to the interpreter, [Redacted/Rafiullah] continued to comment on the bright light and stated several times that he could not remember because he was so scared."

Then, in reply to a CID question, the U.S. civilian Law Enforcement Professional added:

"He was very specific that he said this incident occurred between 0230 and 0245. He did not have a watch on and when he was asked about how he knew the time he would just stop talking. He also kept referring to a "machine gun" but it is unclear what type of weapon was used as he may not have known the types of weapons. He stated the bright light really scared him and he did not remember much."

[This is the witness whose repeated, varying accounts to CID were later used by Army prosecutors to build much of their narrative of the Alkozai killings upon. Afghan police authorities and other Afghan officials may have used Rafiullah's early accounts to build their hastily compiled, and apparently never revisited, outline of the killings upon, as well.]

Rafiullah was also the first Afghan witness of the attacks to be interviewed by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent. That interview took place before noon March 11th at the Kandahar Airfield military hospital, shortly after Rafiullah arrived there following his initial FOB Zangabad treatment, and subsequent medical evacuation by air to KAF as a civilian casualty.

Shortly after CID's (weather-delayed) midday arrival at VSP Belamby on Sunday, March 11th, Habibullah Naim became the second Afghan witness of the attacks, and the first uninjured witness, to be interviewed by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent (apparently at VSP Belamby). (A total of just three *uninjured* Afghan witnesses were ever interviewed by CID – witnesses, each interviewed only once, who were present at only two of five crime scenes.) But for some reason – unlike his father Mohammad Naim, younger brother Sadiqullah Naim, and teenage neighbor Rafiullah (all injured) – CID never again interviewed Habibullah Naim, before he was (apparently mistakenly) killed by a U.S. airstrike in the fall of 2012.

In his sole interview with a CID Special Agent, through a civilian ODA 7216 interpreter, at about 4:45 PM on Sunday, March 11, 2012, husband and father Habibullah Naim included the following details, according to the Agent's Investigation Report summary of the interview (although the Army, as it did throughout the CID's ROI, redacted the names in this account, it's clear that this is Habibullah speaking, because of a

recorded public statement Habibullah made on March 16th, and because his name was inadvertently left unredacted in a summary of what he told two U.S. soldiers at the gate of FOB Zangabad early that morning, about the attack at the Ibrahim Khan Houses section of Alkozai, approximately half a kilometer north of VSP Belamby):

"Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] stated his family was in their compound sleeping when 10-12 Soldiers came into his village and went into the first compound, shooting one woman; however, another woman escaped and warned him. Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] stated he heard lots of gunfire inside the nearby compounds when a guy came into his house and shot his father in the shoulder when he tried to run. [...] Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] was asked if there was more than one Soldier that came into his compound, at which time he stated there was about 10-12 and he claimed to have seen multiple Soldiers. Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] was asked how he escaped if there were so many Soldiers surrounding his compound, which he stated was possible because they were running around into the compounds and didn't see him escape [over a wall]. Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] stated he was told by his wife the Americans were only shooting the males, so she told him to run away while she stayed in the compound. [...] Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] was asked if he was aware of any other persons killed or injured [at this point in the summary, the CID has recorded Habibullah describing only soldiers "shooting one woman" in the "first compound," without specifying whether she was killed], at which time he stated there were two dead bodies in the compound that was connected to his, which house an older male, known as [Redacted/Nazar Mohammad] and his wife (NFI). [NFI apparently means No Further Information.] Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] stated the first compound that was attacked had NAZARAKA [Nazar Mohammad] and a little girl (NFI) shot, which have already been buried. Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] was asked how he knew there were multiple American Soldiers attacking his compound, at which time he indicated that there were multiple people talking loud and in the English language around his compound during the attack. Mr. [Redacted/Habibullah] was asked if he saw any of the American Soldiers or saw what they were wearing, which he stated he did not because of how dark it was at the time."

The same information about escaping over the wall was relayed by Habibullah Naim, in Pashto, to an Afghan civilian guard at the FOB Zangabad gate that morning, and to President Karzai during a recorded public meeting in Kabul on Friday, March 16, 2012. Unlike his CID interview on the afternoon of March 11th, and lone media interview published

March 23rd, in his March 16th Kabul statement Habibullah apparently did not mention seeing multiple soldiers (see the translation in the [Addendum](#) below). If the CID Special Agent asked Habibullah what time the attack at his home occurred, CID did not record his answer.

Two U.S. soldiers separately provided sketchier versions to CID of the first account that Habibullah gave to Americans, through an interpreter, at the FOB gate between 4:15 AM and 5:30 AM that morning – an account that may not have mentioned 10-12 soldiers, or his escape over the wall, and, amid the obvious early panic and confusion, under-counted the number of Alkozai dead and wounded. The Afghan casualty count – names unmentioned – was the focus of the sketchy interview summaries those U.S. soldiers provided to CID.

Before Habibullah Naim was interviewed by those two American soldiers, as a civilian Afghan guard at the FOB gate later told CID, through an interpreter, *"the driver of the motorcycle was crying and said 'we have injured and dead body,'"* while another civilian Afghan guard, who helped search Habibullah at the FOB gate, told CID, through an interpreter, that Habibullah *"was crying the whole time,"* and that Habibullah told the guards that *"he didn't know who was alive and who was dead,"* according to CID summaries of two "A-Team Security" guard interviews with CID agents. Both of those Afghan security guards went off duty at 4:00 AM on March 11th.

The two U.S. soldiers – a female Human Intelligence (or "Human Terrain") Specialist named Eddings and a male Sergeant First Class – interviewed Habibullah at the northern gate (or Entry Control Point) of FOB Zangabad sometime between 4:15 AM (when Bales was still missing) and 5:30 AM on March 11th – in part because the 3-21 IN Sergeant Major had told Eddings that the Army was still trying to verify where and how the attack had happened and where any U.S. soldier(s) involved had gone. The Afghan interpreter who the two U.S. soldiers used at the gate worked for the security guards at FOB Zangabad and the U.S. soldiers told CID that they didn't know his name (Eddings told CID that the gate interpreter was bald with a medium build, and the SFC told CID that he had a heavy build and was wearing a black knit cap).

Earlier, before she awoke the SFC, Eddings was told inside the FOB by an interpreter with grey hair and beard, whose nickname she knew, that Faizullah stated, when Eddings asked him "where the incident happened," that *"it happened in Belambai village circle near an Afghan National Army (ANA)*

and Coalition Forces (CF) base.” (That interview may have been the source of the FOB Battle Captain's confused information about the attack location. That confusion may have been caused by interpreters and soldiers assuming that the residence of non-witness Faizullah – location unknown – was where the injuries and deaths occurred.) Later, Habibullah Naim evidently told both U.S. soldiers during his interview with them at the FOB gate that he was “from the village of Kuriazai.” Notably, as part of his sworn statement to CID about the gate interview of Habibullah, the U.S. SFC said:

“During the questioning [of Habibullah Naim], I felt the interpreter we were using had a change of demeanor once [Redacted/Habibullah] was explaining that it was an American Soldier that had caused the incident. I was starting to feel a bit uncomfortable asking further questions with the interpreter.”

“Q. Do you feel as though he interpreted correctly?”

“A. *For the most part yes. However, I personally feel that some information that was asked, and information that was responded to was lost in interpretation.”*

According to another Afghan civilian A-Team Security gate guard, whose interpreted interview CID summarized, one of the five wounded civilians at the FOB gate – possibly Habibullah Naim's teenage sister Parmina Naim, who CID interviewed the next day, apparently for the first and last time on the written record – spoke to the Afghan guard, as he and his colleagues were searching (and in one case questioning) the wounded Afghans at FOB Zangabad's gate, to say:

“Our family is dying here please do something for us.”

The U.S. Army 3-21 Infantry Battalion Aid Station personnel at FOB Zangabad – including both 3-21 Battalion Surgeon Captain Dillon and 1-25 Brigade Surgeon Major Travis Hawks, assisted by multiple FOB medics – did quickly do something for all five wounded Afghan civilians, using routines they'd honed through several mass casualty events since taking over the area from the Canadians - *“who took everything home with them,”* Major Hawks told the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing, at Transcript Page 696, resulting in the construction of a new aid station tent. The FOB Aid Station was also experienced at treating more routine trauma injuries suffered by Afghan civilians and soldiers, who received initial treatment at the FOB before being transported to the distant hospital(s), usually by Afghan police vehicles or aircraft.

	<p>After more than an hour of triaged trauma treatment at FOB Zangabad's ("Role 1") Aid Station, all five Alkozai wounded, and Faizullah, were flown in two US helicopters (one at about 5:30 AM, and, after the weather had deteriorated, requiring an "Air Force Pave Hawk" aircraft to be used for the second trip, the other by about 9:00 AM), to Kandahar Airfield's "NATO Role 3, Multinational Medical Unit" (MMU) military hospital for further care.</p> <p>Five Alkozai wounded and Faizullah thus reached Kandahar Airfield by air (and both Faizullah and Rafiullah had been interviewed by U.S. CID agents at KAF) before Bales was airlifted out of VSP Belamby at 12:55 PM [more than seven hours after Bales returned to the VSP, took a shower, changed clothes, had breakfast, packed a bag, and asked for and received access to his personal HP laptop computer, all while under guard by one or two Special Forces soldiers].</p> <hr/> <p><u>See the Addendum</u> at the foot of this Timeline, for more on the still-confusing sequence of events at Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai; for some details of the ballistics evidence that places Robert Bales in at least the cow shed of the Sayed Jan (Rafiullah) home that night; and for Alkozai-connected discrepancies in the undocumented, hastily compiled, incomplete crime-scene summaries, that seem, based on the public record, to be the final written investigative report(s) compiled by Afghan authorities (national police and army officials) - upon whom U.S. Army officers and investigators heavily relied to identify massacre casualties.</p>	
4:36 AM	<p>FOB Zangabad's Infrared Sensor Operators Located SSG Bales</p>	Sources
	<p>At 4:36 AM, an hour after Alkozai wounded reached FOB Zangabad, and about 45 minutes after FOB Zangabad cameras began searching for him, Bales was spotted by the Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) operators (civilian contractors working for Navmar Applied Sciences Corporation), from their FOB location about a mile east of VSP Belamby.</p> <p>Two civilians apparently worked as a team to operate the FOB cameras: One control room operator scanned terrain with the camera(s)/sensor(s), and the other watched their output on monitors. A civilian who doesn't seem to be a native English</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 186 (18 March 2012 sworn statement by the NAVMAR employee who was watching the PGSS camera monitors when Bales was located at 4:36 AM, March 11)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 187 (18 March 2012 sworn statement by the NAVMAR employee who was guiding the PGSS cameras with hand controllers when Bales was located at 4:36 AM)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Pages 19-20 (19 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report)</p>

<p>speaker was operating the PGSS camera <i>"hand controllers"</i> when the request came in to FOB Zangabad's Tactical Operations Center (TOC) at about 3:45 AM, from VSP Belamby, for help looking for a U.S. soldier who <i>"may be missing."</i></p> <p>The teammate of the man controlling the cameras told CID in a sworn statement that <i>"knowing the area better than"</i> his teammate, and <i>"because I knew where the ODA compound is located,"</i> he took over the hand controllers from his teammate, when the TOC told them to <i>"scan the area to the south of the outpost and attempt to locate this individual."</i> This camera operator spoke with ODA 7216 Captain Fields by telephone and <i>"Cpt. [Redacted/Fields] further informed me that the person may have been sleepwalking."</i> The operator used the infrared or <i>"thermal sensor to look for this individual"</i> and <i>"per information from the TOC, I scanned to the south of the ODA compound, and widened my search as time went on."</i></p> <p>The civilian operator watching the monitors told CID in a hand-written sworn statement that:</p> <p><i>"I saw the heat spot. Told [Redacted/his teammate] to go back. There is a body that [was] moving to Belamay FOB ODA. We followed him to FOB ODA."</i></p> <p>Then the operator added:</p> <p><i>"First I saw heat spot on our IR [infrared] camera. Then turn to a body as we followed the body."</i></p> <p>The civilian operating the infrared camera explained it this way to CID:</p> <p><i>"At approximately 0436 I located the missing individual in a field to the south of the ODA compound. Within approximately one minute of my initial observation of the individual, I saw him drop into a prone position. While he remained in the spot, I scanned the area that it appeared that he was coming from for movement. I saw no movement in the area that he appeared to be coming from."</i></p> <p>"Were you familiar with the area he was coming from?" CID asked the civilian operating the camera. The operator replied:</p> <p><i>"Yes, it is an area we scan all day long. It is an area that is known for insurgent activity."</i></p> <p>Then he repeated that, in the hour preceding 4:36 AM, and until 4:54 AM (before dawn) – which is when they <i>"discontinued scanning that area and returned to a normal</i></p>	<p>summarizing a 16 March 2012 interview of, apparently, the NAVMAR PGSS operator at the hand controls when the FOB's infrared camera located Bales)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report list of the sequence of events that had been reported to SOTF-S's TOC at Kandahar Airfield's Camp Brown by 8:30 AM on March 11th)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 123 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 94 (16 March 2012 sworn statement by a HHC 3-21 IN Sergeant Major at FOB Zangabad)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 58 (16 March 2012 sworn statement by the HHC 3-21 IN First Lieutenant who was Battle Captain at FOB Zangabad that night)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 46 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by a 3rd Squad Specialist responsible for positioning two RG mine-resistant trucks to defend the base when needed)</p>
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scan of the entire battle space” - he saw “no movement or people,” aside from Bales and those at the VSP who disarmed Bales.

Two days before he made that sworn statement, the same civilian (it appears, although the name is redacted), who was operating the hand-controllers when Bales was located, told CID, as summarized in the Agent's Investigation Report:

“CPT [Redacted/Fields] contacted the TOC and stated he believed a Soldier was sleepwalking, which Mr. [Redacted/the PGSS civilian who began operating the cameras] thought the Soldier may have entered a building and fallen asleep because they could not find any movement. About 0434-0435, Mr. [Redacted/PGSS civilian operator] stated he was scrolling the area south of the VSP, which was an area raided by the ODA twice within the last five weeks, and identified a person in the prone position who appeared to be wearing a ‘man dress’. [...] Mr. [Redacted/PGSS civilian operator] stated during the time he was searching, he did not see any other movement in the surrounding areas.”

His monitor-watching teammate, on the other hand – when asked by CID “What did you witness in the village?” - wrote, in English:

“Around the area we found the soldier I saw 2 body moving to and from house to house. It does not look normal. Because of the way this 2 body walking and running. This is not usually routine the way Afghan doing in the morning at this village.”

That operator told CID, when asked, that he did not report what he saw to anyone.

Reports to CID of the distance Bales walked while under FOB Zangabad camera surveillance, beginning at 4:36 AM, vary. According to a timeline of events reported to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of Special Operations Task Force–South (SOTF-S) at Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, and provided to a CID Special Agent at 8:30 AM on March 11th by SOTF-S's Battle Captain, First Lieutenant [Redacted]:

*“About 0435, 11 Mar 12, surveillance cameras were able to locate and identify a person crawling in a field about **500 meters** south of VSP Belambai, who also appeared to be carrying a rifle and had NVG's [Night Vision Goggles].”*

ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields told CID in his March 13th sworn statement that shortly after 4:30 AM, “right before” a patrol was due to leave the base to search for Bales:

*"...the PGSS personnel from FOB Zangabad called and stated that they identified one individual approximately **400 meters** south of the VSP site moving north towards the VSP site and appeared to be wearing NVGs."*

A 3-21 Army Infantry Sergeant Major at FOB Zangabad described to CID what he saw on the PGSS camera monitor, when Bales was first spotted at 4:36 AM:

*"I walked in right after they got a visual on an individual that resembled a soldier. When I walked in he was on the north/south-running road about **600** [meters] from Balambai. He appeared to be pacing back and forth and had what looked like an M4 on his side. He started walking north toward route Charlottetown, he then took a right on route Charlottetown. He then started to do an airborne shuffle then started walking. He walked up to the front gate, and during this whole time LT [Redacted] was talking with the ODA and telling them his location."*

FOB Zangabad's Battle Captain, another First Lieutenant (name also redacted), told CID that:

*"...the PGSS identified 1x individual in a field approximately **800m** south of VSP Belambay. The PGSS was able to identify the individual was wearing some type of shawl and a Kevlar helmet with NVGs attached. The PGSS was also able to identify the individual was carrying a weapon. The PGSS followed the individual as he traveled generally north towards VSP Belambay staying in the field. This information was passed to both [Brigade/Colonel Todd Wood] and to ODA. The individual stayed in the field until approx 100m south of [Route] Charlottetown. Once he arrived at RTE Charlottetown he turned east and walked towards VSP Belambay. About half way to VSP Belambay he began running until he arrived at the VSP."*

(400 meters due south would place Bales at least 200 meters north of Dawood's and at least 600 meters northeast of Wazir's; 800 meters due south would place Bales south of the Dawood home, and at least 200 meters northeast of the Wazir home.)

One 2-3 Infantry Specialist's account to CID indicates that Bales was walking north about 70 meters west of VSP Belamby (apparently on or near a north-south "No Name Road," which is about the same distance west of the Dawood home), before he turned east on Route Charlottetown as he neared the base. This SPC, who was part of the Bales-led 3rd Squad, also told

	CID that "We were told that no one was allowed outside of the camp" and "That has been a standing order."	
4:47 AM	Bales Reached The Gate of VSP Belamby	Sources
	<p>ODA 7216 Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard was designated by ODA Captain Daniel Fields to lead a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) patrol outside the base to search for Bales, which started being organized at about 3:30 AM at VSP Belamby, shortly before FOB Zangabad's cameras were asked to start searching for Bales. The patrol was delayed by the need for a 4:30 AM "crypto changeover" and refilling of radios, but had been organized and gathered at the gate and was on the verge of leaving the base when FOB Zangabad reported that their PGSS cameras had spotted, at 4:36 AM, what appeared to be a soldier south of the VSP. Then, as CW2 Allard told CID in his sworn statement:</p> <p><i>"I immediately pushed SSG [Redacted/McLaughlin] and SGT [Redacted/Godwin] to the front of the gate to assist with recovery. While at the front gate we noticed an Infrared strobe coming from the west. We began to call out to SSG Bales and he began to respond back. Just in front of the gate SGT [Redacted/Godwin] had SSG Robert Bales stop and lower his weapons to the ground. SSG Robert Bales was disarmed and searched at the gate. I then escorted SSG Robert Bales to the Operation Center and had him sit on the cot in the room with CPT [Redacted/Fields]. I then moved to the equipment room to put up my gear. When I returned to the area in front of the room SGT [Redacted/Godwin?] was there with the weapons that SSG Robert Bales had on him, I then assisted SGT [Redacted/Godwin?] with clearing of the weapons. I then moved into the room where SSG Robert Bales was sitting with CPT [Redacted/Fields.] CPT [Redacted/Fields] began to ask SSG Robert Bales [] questions about what had happened and SSG Robert Bales stated that he did not wish to tell us anything about what happened. CPT [Redacted/Fields] then made the decision to move SSG Robert Bales from the room and he was placed under guard of [ODA] SGT [Redacted/O'Rourke] and [ODA] SSG [Redacted/King]. CPT [Redacted/Fields] and I began working the issue to have SSG Robert Bales removed from the VSP site. At around 1130 the UH-60 arrived to secure SSG Robert Bales and take him to Camp Brown on Kandahar Airfield."</i></p> <p>In fact, a flight to the VSP from Kandahar Airfield, to take Bales to KAF's Special Forces Camp Brown, had not only launched, but had apparently reached the VSP, by about 6:00</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 122 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Chief Warrant Officer 2 Lance Allard, the Assistant Detachment Commander)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 156 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by 2-3 IN Staff Sergeant Jason McLaughlin)</p> <p>CID Exhibits 33 & 75 (13 March 2012 and 12 March 2012 sworn statements by 2-3 IN Sergeant David Godwin)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 123 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 121 (13 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 SFC X, evidently the acting Team Sergeant on March 11)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 52 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Staff Sergeant Derek King)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 119 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class James Stillwell, a medic who arrived at VSP Belamby March 5th)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 81 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Sergeant First Class Clayton Blackshear)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 84 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by ODA 7216 Sergeant Ross O'Rourke, who unpacked and handed the personal HP laptop computer of Bales to him, when asked, while Bales was under guard in the Medical Shed at VSP Belamby)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 118 (12 March 2012 sworn statement by an Air Force Senior Airman "weather guy" who was one of the attachments or enablers assigned to ODA 7216 at VSP Belamby)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 1, Page 2 (13 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report, noting when CID agents first reached VSP Belamby March 11, and when Bales</p>

AM, before plans were changed – perhaps when the decision was made to notify CID – so the aircraft returned to KAF without Bales. The first four CID Special Agents to arrive at VSP Belamby recorded that they arrived at 12:50 PM on Sunday, March 11th (after a weather-caused delay). CID then handcuffed Bales, who had put on his IOTV body armor by then, evidently now over his full uniform, and at 12:55 PM, March 11, 2012, Bales left VSP Belamby by air for KAF, with one CID Special Agent and two Camp Brown 7th Special Forces Group SSGs as escorts. SSG Bales reached Kandahar Airfield by 1:30 PM that day, half an hour after he left the VSP, where he'd been under guard since his pre-dawn return and apprehension, eight hours earlier.

[For some reason, probably having to do with the arrival of multiple U.S. and Afghan officials at the VSP that morning, including their commanding officers, both the ODA Captain and the acting Team Sergeant seemed to think, and told CID, that Bales departed the VSP hours before he actually did, and other accounts to CID by VSP soldiers likewise fail to accurately cite the hour of his departure.]

In questions following his statement, CID asked CW2 Allard: "What did you say when you called out to SSG BALES as he was approaching the VSP gate?" Allard answered:

"I think that they were saying something like "Hey Bobby" and I maneuvered behind the fence just in case because I didn't know what his mental status was at the time."

SGT Godwin told CID that he and SSG McLaughlin stood at the VSP Belamby gate for about 15 minutes, calling Bales's name, before seeing him 50-100 meters down Route Charlottetown to the west, headed their way. Then, Godwin said in his second sworn statement to CID:

"When SSG Robert Bales was within 3-5 meters away, I ordered him to drop his weapons and gear and put his hands up."

Or, as Godwin put it in his first sworn statement to CID the day before, he told Bales to:

"Stop, drop all weapons and equipment, and put your hands up."

CID asked CW2 Allard "What was his response?" Allard replied:

"Once they got him in and they halted him and started to disarm him, I think his exact words were 'What, are you

was handcuffed and transported from VSP Belamby to Kandahar Airfield's CID Office)

CC Exhibit (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the SOTF-S Operations Center Night Shift NCOIC, noting who was sent from Camp Brown on the first flight sent to retrieve Bales)

The news article from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing, by Adam Ashton of *The News Tribune* (reporting that "soldiers at the [VSP Belamby] outpost had been growing beards, and the sergeant should have had a month's worth of growth on his face"):

<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/crime/article24740128.html>

(Soldier names via media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing)

kidding me?'. I told him that we didn't know what happened and it was for his safety and ours."

Or, as Army lead prosecutor Lieutenant Colonel Joseph "Jay" Morse put it, in his closing argument at the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing (Transcript Page 963), the first SSG Bales response to SGT Godwin's order was:

"Are you fucking kidding me?"

ODA 7216's CW2 Lance Allard also told CID what Bales was wearing when he returned to the VSP:

"He had this cape thing, Multi-cam pants and I think he had a T-shirt on, but I am not positive about that. He had his helmet on his head and that is how we picked him up and saw him."

SSG Jason "Mac" McLaughlin, one of two 2-3 IN soldiers who took Bales into custody, after drinking with him late the night before, told CID:

"He was not wearing body armor."

SSG McLaughlin added:

"He said ['Mac,] you ratted me out. I trusted you with my life!"

Multiple US soldiers told CID, and CID's evidence collection documents, in photographs and text, that Bales wasn't wearing body armor on his return to the VSP that morning, and neither a radio nor eyeglasses were taken from him. See CID Exhibit 73 (beginning at ROI PDF Page 260) for a detailed list of the 21 items that Bales was wearing or carrying south of the VSP, as well as the photograph of a bearded Bales, without eyeglasses, taken after his return to the VSP, at CID Exhibit 45 (ROI PDF Page 182).

(All the soldiers at VSP Belamby had been growing beards for at least a month, according to a media report from the Article 32 hearing.)

SFC Clayton Blackshear, one of the senior members of ODA 7216, told CID that, after FOB Zangabad's PGSS operators had reported seeing a soldier south of the VSP moving north toward the base "on No Name Road":

"At this time I was directed to grab a shotgun with non lethal rounds to interdict SSG Bales at the gate. By the time I had done this and was on my way I saw CW2 [Redacted/Allard]

with SSG Bales coming toward my location. SSG Bales was wearing multicam bottoms that were ripped, a tan [green] t-shirt, and he was covered in blood. I moved to the OPCEN with the rest of the leadership where I discovered that he had multiple weapon systems, many [were] covered in blood. [...] We then pushed everyone out of the OPCEN minus CPT [Redacted/Fields,] SFC [Redacted/acting Team Sergeant SFC X,] CW2 [Redacted/Allard,] and I. We asked SSG Bales what had happened from start to finish. He basically pleads the fifth. [...] We then placed SSG Bales under armed escort by two ODA members [until about 8:30 AM, when his guard was reduced to one ODA escort], had him get cleaned up and changed and kept him under supervision until the arrival of CID [at 12:50 PM]."

ODA 7216 Captain, Daniel Fields, explaining to CID why Bales was allowed to shower and change clothes:

"SSG Bales requested to clean up, so we gave two 18-series Special Forces soldiers the responsibility of guarding SSG Bales."

The acting ODA 7216 Team Sergeant, SFC X, told CID that, shortly after Bales returned and told them "I'd rather not tell you guys" what he'd done:

"We then got a call from the SOTF-S Battle Captain that there was a bird inbound to pick him up and that we might have to provide two escorts. Not knowing exactly what he had done, we decided to have him change clothes and not show up to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) with his clothes in the state they were in. I then told SFC [Redacted/Stillwell] to examine him to make sure [he's] not hurt or have any hidden injuries. He later came back letting me know that all he had were minor bruises and scratches. The aircraft showed up about twenty minutes later but was turned around to KAF to go pickup [an] official escort. During this time SSG Bales was [being] guard[ed] in the Medical Shed..."

The Air Force "weather guy" attached to ODA 7216 briefly took over for one of the Special Forces guards, as Bales was finishing his shower, and told CID:

"I relieved [Redacted] and assisted [Redacted] on guarding Bobby for a short time. During this time frame he made several comments: 'Aww man, at least you could put a team [Special Forces] guy to guard me,' 'Soo weather guy, what's the weather going to do... Is it going to rain?' The comments were made in a joking manner."

ODA 7216 Staff Sergeant Derek King was one of those tasked with guarding Bales, shortly after Bales refused to tell the ODA leadership what he'd done:

"Approximately five minutes later or so [after having been told to standby outside the OPCEN while Bales was being questioned there] SFC [Redacted/SFC X?] grabbed myself and SGT [Redacted/O'Rourke] and told us that we were to maintain guard on SSG Bales until we got him out on a flight. Also, we were told to have him clean up and look presentable to be taken to KAF. At that point the leadership brought him out and SGT [Redacted/O'Rourke] and I then walked with him over to his room. When there he proceeded to get undressed and get ready to take a shower. SGT [Redacted/O'Rourke] and I then walked with him to the shower and he began to take his shower. [...] Once he got dressed and ready to go he began to pack up his rucksack. [...] Also while we were there [in the MEDSHED near the Helicopter Landing Zone awaiting the flight to KAF] he had asked to see his laptop [that he'd packed in his rucksack]. So SGT [Redacted/O'Rourke] pulled it out of his rucksack and gave it to him. SGT [Redacted/O'Rourke] and I were both outside the MEDSHED just pacing around and I heard a crack. I turned around and he had broken his laptop. He then placed it in a black trashbag that was sitting underneath the stretcher. [...] Soon after that SFC [Redacted/SFC X?] came over to us and told us to move to the ASO [intelligence] room inside the OPCEN. He also told SGT [Redacted/O'Rourke] that he was good and could go help out around the camp, pulling security. From there, SSG Bales and I sat in the ASO room for approximately 3 hours. [...] Soon after we began to eat our food [at lunchtime] SFC [Redacted/SFC X?] came in and told SSG Bales to get up and get ready to move to the helicopter."

In his sworn statement, ODA 7216 Sergeant Ross O'Rourke, who guarded Bales along with SSG King for at least an hour after Bales was escorted out of the Operations Center, told CID:

"The door to the medical conex was open, because SSG [Redacted/King] and I were standing outside, while he [Bales] sat alone in the conex. At some point he asked that we remove his laptop. I think he said so he could give it to someone. I pulled it out of his rucksack, and he grabbed it, and attempted to destroy it. He broke the screen off, and dropped it on the ground. Either myself or SSG [Redacted/King] moved it away and put it in the black trash bag under the litter we were sitting on [earlier]. I later informed SFC [Redacted/SFC X?] that it was there, and he promptly passed it on to the CID members."

	<p>CID asked SSG King, then guarding Bales along with SGT O'Rourke: "Why do you think SSG BALES destroyed his computer?" King replied:</p> <p><i>"I have no idea."</i></p> <p>CID then asked King: "Do you know what SSG BALES was accessing on his computer?" SSG King replied:</p> <p><i>"No, I was outside the MEDSHED. I heard the crack and I went in and it was damaged."</i></p>	
<p>Between 10:00 PM March 10 and 6:00 AM March 11</p>	<p>Two Aircraft Flew Near VSP Belamby Overnight, KAF Records Later Revealed</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>There may be corroboration for what VSP Belamby's Air National Guard Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC, <i>aka</i> the Joint Tactical Air Controller) Technical Sergeant told CID that he thought he heard on March 11 - "<i>helicopters</i>" - from the roof of the VSP Belamby Operations Center shortly after the Technical Sergeant helped fire up a few illumination flares at about 4:00 AM:</p> <p>On March 30, 2012, a CID Special Agent "<i>received information [from Kandahar Airfield, since the closer FOB Masum Ghar had purged its data] pertaining to the flights in and around VSP Belambai from 2200, 10 Mar 12 – 0600, 11 Mar 12. The information indicated there were seven flights during that time frame; however, only two flights (GM35 and GM37) were in the vicinity of VSP Belambai.</i>"</p> <p>The next day, March 31, 2012, the CID Special Agent "<i>received additional hour by hour information pertaining to flights GM35 and GM37 flight paths around VSP Belambai.</i>"</p> <p>Before obtaining that information from Kandahar Airfield's records, CID, on March 29th:</p> <p><i>"...coordinated with MAJ [Redacted,] Task Force Arctic Wolves, Forward Operating Base Masum Ghar...at which time he stated Task Force Arctic Wolves did not maintain information pertaining to flights for more than 1-2 days due to the amount of space required to store the information, which required to</i></p>	<p>CID Exhibit 172, Page 2 (Agent's Investigation Report detailing the data that CID received on 30 March and 31 March, 2012, from Kandahar Airfield, after FOB Masum Ghar had purged theirs, regarding flights near VSP Belamby that night)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 128 (14 March 2012 sworn statement by the Air National Guard 123 Special Tactics Squadron Technical Sergeant who was a Joint Terminal Attack Controller, or JTAC - also known by others as a Joint Tactical Air Controller - at VSP Belamby)</p>

	<p><i>be purged (deleted or overwritten) often. Additionally, MAJ [Redacted] stated his unit was in the process of re-deploying, and has purged all of their systems."</i></p> <p>CID then asked Kandahar Airfield for assistance, also on March 29th, and:</p> <p><i>"...coordinated with CPT [Redacted,] Task Force Wings, 25th Infantry Division, KAF, at which time he stated he could conduct a search of the system to determine if there was any flights or missions conducted in the Belambai area on 11 Mar 12; however, CPT [Redacted] stated he was sure there was nothing during that time frame because they were responsible for sending out the Medical Evacuation helicopters and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for a reported person[nel] recovery mission. CPT [Redacted] was requested to search a five kilometer radius around the Belambai area from 2200, [10] Mar 12 – 0600, 11 Mar 12."</i></p>	
6:23 AM	Special Forces Alerted The U.S. Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID)	Sources
	<p>At 6:23 AM on March 11, 2012, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) investigation was initiated, at the Kandahar Airfield CID office, when Lieutenant Colonel [Redacted], Staff Judge Advocate, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) – which was then commanded by U.S. Army Brigadier General Christopher Haas, previously the commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group - <i>"reported an American soldier killed and/or injured several Afghan local nationals near Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai."</i></p> <p>The SJA's notice to CID occurred before CFSOCC-A learned that civilians were also killed at homes south of VSP Belamby.</p> <p>Matthew Hoffman, an Army Military Police reservist and civilian police detective in Phoenix, Arizona, apparently supervised CID's investigation of this mass murder from the Kandahar Airfield CID office, assisted by 17-18 other CID Special Agents.</p>	<p>Pages 4-5 (overall PDF Pages 10-11) of CID's Report of Investigation for ROI No. 0107-12-CID379-77597</p> <p>Media reports from the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing</p>

<p>8:00 AM</p>	<p>U.S. Army & ISAF Officers, Still Unaware Of The Murders South Of VSP Belamby, Focused On "Consequence Management"</p>	<p>Sources</p>
	<p>An excerpt from the March 31, 2012 sworn statement given to BG Waddell's CC investigation by the Special Operations Task Force-South (SOTF-S) Night Battle Captain/Officer-In-Charge of the March 10-11, 2012 overnight shift in the Camp Brown Tactical Operations Center (TOC, or "Ops Center") at Kandahar Airfield:</p> <p><i>That night, we had an incident going on with another unit [location unstated] that we had not been able to bring up on the radio for about 5 hours. [...] About 0340 hours, I get the call from [Redacted/ODA 7216 Captain Daniel Fields?]. He said he thought they had someone missing. After the initial shock of that statement, he gave me all the specifics; as far as he knew, SSG Bales had been gone for about 30 minutes. They had already conducted 100% accountability, and they were going to do it again just to verify. At that time, neither SSG Bales' NODs (Night Observations Device) or his weapon were accounted for. [...] At around 0350 hours, even before we started the PR [Personnel Recovery] event, we got a call from Task Force [Redacted/Arctic Wolves at FOB Zangabad] who said that five local nationals were brought to their location. They also said that there were 3-4 people dead, not at that location. So, after I hung up, I called the JOC [the Joint Operations Center higher up the chain of command] to attention and let everybody know that information. The person from TF [Redacted/Task Force Arctic Wolves at FOB Zangabad] also said the person who brought the five people to the FOB (Forward Operating Base) said that they'd been in a gunfight with Americans, plural. We continued to battle track to find out what was going on, a missing Soldier...</i></p> <p><i>[...]</i></p> <p><i>"At 0800 [March 11, 2012], at RC-South [the regular Army's ISAF Regional Command-South], they had a consequence management meeting. At approximately, 0820 hours, [Redacted/ODA 7216 Captain Fields?] called back and said he had a guy that lived about 100 meters off of VSP Belambai who said he had four dead bodies in his house, and he said he also heard that in another village, a whole family had been killed. That was the first we heard that information in the Ops Center. That report obviously matched the earlier [3:50 AM] report we received from Task Force [Redacted/Arctic Wolves at FOB Zangabad] that said there were three dead bodies that were not at FOB Zangabad. So, this new information effectively confirmed that report. At about 0915 hours,</i></p>	<p>CC Exhibit EEE (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the Night Battle Captain Officer In Charge, March 10-11, 2012, at the Operations Center of Special Operations Task Force-South, Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, at PDF Page 329)</p> <p>CC Exhibit FFF (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the Night NCO In Charge, March 10-11, 2012, at the Operations Center of Special Operations Task Force-South, Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, at PDF Page 333)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report list of the sequence of events that had been reported to SOTF-S's TOC at Kandahar Airfield's Camp Brown by 8:30 AM on March 11th)</p> <p>CC Exhibit KKK (1 April 2012 sworn statement by an ISAF Joint Command officer - possibly the deputy COMISAF - at IJC Headquarters who assisted IJC Commander, or COMIJC, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti, at PDF Page 352)</p> <p>The March 11, 2012 <i>Reuters</i> account describing four deaths in the family of 20-year-old "Jan Agha": http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/11/us-afghanistan-usa-witnesses-idUSBRE82A0A420120311</p> <p>This March 11, 2012 photograph, by Afghan reporter Mamoon Durrani, of the interior of Room 2 (the bedroom) of the Mohammad Dawood home, showing bloodstains, Afghan investigators, Mohammad Dawood's mother-in-law Haji Annay (as named to 2470media by Dawood's brother Mullah Baraan in 2015), and a clock on the wall, with its hands at 7:10 o'clock: http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/7_10_am_photo_by_reporter_mamoon_durrani_of_the_dawood_family_bedroom_and_wall_clock_after_the_3_am_murder_of_mohammad_dawood_march_11_2012.jpg</p>

[Redacted] came back from the consequence management meeting and verified a family had been killed and he was able to break down the number of women and children and their relationships. During this time, we were still putting everything together and my replacement was on shift. As far as key leader engagement, the initial reaction from the locals was pretty hostile. As I was leaving shift at about 1100 hours, there was about 150-200 people at VSP Belambai's gate. At that time, we had a team that was ready to go: everything that we needed to support the team was there. They had their riot control gear because of the Quran burning was two weeks prior to this, but there was nothing hostile happening."

Note that Ibrahim Khan Houses is at least 400 meters north of VSP Belamby. And the earliest reports the U.S. Army received of the dead at those homes, given by Faizullah Naim and Habibullah Naim to regular U.S. Army personnel at FOB Zangabad, between about 3:30 AM and 5:30 AM, March 11, mention just three dead (neither had apparently yet learned of the death of 2-year-old Toraki/Gulalai, daughter of their murdered neighbor Nazar Mohammad).

So the new information received by SOTF-S's TOC at 8:20 AM (although the TOC night shift NCO-IC gave the time of that report as 7:00 AM in his CC statement) – apparently directly from Special Forces Detachment Commander Captain Fields at VSP Belamby – about “a guy that lived about 100 meters off of VSP Belamby who said he had four dead bodies in his house” tends less to confirm than to confuse. [Particularly given the same-day [Reuters account](#) of a family of four killed in one home, location unknown, as described by surviving 20-year-old family member and witness Jan Agha.]

But whoever that unnamed man was at the gate of VSP Belamby during the early daylight hours of March 11, if it was a man from Ibrahim Khan Houses of Alkozai, neither his identity, nor his Army-numbered-and-mapped home location 400-600 meters “off of VSP Belamby” were apparently known, or of enough interest to carefully document, to the VSP Belamby soldier(s) who reported the man's account to SOTF-S at KAF.

Note, too, that Camp Brown's night-shift Battle Captain makes no reference, in his March 31, 2012 CC investigation account, to having learned of the murder of Mohammad Dawood, south of VSP Belamby, as of the end of his shift at 11:00 AM on March 11th. Yet by 7:10 AM that morning, an Afghan reporter had photographed at least one gloved Afghan investigator – from the Afghan Uniform Police? – examining blood stains inside the Dawood bedroom.

From a sworn statement to the CC investigation on April 1, 2012 by [Redacted/possibly the Deputy COMIJC] at the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) Joint Command (IJC) HQ, explaining what IJC "Command General" or COMIJC U.S. Army Lieutenant General (LTG) Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti was focused on in Kabul that morning, in consultation with ISAF Deputy Commander General Bradshaw and the American Embassy:

"The specific guidance General Scaparrotti was communicating to [U.S. Army Regional Command-South (RC-S) Commanding] General [James] Huggins was that they were already reaching out to [Kandahar province] Governor Wesa in the south, and also to Brigadier General Razziq [Kandahar province Chief of Police]. Those were two instrumental individuals that were going to help us mitigate this and being involved."

[...]

"When the president [Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai] directed them [the Afghan National Army leadership] to conduct a visit, they needed military lift; so we were working feverishly trying to get them air transportation [from Kabul to Kandahar]. Unfortunately, the weather at the time [March 11-12] was inhospitable, so we were not able to get them out there for a day and a half; but we continued to work and continued to support them. To make a long story short, we were able to fly [Afghan National Army Chief of Staff] General [Sher Mohammad] Karimi and his delegation out to Kandahar [Airfield, presumably] and then they were able to catch a rotary wing from Kandahar to VSP Belambai. They were the[n] able to do their walk-about. I use the word walk-about instead of investigation; they really did not do an investigation, because from the reports and the discussions we have had with General Karimi, they really just talked to a couple of witnesses. The purpose of their visit was to do mitigation for the PoA [President of Afghanistan], and show the Government's face to the people of Belambai and in Panjwa'i. This delegation received aggressive harassing fire and they did lose an ANA member from that delegation. Before the delegation visit was over, General Scaparrotti offered General Karimi to meet with our CID agents; General Karimi accepted that offer. We were able to coordinate that meeting. General Scaparrotti told General Karimi that the meeting would be for a restricted audience. [...] Because of the condolence payments, the families are moving on. [...] In summary what I would share with you is the KLE [Key Leader Engagement] management and consequence management was aggressive and it was based on experience. We've learned from the Koran burning, how to get out in front of it; and I would say we did get out in front of it."

By Noon	Vehicles Carrying Bodies Began Parking Outside VSP Belamby's Gate	Sources
	<p>Something was certainly "out in front": Multiple minivans and pickup trucks carried bodies of murder victims to the road in front of VSP Belamby during the daylight hours of March 11, 2012. Local residents also came to the VSP that day, on motorbikes and by foot, where they gathered at and near the gate of the base – about 100 male villagers by 10:00 AM, and 150-200 men and boys by 11:00 AM, according to reports that reached the Army Special Forces command at Kandahar Airfield's Camp Brown. The male villagers are visible in March 11th photographs and videos of the parked vehicles taken by Afghan reporters and photographers – the only members of the media who were on the ground in Panjwai.</p> <p>But those members of the Afghan media – whose footage was used by news outlets around the world – were evidently the <i>only</i> people who made a record of the vehicles and the civilian murder victims driven to the base that day – the same day the victims were to be buried, as Afghan and U.S. officials knew.</p> <p>Instead of being invited into the base, mere feet away, as a gesture of condolence and respect, or for documentation and evidence collection by U.S. Army (and/or Afghan) CID agents who'd arrived at the VSP by 1:00 PM, the vehicles were instead left to themselves and the locals – and, briefly, a few Afghan officials protected by Afghan security forces – as they parked for varying amounts of time along the east-west gravel road ("Route Charlottetown") abutting the VSP's south-facing gate.</p> <p>There, just outside the VSP, that stark and undeniable evidence of mass murder remained, unexamined by CID or any American official – although perhaps, if not recorded in photographs taken from a VSP guard post by anyone in authority (as some Afghan media photos were), at least briefly recorded on FOB Zangabad's PGSS aerial surveillance system. Unexamined and undocumented, yet viewed long enough by one American official to provide evidence of their presence for those who dismiss the accounts of Afghans. That official was a conventional U.S. Army Colonel who briefly stopped to view the bodies in four of the vehicles on his way into the base at about 1:00 PM, as detailed below.</p> <p>Afghan media, who'd arrived from Kandahar city independently, and with Afghan officials, photographed at least 7 or 8 vehicles carrying victims, as local villagers viewed them, while U.S. and Afghan military officials and politicians – who</p>	<p>CC Exhibit DDD (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the Special Operations Task Force-South (SOTF-S) Commander, the Battalion-level command, based at Kandahar Airfield, for the Special Forces detachments running VSP Belamby, at PDF Page 322)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 111, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report list of the sequence of events that had been reported to SOTF-S's TOC at Kandahar Airfield's Camp Brown by 8:30 AM on March 11th)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 1, Page 2 (13 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report, noting when CID agents first reached VSP Belamby March 11, and when Bales was handcuffed and transported from VSP Belamby to Kandahar Airfield's CID Office)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 175 (16 March 2012 sworn statement by 1-25 Stryker Brigade Commander Colonel Todd Wood, who arrived at VSP Belamby at about 1:00 PM on March 11)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 260 (21 May 2012 sworn statement by Colonel Todd Wood, who, with his Task Force Arctic Wolves unit from FOB Masum Ghar, had returned home by then to Fort Wainwright, Alaska)</p> <p>August, 2013 Bales Sentencing Hearing testimony of Colonel Todd Wood, at Transcript Pages 736-738</p> <p>CID Exhibit 259 (11 May 2012 sworn statement by a Corporal, then at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, who was formerly with HQ and HQ Company, 1-25 SBCT, FOB Masum Ghar, who saw the body of "a little girl in a red outfit" in one of about three vehicles that were outside VSP Belamby when he drove by in the rear air-guard position of a Stryker vehicle)</p> <p>BG Waddell's AR 15-6 Command Climate (CC) investigation findings at Page 38 (PDF Page 41), regarding the Afghan and U.S. officials who gathered at VSP Belamby on March 11, 2012</p>

quickly arrived by air and ground from the Panjwai district center, Kandahar city, Kandahar Airfield, Camp Hero near KAF, FOB Zangabad, FOB Masum Ghar, and, apparently, even from Kabul (Afghanistan Border & Tribal Affairs Minister Asadullah Khalid) – quickly gathered, by early afternoon, inside VSP Belamby to “mitigate” the “event” and “manage consequences.”

[Mid-afternoon at VSP Belamby on Sunday, March 11, 2012, ranged from 2:00 AM March 11, Alaska time, to 6:00 AM ET Sunday morning on the east coast of the United States.]

Although at least a few Afghan officials viewed some or all of the bodies outside the VSP, the identities of the victims brought to the base do not seem to have been formally recorded or documented – at least not publicly – by any Afghan or American authorities at the scene. Those authorities were admittedly fearful of the crowd of villagers gathered outside (though they were being guarded by armed Afghan security forces), but yet evidently wouldn't ask the vehicles to enter the base, where Americans and Afghans should have been able to view and document the victims without risk of harm to themselves.

Some surviving family members *were* invited into the base that day (at least the Afghan Army part of the base), so the fact that the vehicles carrying their family's victims were not, while Khalid and Raziq and others worked to get the victims driven away to be buried as soon as possible, perhaps speaks for itself.

The Special Operations Task Force-South (SOTF-S) commander at Kandahar Airfield – a key part of the chain-of-command for the Special Forces soldiers at VSP Belamby, which had jurisdiction over the investigation – arrived at VSP Belamby by air with the regular Army CID agents at 12:50 PM that day, while vehicles full of bodies were still parked outside, and probably still arriving – vehicles that, but for the Afghan media who'd arrived and started photographing them, would have remained virtually invisible on the public record.

The SOTF-S commander's March 31, 2012 sworn statement to BG Waddell's CC investigation indicates that he deferred to a hasty, poorly documented “official” Afghan version of events, while the highest ranks of the U.S. military were busy with the politicized task of arranging for Afghan colleagues to assure the locals, and the world, that no stone would remain unturned by U.S. (CID) investigators - who were meanwhile failing, on March 11, to document some of the most irrefutable, time-sensitive evidence made available to them:

CC Exhibit EEE (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the Night Battle Captain Officer In Charge, March 10-11, 2012, at the Operations Center of Special Operations Task Force-South, Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, at PDF Page 329)

CC Exhibit FFF (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the NCO In Charge, March 10-11, 2012, at the Operations Center of Special Operations Task Force-South, Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, at PDF Page 333)

CC Exhibit PPP (29 March 2012 sworn statement by the Battle Space Owner, a conventional Army 3-21 IN Lieutenant Colonel based at FOB Zangabad, at PDF Page 368)

CC Exhibit MMM (3 April 2012 sworn statement by the U.S. Army “mentor” or “partner” of District Chief of Police for Panjwai district LTC Sultan Mohammad, at PDF Pages 358-360)

CC Exhibit KKK (1 April 2012 sworn statement by an ISAF Joint Command officer - possibly the deputy COMISAF - at IJC Headquarters who assisted IJC Commander, or COMIJC, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti, at PDF Page 352)

Media footage of the vehicles, including this photograph, which shows Minister Asadullah Khalid on the right, Kandahar Provincial Council member Agha Lalai Dastgeeri (in the turban), and presumably U.S. Army Colonel Todd Wood next to Dastgeeri:
http://images2.corriereobjects.it/gallery/Esteri/2012/03_Marzo/afghanistan-soldati-usa-strage/01/img_01/afg_08_672-458_resize.jpg?v=20120311193435

The first unredacted version of the June 1, 2012 Bales Charge Sheet to be made public (in 2015):
http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/unredacted_june_1_2012_second_bales_charge_sheet_from_record_of_trial_october_2015.pdf

March 11, 2012 photographs of vehicles that carried victims to VSP Belamby's gate, grouped by family, where known:

Vehicle 1 (Probably Wazir family victims, ten of whom were burned, from

"I really think, with the Quran burnings and this shooting, that if there's a success story to be taken away from this tragedy, it would be the level of Afghan participation in maintaining a level of control – consequence management, really. That morning, with the risk of the masses that we saw moving, we took General Habibi, the commanding officer of the [ANA] 205th Corps, up on his offer for reinforcements. I flew out with the CID (Criminal Investigations Division) and got in touch with some of the key Afghan figures to help with the consequence management. [General Razziq](#) [Kandahar province's Chief of Police] is definitely a heavy hitter down there in the south, and we had just had lunch with him a few days prior to the incident. [...] I had interacted with other key leaders in the past, and I felt very comfortable with them and felt that they were there to help us. There was another gentleman whom I had not met before, but who is also a very big political figure, was a minister [[Asadullah Khalid](#), Afghan Border & Tribal Affairs Minister, and later head of the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan's CIA-mentored intelligence agency] who had come in from Kabul. They were all a big help on that first day to get the local populace to stay manageable and stay calm and not erupt into violence or attempt to storm the front gate, which I think was a tremendous asset. [...] Two days after the event, a delegation came by; some were from Kabul [including ANA General Karimi] and I believe some of those personnel were their investigative team. They pulled me off to the side and started asking questions. I was absolutely careful not to release any protected information with regards to his name, his family, where he lives, etc. [...] Beyond that, I was trying to set up a Shura either there at the base, or at the school immediately off of the base, to try to have some interaction with the locals. It was very important to me that we knew what they were tracking as far as number of dead and wounded, since the security situation didn't provide us the opportunity to interact with the people. As we went to the compensation table, the GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] officials were able to see people and basically rack-and-stack the data, so it was important to me that we had the information about who was affected so that when word got out that condolence payments were being made, we could tell them that was what GIRoA leadership provided, and we could go on a case-by-case basis. That way, it was not a U.S. or coalition force determination about their losses or who deserved or did not deserve payment."

Control or "management" of American media coverage of this mass murder was probably perceived as a success story by the U.S. Army and Pentagon – successful management that was

south of VSP Belamby):

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/wazir_family_victims_of_panjwai_massacre_in_najiban_village_driven_to_camp_belamby_epa_march_11_2012.jpg

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/data?pid=avimage&iid=is_b6FIfm7pg

http://images2.corriereobjects.it/gallery/Esteri/2012/03_Marzo/afghanistan-soldati-usa-strage/01/img_01/afg_08_672-458_resize.jpg?v=20120311193435

<https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/murdered-civilians-1.jpg>

<http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2012/03/11/world/asia/12afghanistan-ss-4.html>

Vehicle 2 (Wazir family victims):

<https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/murdered-civilians-9-1024x688.jpg>

<http://media.silive.com/advance/photo/2012/03/10674889-standard.jpg>

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/najiban_eyewitness_and_wazir_neighbor_by_durrani_apf_3_11_2012.jpg

Vehicle 3 (Wazir family victims; all of these photos or screen-captures seem to be mirror images of the vehicle, based on the document text visible in the last photograph):

<https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/murdered-civilians-3.jpg>

<https://publicintelligence.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/murdered-civilians-6.jpg>

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/burned_body_of_young_man_from_wazir_family_of_najiban_in_truck_near_camp_belamby_panjwai_district_kandahar_province_afghanistan_from_pajhwok_via_cnn_video_march_11_2012.jpg

<http://debatingchambers.com/wp->

considerably aided by the fact that no U.S. or U.K. reporters or photographers left their distant Kabul bureaus to cover these Kandahar killings – then or since.

[More than a year later, a London-based CBS-TV reporter came to Panjwai, embedded with U.S. Special Forces, to cover a 'local uprising' story (particularly the belated establishment of some Afghan Local Police in the area) that the military was touting, and visited VSP Belamby and a home near Ibrahim Khan Houses, as part of that story – making her the first U.S. reporter to reach VSP Belamby since before the mass murders. Then, in June, 2014, two years after the killings, and just before his tenure as Kabul Bureau Chief ended, a *Washington Post* reporter became the second American reporter since the massacre to reach VSP Belamby, which by then housed no U.S. troops, and the first to visit some of the victims' homes, and to photograph and speak to a victim (in Kandahar city) and that victim's Panjwai neighbor (without mentioning what the previously unidentified neighbor witnessed that night, if anything), while, like the CBS-TV reporter, covering another story about the security situation in the Horn of Panjwai area.]

1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division Commander U.S. Army Colonel (COL) Todd Wood and one-two of his security contingent (part of Combined Task Force Arctic Wolves, from Fort Wainwright, Alaska, based at FOB Masum Ghar, near the Panjwai district center) stopped to look at bodies as they were walking (in Wood's case) or driving into the VSP, sometime after noon on March 11. Wood walked to the VSP from the east, after parking his 4-vehicle convoy about 100 meters down "Route Charlottetown" from the VSP's gate.

Aside from Colonel Todd Wood, apparently only one U.S. Army Specialist or Corporal, from a platoon in Wood's conventional 1-25 SBCT HQ Brigade at FOB Masum Ghar, looked at any of the bodies in the vehicles outside VSP Belamby. That Specialist or Corporal looked down at the parked vehicles from his rear air-guard hatch position in an armored Stryker vehicle as it passed by on the road about mid-day. That soldier briefly saw a little girl in a red outfit, among other covered bodies, from about 20 meters away, when a sheet slipped off her, and saw three separate vehicles, he told CID, estimating that as many as 350 local people had gathered outside VSP Belamby by that time. (If there were any others from Wood's security contingent who viewed the bodies, CID evidently didn't interview them.)

[This photograph](#) presumably shows Colonel Wood that day, in sunglasses on his way into the VSP, standing next to Kandahar

[content/uploads/rare_footage_of_1_or_2_more_young_wazir_family_panjwai_massacre_victims_in_cloth_covered_bed_of_small_white_pickup_truck_outside_camp_belamby_march_11_2012.jpg](#)

http://media.farsnews.com/media/Uploaded/Files/Images/1390/12/22/13901222000147_PhotoL.jpg

Corrected (non-mirror) images of each of the five preceding photographs of **Vehicle 3** (Wazir victims in a canopied truck):

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/murdered_afghan_civilians_from_panjwai_wazir_family_via_publicintelligencedotnet_3_corrected_to_mirror_image_2015.jpg

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/murdered_afghan_civilians_from_panjwai_wazir_family_via_publicintelligencedotnet_6_corrected_to_mirror_image_2015.jpg

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/burned_body_of_young_man_from_wazir_family_of_zangabad_kandahar_in_cloth_covered_pickup_truck_outside_vsp_belamby_from_pajhwok_via_cnn_video_march_11_2012_corrected_to_mirror_image_2015.jpg

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/rare_footage_of_2_or_3_more_young_wazir_family_panjwai_massacre_victims_in_cloth_covered_bed_of_small_white_pickup_truck_outside_vsp_belamby_march_11_2012_corrected_to_mirror_image_2015.jpg

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/wazir_family_panjwai_massacre_victims_in_cloth_covered_pickup_truck_march_11_2012_via_farsnews_corrected_to_mirror_image_2015.jpg

Vehicle 4 (Possibly two Wazir family victims, from south of VSP Belamby):

http://images2.corriereobjects.it/gallery/Esteri/2012/03_Marzo/afghanistan-soldati-usa-strage/01/img_01/afg_11_672-458_resize.jpg?v=20120311193436

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/panjwai_district_dead_in_van_and_towed_trailer_near_combat_outpost_belamby_kandahar_province_afghanistan_pajhwok_video_via_cnn_march_11_2012.jpg

<http://cmsimg.armytimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/bilde?Site=M6&Date=20120325&Category=N&EWS&ArtNo=203250301&Ref=AR&Max>

	<p>Provincial Council member Agha Lalai Dastgeeri, who's gesturing between Wood and Afghan Border & Tribal Affairs Minister Asadullah Khalid on the far right: http://images2.corriereobjects.it/gallery/Esteri/2012/03_Marzo/afghanistan-soldati-usa-strage/01/img_01/afg_08_672-458_resize.jpg?v=20120311193435</p> <p>The minivan they're looking at – with a heart decal on its windshield, as seen in other photographs – apparently carried (three?) Wazir family victims, because at least one of the victims in the vehicle was visibly burned.</p> <p>Colonel Wood testified at the Bales sentencing hearing in August, 2013 (Transcript Page 737) that he counted 13 bodies in 4 vehicles:</p> <p><i>"As I got closer, I made eye contact with [an erroneous(?) transcription lists "Haji Khudaidad," but Wood likely said or meant Asadullah Khalid, the Afghanistan Border & Tribal Affairs Minister, who spoke English]; he motioned me over, he wanted to talk to me, so I moved then by the vehicles and at the first vehicle there was an Afghan Army Soldier who recognized me, motioned for me to come over, threw the tarp off the first vehicle which was in – the first of four vehicles parked out there, it was an open-end truck; what we would refer to as a bongo truck, sort of modified pickup used to haul anything in. And there was a tarp in there, he pulled the tarp back, and what I observed inside that tarp was eight bodies, they were wrapped in cloth and appeared to me like they were headed out to be buried. It looked like the burial shrouds that they would put on. They motioned me to the next vehicle, which I observed more bodies. And then the last two vehicles, which each had a body; so it was a total of 13. [...] The colors of the rags that they were wrapped in, or the blankets, were dark in color; I could tell that they were wet.</i></p> <p><i>[...]</i></p> <p><i>Well, I met with [an erroneous(?) transcription lists "Haji Khudaidad," but Wood likely said or meant Asadullah Khalid, the Afghanistan Border & Tribal Affairs Minister, who spoke English] and the rest of the senior leaders there [at VSP Belamby] and tried to find out what their plan was for the immediate mitigation of the event. That immediate mitigation included a shura, but it also included getting the vehicles that were out front with the bodies released so that they could go get buried."</i></p> <p>[There are public reports of other body counts – two of 15, and two of 16, seen in an unstated number of vehicles – which were separately made by three Afghan journalists and "Zangabad villager Allah Gul, 57" (apparently a neighbor of a</p>	<p>W=640&Border=0&Afghans-say-U-S-paid-50K-per-shooting-death</p> <p>Vehicle 5 (Presumably the body of Mohammad Dawood, from south of VSP Belamby):</p> <p>http://media.silive.com/advance/photo/2012/03/10674886-standard.jpg</p> <p>http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2012/03/11/world/asia/12afghanistan-ss-2.html</p> <p>http://media.silive.com/advance/photo/2012/03/10674887-standard.jpg</p> <p>https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/bl_panjwai02_0312.jpg</p> <p>Vehicle 6 (Three victims from Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai, north of VSP Belamby, including Tora/Gulalai, her father Nazar Mohammad to her left, and likely Khudaydad to her right):</p> <p>http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2012/03/11/world/asia/12afghanistan-ss-3.html</p> <p>https://fbcdn-sphotos-e-a.akamaihd.net/hphotos-ak-snc7/423872_385595624785072_1058595446_n.jpg</p> <p>http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/data/upimages/kandahar_massacre_by_us_soldier_8.jpg</p> <p>http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/data/upimages/kandahar_massacre_by_us_soldier_4.jpg</p> <p>http://media.farsnews.com/media/Upload/Files/Images/1390/12/22/13901222000156_PhotoL.jpg</p> <p>Vehicle 7 (A still-unidentified victim, from an unidentified home):</p> <p>http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/About/General/2012/3/13/1331629661865/Afghan-shootings-007.jpg</p> <p>Possible Vehicle 8 (This minivan seems to be carrying two victims, not seen in the other photos, from an unidentified home):</p> <p>http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/screen_capture_of_a_likely_eighth_vehicle_carrying_unknown_murder_victims_outside_vsp_belamby_</p>
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victim or victims).]

In a second (May 21, 2012) sworn statement to CID, Colonel Todd Wood stated:

"There were several vehicles parked out front, 2 open bed trucks, 2 vans; as I got close, an ANA, or AUP Soldier motioned for me to look. I visually observed, through an open tarp (already uncovered), 8 bodies wrapped in cloth in the first of four vehicles, a second vehicle had three bodies [see the photograph above], and the remaining two vehicles had 1 in each vehicle. I could not identify if the bodies were male, female, or children. Could not tell if any were burned, but was informed several were burned, but no confirmation that the group I observed had been burned. I could not tell if the bodies had gunshot wounds. [...] I saw 8 bodies wrapped up in various blankets and clothing, they were all wrapped separately. The cloth varied in color mostly red or dark blue/black material. There were some white cloth present and it was cover[ed] in red splotches that appeared to be blood. The bodies were all separate; I could tell the heads which were located closest to the cab of the truck. The trucks were a white color, with a canopy top, open sides. [...] Second vehicle was same as the first, but it only had 3 bodies. The trucks were a white color, with a canopy top, open sides. [...] The third vehicle was [a] van, I do not recall the color. That van had one body, looked large enough to be an adult. [...] The fo[u]rth vehicle was a van, do not recall the color, and it contained 1 body. Could not identify if it was male/female or adult/child."

The 8 bodies in a canopied truck that Wood describes in his 2013 testimony, and in his two sworn 2012 accounts to CID, appear in no known media footage. 7 or 8 different white minivans and trucks were filmed or photographed carrying bodies outside the VSP that day (see the Sources column for links to photos of the vehicles). But no more than 4 bodies can be discerned in any one of those 7-8 vehicles – including in a short-bedded canopied pickup truck (carrying two burned young men and a little girl from the Wazir home, with a canvas-type canopy on the top and sides) that otherwise comes closest to the “bongo” truck that Wood describes as carrying 8 bodies. (Since at least one Afghan photographer apparently documented Colonel Wood at the scene, it seems unlikely, but not impossible, that no photo of the bongo truck carrying 8 bodies, that Wood describes, was made public.)

There are two vehicles seen in photographs from that day carrying a single body to the base – one is a distinctive pickup truck with a blue stripe, carrying a victim who remains unidentified, and the other is a minivan that may have been

[on_march_11_2012.jpg](#)

The image of the possible 8th vehicle was taken from this video footage: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jGIGMLXvKY>

carrying the body of Mohammad Dawood on a cot. So Wood's testimony apparently describes a third vehicle (another minivan) that carried an unidentified single victim.

If Colonel Wood in fact saw two vans carrying a single victim each, plus a pickup truck with 8 bodies, and a van with 3 bodies, the bodies in the 5 or 6 different vehicles, seen in photographs, that Wood didn't describe or count, carried at least 11 more bodies than the 13 that Wood saw and counted – for a total of at least 24 (not 16 or 17) murder victims.

Such a dramatic body-count discrepancy in fact aligns with a major “managed”-away (ignored) discrepancy in the identity of massacre victims: There are descriptions by Afghan reporters in media coverage at the time, for non-Afghan media outlets, of 13 more murders that, it's now clear, were not murders charged to or admitted by SSG Robert Bales. The four media accounts describing those deaths are excerpted [here](#).

While the grim evidence right outside the gate of VSP Belamby remained unexamined and undocumented by responsible authorities inside the VSP that day, the “Battle Space Owner” of the region – a conventional Army Battalion commander and 3-21 IN Lieutenant Colonel based a mile away at FOB Zangabad – was otherwise engaged, as he explained to the CC investigation in a sworn March 29, 2012 statement:

"I called [Redacted/an American] at the [Panjwai] District headquarters. [Redacted] is the partner of our District Chief of Police and acting District Governor, Sardar Mohammad. I asked [Redacted] to ask Sardar Mohammad if he received any reports out of the Belambai area of any activities that had occurred during the night. [Redacted] and I met and discussed the best way ahead regarding who is going to be notified and who should we bring in. Once I got confirmation from Sardar Mohammed that he received reports, I recommended he contact Haji Fazaluddin Mohammed, who is the Deputy District Governor, and any other Senior Shura members to ask them if they've heard anything. [Redacted] notified me that he had been on the phone with [ANA] General Habibi, and that the Corps Chief of Staff and officers from the [ANA] 205th Corps and some representatives from General Habibi's brigade staff were enroute to Zangabad. I believe that group's intent was to assess the situation and determine facts surrounding reports from the area of civilian casualties. Approximately mid-morning, Sardar Mohammad and the Afghan Staff contingent arrived at [FOB] Zangabad. Once the link-up was complete, we departed to VSP Belambai. I arrived with [Redacted,] the DCoP and the ANA staff members at VSP Belambai and we went to the ANA side of the compound. Shortly after I arrived,

Assadullah Khalid [the Afghanistan Border & Tribal Affairs Minister] arrived at VSP Belambai with some members of the Provincial leadership with whom I am not familiar with. Some of the press also arrived with them. [Kandahar province Chief of Police] General Razziq arrived with some Panjwa'i ASOP [Afghan Social Outreach Program] Shura members who we normally meet with at the weekly Monday shuras at the District headquarters. I compared notes with Fazaludin Mohammed about the reports we've received. The decision was made, I believe by Assadullah Khalid, for a group of the Provincial and local leadership to walk to the compound in Naji Bien and the compound in Alikozai to confirm the locations of the events from the prior night. When I started to approach the gate, the locals at the gate began to get agitated and started to approach me. That is when the ANA asked me to stay inside and keep all the Americans within the VSP. We basically consolidated at the VSP and waited for the Afghan contingent to go out to the different villages and do what they had to do. At one point, Assadullah Khalid made some kind of announcement or some kind of speech to the crowd. After that, part of the crowd started to disperse from the gate. A shura took place on the ANA side of the VSP later on that day with some of the ASOP Shura members, the Corps command, and General Habibi. After the shura, a majority of the delegates left, but General Razziq and Sa[r]dar [Mohammad] stayed until early evening. He continued to meet with some of the ASOP Shura members and some of the local senior members of the community."

"Q: Are there any additional KLE [Key Leader Engagement] or consequence management actions that should be taken in response to the incident?"

"A: Right now it's difficult [to] tell until the [CID] detachment has an opportunity to make it down to one of the villages. I think the payments we made last week went a long way in taking care of the families. Other than that, I cannot tell until we get a detachment to one of those villages. [...] I can add, that the level of support we received from our Afghan counterparts was great. Their level of support is what got us through this situation."

The referenced "payments" amounted to almost a million U.S. dollars, converted to Afghanistan currency (Afghanis), and hand-delivered – despite the SOTF-S Commander's claim that "the security situation didn't provide us [the Special Forces or regular U.S. Army] the opportunity to interact with the people" to identify Afghan casualties – to four family representatives on March 24, 2012 in Kandahar city – before American investigators ever made it to the scenes of the crime. [See the

[Addendum](#) at the foot of this Timeline for more about those March 24th payments.].

The American “*partner of our [Panjwai] District Chief of Police and acting District Governor, Sardar Mohammad,*” who the Battle Space Owner (FOB Zangabad's 3-21 IN Battalion Commander) called that morning, revealed to the CC investigation on April 3, 2012, that he was likewise too busy mentoring Afghan *police* officials about something else, to examine, or to encourage them to examine and document, the evidence of mass murder parked right outside the gate of VSP Belamby that day. Yet this U.S. Army officer and mentor of Afghan police authorities nevertheless confidently defined what had happened that night, to those Afghan authorities he and others were mentoring, just after CID's first and only visit to the scenes of the crime:

"On the morning of the shooting, [Redacted/the 3-21 IN Lieutenant Colonel Battle Space Owner at FOB Zangabad], the battalion commander for [Redacted/the 3-21] INF called me at approximately 0630 [before the U.S. Special Forces Command knew of any deaths south of the VSP]. He informed me about what had happened and asked me to contact my Afghan partner, the District Chief of Police, [Redacted/Sardar Mohammad.] I immediately went over there and met with [Redacted/Sardar Mohammad.] He was on the phone with the Provincial Chief of Police, BG Razziq who was informing him of what had happened. [Recall that by 7:10 AM that morning an Afghan police investigator was already at the Dawood crime scene.] We exchanged notes and then made a plan to move to [FOB] Zangabad to link up with [Redacted/COL Wood] the BDE [1-25 Brigade] leadership and also the Afghan leadership. Once we arrived there, [Redacted] spoke to the Afghan leadership and the decision was made to move to FOB [VSP] Belambai. Once we got to Belambai, [Redacted] and the other Afghan leadership moved to the sites where the actual shootings occurred. I stayed on the COP [VSP] the entire time. When the individuals returned, they held a press conference [which included [Asadullah Khalid](#) speaking in English, as recorded by Afghan media] and briefed what they had seen. Basically the DCOP and PCOP briefed some of the representatives who had come down from Kabul. My part was to assist the DCOP with secure transportation from Belambai back to [FOB] Zangabad. When I returned from Belambai, I interacted with some of the local leaders here. We had a shura the day after where this topic came up. We didn't go into details, but I did reassure them that this was the act of the one individual and it is being investigated. I passed on our condolences for what had happened, and I thanked them for all of their assistance in providing accurate information to the

local population. The next interaction was the actual day when the payments were made to the families. I traveled to the Governor's Palace in Kandahar City. The DCOP was not there, but I went to answer questions for any local leaders. Nobody really had any questions, and there wasn't a lot that I needed to do. My last interaction was yesterday, when we went back to Belambai. We escorted CID agents to the compounds where the shootings occurred. The DCOP was with us that day. He helped guide us to where the shootings occurred. He interacted with the CID agents. We also briefed the PCOP.

[...]

Our Afghan partners really went above and beyond to deal with the locals and talk to their people to counter any rumors or incorrect information that was circulating or in the press. They also let people know that the Americans are conducting an investigation, are being very straight forward and are not trying to hide anything. When the payments happened, they ensured that the recipients were vetted; they shared all of that information with us. They helped get the people to the Palace. They sat with [Redacted] when the payments were made. They traveled with the people to the banks to make sure that they could deposit their money. Yesterday the DCOP was helpful on the scene with the CID agents. He pointed out the specific areas where people had been shot. He helped the CID agents sketch out the compounds and answered any questions that they had. It was a full day. We were out from about 0430 until 1800. The other superstar is the new [Panjwai] District Governor, Haji Faisil Mohammed, who was crucial in making people understand that this was the act of one man. He also reminded the people of all of the projects that we had done and of the improved security. Our Afghan partners were definitely crucial to the mitigation of the event."

"Q: Were there any Afghans outside of the district level who proved to be particularly important or helpful to the process?"

"A: One that I would be familiar with is GEN Razziq the PCOP [Provincial Chief of Police]. The day of the event, he went to the scene with the DCOP, he met with the locals and calmed things down a bit, and he reassured people that there would be an investigation and that the truth would come out. I don't have proof of this, but I was told that he issued personal funds to the families on the day of the event to help them. He set up the process of getting the victims' families to the Palace on the day that the payments were made. He was there yesterday to ensure that the CID agents were able to get to the site."

"Q: So both the DCOP and PCOP were there yesterday [April 2, 2012]?"

A: Yes, the DCOP was there all day. The PCOP was there for about an hour. He drove down and was with us at the first [Mohammad Wazir] compound. I didn't see them at the second [Mohammad Dawood] compound. I think they had left by then. He talked to the leadership there and assisted the CID in their investigation."

Q: Did the absence of a permanent district governor have an impact on consequence management? Has the new governor been installed as the permanent district governor?"

A: Haji Faisal Mohammad showed up today with a representative from the provincial government. There were probably about 75 people in the shura [meeting] room and a news crew. The provincial leader recognized him as the new district governor and swore him in. I was talking to [Redacted] (GEN Razziq's mentor) and there is some confusion on whether Haji Faisal Mohammad is actually the new district governor. The leadership of Sardar Mohammad and Haji Faisal Mohammad filled the void left by the death of the former District Governor. Both of them were crucial to the mitigation. Sardar Mohammad was the acting District Governor throughout most of this time."

Q: Can you confirm that neither the shooting nor the investigation came up in the shura today?"

A: It did not. We actually had two shuras: a development shura to talk about upcoming projects and a second shura where Haji Faisal Mohammed was installed as district governor."

[...]

Q: Are there any additional KLEs or consequence management actions that should be taken in response to this incident?"

A: At this point, I think we have pretty much checked all of the boxes. I think the crucial event was that the morning of the event, within six hours, everyone had met at [FOB] Zangabad. ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] was sharing its notes with the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces]. The relationship between the two groups was critical to getting the truth out. Also, ISAF representatives including [Regional Command-South Commanding] GEN Huggins [U.S. Army], met with Afghan leadership back at [FOB] Zangabad later. ISAF showed the [Redacted/PGSS surveillance] footage of the shooter being detained. That helped to make it clear that it was a single individual."

It seems obvious, from statements by American “mentors” of Afghan police, army, and civil authorities like this one, that neither then, nor years later, would the promotion-focused officer corps of the U.S. Armed Forces, whether conventional or special forces, consider it expedient, or incumbent upon their high rank and responsible position, to report or explain the existence of a U.S. Army Charge Sheet *under-count* of March 11th Panjwai murder victims, as compared to the (up to 29) murders collectively described by English-language media accounts at the time. Six of those media accounts – by different Afghan reporters for non-Afghan news outlets (*Bloomberg, The New York Times, Reuters, The Guardian, The Associated Press, and Agence France-Presse*) – describe victims whose murders or injuries, it's now clear, were not charged to SSG Bales. If confirmed, those unnamed Panjwai victims, added to the 16 [rarely-named, now-identified](#) victims who Bales, in a deal to avoid the death penalty, pleaded guilty to killing, would mean that a mass murder of 29 people took place on March 11, 2012 – [13 more murders](#) of Afghan civilians than claimed by Afghan and American authorities.

See the Addendum, just below, for more on the still-confusing sequence of events at Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai; for some details of the ballistics evidence that places Robert Bales in at least the cow shed of the Sayed Jan (Rafiullah) home that night; and for Alkozai-connected discrepancies in the undocumented, hastily compiled, incomplete crime-scene summaries that seem, based on the public record, to be the final written investigative report(s) compiled by Afghan authorities (national police and army officials) - upon whom U.S. Army officers and investigators heavily relied to identify massacre victims.



April 2, 2012 U.S. Army CID photograph

Looking northeast from the courtyard toward the five rooms of the Sayed Jan (and Rafiullah) home in Alkozai, north of VSP Belamby. Room 1, occupied by farmer Khudaydad before he was murdered at this home March 11, is on the far right. The cow shed where CID found a spent 9mm pistol casing, fired by a Bales-carried gun, is out of sight to the left in this view. Beyond the courtyard wall and an intervening path the top of the neighboring five-room Mohammad Naim home is visible.

Addendum	Ibrahim Khan Houses & The Afghanistan Government Investigation(s)	Sources
	<p><u>Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai</u></p> <p>To quote U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Joseph "Jay" Morse, in his closing argument for government prosecutors at the</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 111, Pages 2-3 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of an 11 March 2012 interview of Habibullah Naim by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, apparently at VSP Belamby, as interpreted by a civilian working for ODA 7216)</p>

August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing (Transcript Page 957):

"Panel members, this is Afghanistan. What you are about to see in front of you are two homes on the outskirts of the village of Alikozai, just north of the Registan Desert and about 40 kilometers west of Kandahar City. Alikozai itself is really just a group of homes, solidly built [inaudible], homes just like the two you are about to see in front of you. The people in this village have no paved roads. Their homes have no running water and no electricity, no plumbing. Most of the people in Alikozai, like the people who live at the two homes you see in front of you, are farmers making a living growing crops, typically of grape or wheat, oftentimes on someone else's property. They are tight-knitted families. They are culturally and ethnically Pashtun. They're traditional. They're deeply religious. They don't live an easy life."

1. On the west: The **Sayed Jan home**

Each of the five side-by-side rooms in the one-story Sayed Jan home, 600 meters north of VSP Belamby, had a doorway on its south side, opening on the large courtyard. All five rooms – each 10 feet by 21 feet, as measured by CID – appear from CID photos to have metal exterior doors. As was probably true of all five rooms, there were no interconnecting interior doors to other rooms in Room 4 (which was sketched by CID) – where teenager Rafiullah, his grandmother Nikmarghah (who raised him), Rafiullah's younger sister Zardana, their aunt (a sister, name unknown, of Rafiullah's father Samiullah), their great-aunt Shah Babo (the first, older wife of Nazar Mohammad, brother of Rafiullah's grandfather Sayed Jan) and their great-aunt's young daughter (possibly Naseema/Layla) were all apparently sleeping. There was also a cow shed at the far west end of the compound, aligned with the rooms, but separated from them. The rooms share common walls, and are aligned on the north side of the courtyard.

The courtyard is surrounded by high walls. The east wall (facing the Mohammad Naim home) had the only two entryways – a cloth-covered entry (see CID PDF Pages 830-832), into the courtyard, on the south end of the east wall, and an entry, with no door or exterior covering (see CID PDF Pages 815-818), in the north end of the east wall, leading into Room 1, occupied by Khudaydad, who was a farmhand (and relative) who helped Sayed Jan in his small vineyard. Khudaydad was murdered in or near Room 1 that night.

[Khudaydad, from a family of Kuchi, or Nomads, was a middle-aged adult son of Sayed Jan's wife's brother, with a wife and (per prosecutor LTC Morse) seven children of his own – who

CID Exhibit 261, Pages 2-3 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 30 May 2012 interview of Rafiullah by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, assisted by a female interpreter, at the Mandigak Palace - the headquarters of Provincial Chief of Police Raziq - in Kandahar city; Rafiullah notes in this interview that *"The man did not lift the cover of the storage area; the bullets [that hit Rafiullah in both legs in Naim Room 2] came through the cover."*)

CID Exhibit 247, Page 2 (Agent's Investigation Report of a 19 April 2012 interview of Rafiullah by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent carrying photographs of Alkozai homes)

The aerial map locations of attacked homes and VSP Belamby were made possible by the invaluable on-site Zangabad research of Afghan reporter [Mamoon Durrani](#)

Detail of injuries to the Sayed Jan family cow from an October, 2012 interview of Rafiullah by [Lela Ahmadzai](#) of 2470media.com

CID Exhibit 138 (16 March 2012 sworn statement by a civilian interpreter working at FOB Zangabad that morning for a Sergeant Major from the 3-21 IN)

CID Exhibit 54 (15 March 2012 sworn statement by a civilian U.S. MPRI Law Enforcement Professional assigned to FOB Zangabad)

CID Exhibits 217, 218, & 219 (CID's 2 April 2012 Crime Scene Examination of the side-by-side Mohammad Naim and Nazar Mohammad homes; CID's Crime Scene Sketches of the layout of both homes and of Naim Room 2, at ROI PDF Pages 867-868; and CID's 2 April 2012 Photo Packet of the Naim home, at ROI PDF Pages 872-892)

CID Exhibits 217, 218, 220, & 221 (CID's 2 April 2012 Crime Scene Examination of the side-by-side Mohammad Naim and Nazar Mohammad homes; CID's Crime Scene Sketches of the layout of both homes, Naim Room 2 - at ROI PDF Pages 867-868 - and Nazar Mohammad Room "8," at ROI PDF Pages 893-894 - which is actually Room 3 of 5 in the Nazar Mohammad home; both Room 8 sketches are mislabeled by CID as in

	<p>lived elsewhere, 2470media learned from Rafiullah's father Samiullah in 2015.]</p> <p>Teenager Rafiullah – son of Samiullah (who had moved to Kandahar city), and grandson of Samiullah's father Sayed Jan (Sayed Jan, with his wife Nikmarghah/Khalida, raised Rafiullah in Alkozai from infancy; Sayed Jan was away that night, visiting Samiullah) – gave multiple interviews, whose details often vary, to U.S. Army CID Special Agents. In an April 19, 2012 interview with a CID agent who brought photographs of the homes with him, Rafiullah told CID through an interpreter that, during the attack at his grandfather's home (neighboring Mohammad Naim's on the west), he and 2-3 family members ran from Room 4 at the Sayed Jan home to Room 4 at the Naim home, where pre-teen Sadiqullah Naim and 1-2 of Sadiqullah's siblings were sleeping.</p> <p>At about the same time that Rafiullah and his family awoke at their home to the sound of gunfire in or near the cow shed on the west, and/or in or near Room 1 on the east side of their home, and fled next door, a daughter and grandchildren of Mohammad Naim, asleep in the neighboring home to the east, apparently heard the same gunfire and awoke Naim (in Room 2, the only room at the Naim home with a door), Mohammad Naim told CID through an interpreter in a May 29, 2012 account (having by then mostly recovered from his serious wounds), as summarized by CID:</p> <p><i>"Mr. [Redacted/Mohammad Naim] had recently moved to this location from another home he owned, due to the house getting hit with bullets from skirmishes between the Taliban and the nearby American base (NFI). [...] Mr. [Redacted/Naim] stated Miss [Redacted] and Mr. [Redacted] kids woke him up stating that they heard shots from Mr. [Redacted/likely Khudaydad's] location [in Room 1 of the Sayed Jan home]. Mr. [Redacted/Khudaydad] was a man who worked for Mr. [Redacted/Sayed Jan] and lived in a room in the compound next to Mr. [Redacted/Naim's]."</i></p> <p>[The CID notation "NFI" apparently means No Further Information provided.]</p> <p>Then, Mohammad Naim continued [although at this point Naim may be referring to what he heard at the Sayed Jan home, or at both neighboring homes, or at just his eastern neighbor Nazar Mohammad's home, where the sole witness who testified about the killings there, a young girl, told an Australian TV interviewer that her father's dog was the first to be shot]:</p>	<p>Naja Bien; and CID's 2 April 2012 Photo Packet of the Nazar Mohammad home, at ROI PDF Pages 895-920)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 261, Page 2 (30 May 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 29 May 2012 interview of Sadiqullah by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, assisted by a female interpreter, at the Mandigak Palace - the headquarters of Provincial Chief of Police Raziq - in Kandahar city)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 1, Pages 5-6 (13 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report of a 12 March 2012 interview of Parmina Naim by a U.S. CID Special Agent, while she was being treated for her wounds at the NATO ROLE 3 "MMU" military hospital at Kandahar Airfield, as interpreted by a civilian male working for CID at KAF)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 261, Pages 1-2 (30 May 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 29 May 2012 interview of Mohammad Naim by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, assisted by a female interpreter, at the Mandigak Palace - the headquarters of Provincial Chief of Police Raziq - in Kandahar city)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 261, Page 1 (30 May 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 29 May 2012 interview of Mohammad Naim by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, assisted by a female interpreter, at the Mandigak Palace - the headquarters of Provincial Chief of Police Raziq - in Kandahar city)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 217, Page 1 (Agent's Investigation Report summary of the Mohammad Naim home crime scene examination CID conducted on April 2, 2012)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 219 (Photographic Packet containing an index and most of the photographs taken by CID during its April 2, 2012 crime scene examination at the Mohammad Naim home)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 263 (30 May 2012 sworn statement) by the Combined Task Force Lancer U.S. Army Colonel who was the "Senior Mentor for the Kandahar Provincial Chief of Police BG [Redacted/Raziq]" at Kandahar Provincial Headquarters in Kandahar city)</p>
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<p><i>"Mr. [Redacted/Mohammad Naim] heard his neighbor's dogs barking. He then heard shots and the dogs screaming as if they were hurt. Then the dogs stopped."</i></p> <p>At first Mohammad Naim was apparently not overly alarmed by the shooting at the Sayed Jan home next door, because he was used to having his home searched by U.S. and Afghan soldiers, day and night, Naim testified in person at the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing, as interpreted (Transcript Page 19):</p> <p><i>"It's a routine thing. Sometimes they come and they search; six to seven times I've been searched, even 3 weeks prior to this incident, a search party came, they come at nighttime, they come at daytime and they come and they do a search. This is not what we expected."</i></p> <p>Rafiullah fled his home during or after the murder of Khudaydad. But then, before a soldier entered Naim Room 2 (the bedroom of Mohammad Naim and his wife), or the nearby Naim Room 4 where Rafiullah had fled, multiple murders took place at the Nazar Mohammad home abutting Naim's on the east, CID was told.</p> <p>2. In the center: The Mohammad Naim home and</p> <p>3. On the east: The Nazar Mohammad home</p> <p>Like Sayed Jan's home, each of the five side-by-side rooms in the one-story Mohammad Naim home, 600 meters north of VSP Belamby, had a single doorway on its south side, opening on the large courtyard. In this home, however, only one room had a solid door (Room 2). As in Naim Room 2, which was sketched by CID, there are likely no interconnecting interior doorways in the other rooms, and the five rooms – each about 10 feet wide by 13 feet deep, as measured by CID – are aligned on the north side of the courtyard, sharing common interior walls.</p> <p>The courtyard is surrounded by high walls. The courtyard's west wall (facing the Sayed Jan home) had two exterior entryways – an entry on the north end of the west wall with a door, and a wide entry with no door on the south end of the west wall (see CID photos at PDF Pages 872-874). The Nazar Mohammad home adjoining Mohammad Naim's – on the east side of an interior wall that permitted access between the two homes – apparently had external access beyond its exterior courtyard walls only through the Naim courtyard's west wall. (Thus, the attack at the Nazar Mohammad home required a shooter to either climb a wall, or to cross Mohammad Naim's courtyard, west to east, to reach the Nazar Mohammad</p>	<p>CID Exhibit 34, Pages 1-2 (15 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a late 11 March 2012 interview of Chief Investigator [Redacted/Khudaidad] of the Afghan Uniform Police, who later refused to give a sworn statement, by two U.S. Army CID Special Agents, apparently at Kandahar Provincial Headquarters in Kandahar city, and related summaries of the March 12 turnover of AUP reports, photographs, and ammunition evidence to CID)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 41 (Evidence Custody Document No. 191-13, describing 7 burned 5.56mm shell casings and 2 burned 9mm shell casings the Afghan Uniform Police evidently collected in Room 4 of the Mohammad Wazir home, south of VSP Belamby; plus 5 unburned 5.56mm shell casings and 3 unburned 9mm shell casings the Afghan Uniform Police evidently collected at another location; and 2 "Market Street Classics"-brand syrup packages collected by the AUP at an unknown location - all of which were collected March 11, and given to U.S. CID investigators on March 12, 2012)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 257, Page 3 (17 May 2012 sworn statement by an HQ Company, 18th Airborne Corps Lieutenant Colonel at Fort Bragg, NC, who on March 11, 2012 was the Transition Team Commander, apparently based at FOB Lindsey, responsible for mentoring the 205th ANA Corps HQ, and MG [Redacted/Hamid], the 205th ANA Corps Commander)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 37 (11 March 2012 initial one-page report by the Afghan Uniform Police about the killings, as translated)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 40 (The 2-page, undated, "official" Afghan Uniform Police <i>"Report of 17 killed and 6 wounded in Belombai and Girandi Villages,"</i> as translated. That report, signed by Major [Redacted, but Khudaidad, based on reports of his Article 32 testimony] - <i>"Chief of Crime Scene Investigations under CID," aka "Chief of Criminal Techniques," aka "Chief Investigator"</i> for the Afghan Uniform Police - was presumably the result of an investigation supervised by Kandahar Provincial Chief of Police Abdul Raziq; see CID Exhibit 263; the Exhibit 35 "sketch" at PDF Page 120 that accompanied the "Official Afghan</p>
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	<p>courtyard.)</p> <p>Rafiullah told CID that after the murders at the Nazar Mohammad home on the east, a soldier entered Naim Room 4 and immediately started shooting, apparently missing his younger sister Zardana and others hiding in that room. The children then fled to another Naim room, Room 5, where animals were kept, but a soldier chased them there as well, and so they fled again, this time to Room 2, the room occupied by Mohammad Naim, his second wife, and many of Naim's 16 children. Naim by that time had again been alerted to nearby shooting, this time apparently by Maryam, the second wife of the murdered Nazar Mohammad, whose home abutted Naim's on the east. (Eyewitness Maryam, whose name was listed in only one media account, in May, 2012, by New Zealand reporter Jon Stephenson for <i>McClatchy</i>, which was confirmed to 2470media by a family member in 2015, has never been interviewed by CID or the media – although the Army may have asked to interview her.) Nazar Mohammad's wife Maryam, who had just been widowed, and had seen their young daughter Tora murdered by a shot to the head, ran screaming to Naim's bedroom door and warned the Naim men to escape, before opening the door to Room 2 from the outside for Naim (it had apparently jammed or was locked from the outside for some reason), and then evidently fleeing the premises along with others.</p> <p>Mohammad Naim then came out of Room 2 to await the soldier(s), against the advice of his family, and that's apparently when the children hiding in Room 5 fled into Room 2 to join the others. Naim told his children to light a lamp to show he had nothing to hide, he told CID. Naim didn't describe a soldier chasing children from Room 5, as Rafiullah described it to CID with the use of crime-scene photos, but instead told CID that a soldier, with a light on his head, jumped over the wall (from either the Nazar Mohammad home on the east or the Sayed Jan home on the west, or over the southern wall – the names are redacted in Naim's account, and Article 32 reporting never clarified that key detail), then immediately approached and shot Naim at very close range, without saying a word. A soldier then either entered Room 4, and started chasing children from room to room (based on an account by preteen Sadiqullah Naim), or immediately entered Room 2 and started shooting – which is where both Sadiqullah and Rafiullah, and others, were eventually shot while trying to hide.</p> <p>Rafiullah's pre-teen neighbor Sadiqullah "Sadiq" Naim, who was eventually shot with Rafiullah in the same room (Room 2) at the Naim home, told a CID Special Agent on May 29, 2012</p>	<p>Police Report" conflicts with the police report as to the total number of murders)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 35 (Undated "sketch" that accompanied the two-page, Dari-language "Official Afghan Police Report"; the sketch was released, but the Dari-language report was withheld by the Army from the redacted CID ROI; the AUP sketch and the March 12th English translation of the AUP report the sketch accompanied differ as to the number of murder victims, and the sketch appears to locate all attacked homes south of VSP Belamy)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 103, Pages 1-3 (22 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a March 17, 2012 meeting at Camp Hero, Kandahar province, between U.S. Army officials, including CID agents, and four Afghan National Army Colonels: a Religious Cultural Advisor, a Corps IG, a Judge Advocate General, and a G2 Intelligence Officer, all from ANA 205th Corps Headquarters at Camp Hero; the topic of discussion was the site visit the four ANA Colonels had made to or near the crime scenes, at about 9:15 AM on March 11; the ANA Colonels were, however, unable to locate any of the attacked homes on aerial maps for the Americans, or otherwise point them out, although they delivered the ANA's "final Ministry of Defense Report" about the killings to the U.S. Army at this meeting)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 315 (06 November 2012 US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory Firearms Interim Report detailing the ballistics evidence discerned from the submitted weapons and spent ammunition)</p> <p>CID Exhibits 212, 213, & 214 (CID's 2 April 2012 Crime Scene Examination of the Sayed Jan home; CID's Crime Scene Sketches of the layout of the home, including 3 sketches showing where evidence was found in Khudaydad's Room 1; one sketch of Room 6, the cow shed; and CID's 2 April 2012 Photo Packet of the Sayed Jan home, all at ROI PDF Pages 811-859)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 250 (CID photographs of aerial-photo maps - showing the numbers 16 and 17 on Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai, on the south side of "Alpha Road" - that were in the possession of SGT Godwin and/or SSG</p>
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	<p>that both he and Rafiullah ducked into storage areas, which were evidently both cloth-covered (evidently the arched alcoves under the built-in shelf-bed along the back wall, visible in the CID crime-scene photos of Naim Room #2, in Exhibit 219 at PDF Page 887), before they were shot, according to the agent's summary of the Sadiqullah interview, as interpreted:</p> <p><i>"He [Sadiq] then ran out of his room [Naim Room 4] with his brother and sister to his father's room [Room 2] where he hid with Master [Redacted/a brother? in] the left storage bay at the far end of the room. The storage bay was covered by a cloth that hung over the opening. Numerous brothers and sisters of Master [Redacted/Sadiq] were in the room when the man started shooting. Master [Redacted/Sadiq] demonstrated the position he was in while in the storage area. He was on his knees, bent over at the waist, with his head facing the rear wall. Master [Redacted/Sadiq] thought that the bullet that hit him had bounced off of the wall first. Both Master [Redacted/Sadiq] and Master [Redacted/Sadiq's brother?] were concealed under the cloth in the storage area when they were shot. Master [Redacted/Sadiq] did not know where Miss [Redacted] was in the room, but thought that Master [Redacted/Rafiullah?] was in the right storage area next to his."</i></p> <p>Sadiqullah, despite his obviously limited view of whoever was shooting, was one of the unnamed witnesses (accessible at the KAF hospital) cited by Afghan authorities, including Kandahar Provincial Council member Agha Lalai Dastgeeri, to quickly assure the media that a single gunman was responsible for the killings.</p> <p>[Rafiullah told 2470media in October, 2012, that he, like Sadiqullah, thought that one (pistol) bullet hit his leg after he'd jumped under a bed (probably the built-in shelf-bed along the back wall, visible in the CID photos in Exhibit 219), which exited and then bounced off the wall and hit him in the other leg. One of Rafiullah's fingers was injured as well. Bullet fragments remain embedded in Rafiullah's right thigh or hip (according to the transcript of the testimony of Army doctor Major Hawks at the 2013 Bales sentencing hearing) and, Rafiullah's father Samiullah told Lela Ahmadzai of 2470media in 2015, that injury is causing serious, untreated pain and disability for Rafiullah.]</p> <p>Another wounded Naim family member treated early March 11th at FOB Zangabad has scarcely been heard from. She's a teenage daughter of Mohammad Naim, named Parmina, who received multiple gunshot wounds to the torso. She was unable to say much that morning due to the severity of her</p>	<p>McLaughlin, at ROI PDF Pages 1180 and 1122)</p> <p>CC Exhibit LLL (3 April 2012 sworn statement by someone from the conventional Army's 1-25 SBCT at FOB Masum Ghar - the Brigade command for Battle Space Owner 3-21 IN - who served as the president of a 3-member Foreign Claims Commission that paid, in accordance with a "decision on payments" that "went much higher than us," \$980,000 to four Afghan claimants on March 24, 2012, at PDF Pages 354-357)</p> <p>CC Exhibit KKK (1 April 2012 sworn statement by an ISAF Joint Command officer - possibly the deputy COMIJC - at IJC Headquarters who assisted IJC Commander, or COMIJC, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti, at PDF Page 352)</p> <p>CC Exhibit EEE (31 March 2012 sworn statement by the Night Battle Captain Officer In Charge, March 10-11, 2012, at the Operations Center of Special Operations Task Force-South, Camp Brown, Kandahar Airfield, at PDF Page 329)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 199 (Evidence Custody Document No. 200-13, describing the three 5.56mm rifle shell casings, two burned interconnected metal rings, and small, 2" x 1.5" plastic crate that the Afghan National Army retrieved in Najiban on March 11, and gave to CID on March 26, 2012)</p> <p>CID Exhibit 182, Page 5 (27 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of the turnover of ANA-collected ballistics evidence to CID on March 26, 2012)</p> <p>Link to Annex I, Number 13 of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan's (UNAMA's) February, 2013 "Annual Report 2012; Protection of Civilians In Armed Conflict," at PDF Page 82: http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=K0B5RL2XYcU%3D#page=82</p> <p>("Noorbinak"/Robina name and interview with reporter Yalda Hakim, about the killing of Noorbinak's father Nazar Mohammad and his dog, via a March 27, 2012 broadcast by Australian public television's DatelineSBS)</p>
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injuries, has never publicly testified, or been interviewed by the media, but she did give one account (possibly repeated on video) on March 12 to a CID Special Agent at KAF's military hospital, as interpreted and summarized by CID:

"About 1224, 12 Mar 12, S[pecial] A[gent] [Redacted] interviewed Ms. [Redacted, but clearly the teenager Parmina Naim of Alkozai, then a patient at the KAF hospital] who provided a verbal statement wherein she stated she was asleep in her home when the neighbors, Ms. [Redacted,] Mr. [Redacted/Rafiullah] and Ms. [Redacted] came in her house and said an American came to their house and was shooting people. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said the man went to another neighbor's house before coming to her house. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said there were about 30 people staying in their home along with her father, Mr. [Redacted/Mohammad Naim] and her brother, Mr. [Redacted.] Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said they were all frightened and trying to hide. At some point, Mr. [Redacted/Rafiullah's?] grandmother (NFI) came into her house. Shortly thereafter, the man came in. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said the man was wearing some kind of uniform, but she was uncertain of the kind. She could only describe him as having a white and red face. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said the man was armed with a rifle with a yellow light on top. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said when the man came in she could see him trying to tear the women's clothing and he was touching them on the chest. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said she could see Mr. [Redacted/Rafiullah's?] grandmother's clothing had been torn off exposing her chest. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said during the incident, the man beat one woman (NFI) with his fists and knocked her brother's wife, [Redacted,] to the ground and sat on her to keep her from fleeing. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said the man never touched her, but was motioning with his hand to come to him and the man was talking, but she could not understand. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said the man shot her father, Mr. [Redacted/Mohammad Naim] first, then her. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said the man then shot her brother Mr. [Redacted/Sadiqullah,] then shot and killed Mr. [Redacted/Rafiullah's] grandmother [Nikmarghah]. The man then shot Mr. [Redacted/Rafiullah?] and Ms. [Redacted/Zardana.] Before leaving the house, the man entered a room and shot and killed a friend, Mr. KHUDAIDAD, age 70, who was staying with her family. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said the man shot many times while in her house. Ms. [Redacted/Parmina] said after the man shot her family he left the house."

The never-interviewed witness and wife, now widow (name unknown), of Habibullah Naim (see the [3:40-4:30 AM](#) Timeline

(Number of children of victim Khudaydad via the closing statement of LTC Morse at the August, 2013 Bales sentencing hearing, at Transcript Page 971)

A Friday, March 16, 2012 meeting held by President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, where one witness (Habibullah Naim), and survivors and elders from other affected families gave video-recorded Pashto-language statements (Habibullah Naim spoke at the 57-minute mark of this recording): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbueAcJYMZo&feature=related>

CID Exhibit 103, Page 1 (22 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 15 March 2012 interview of Sayed Jan by a U.S. Army CID Special Agent, apparently at Kandahar Airfield, as interpreted by a female civilian SOTF-S/Special Forces Linguist)

CID Exhibit 247, Page 1 (23 April, 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summary of a 12 April 2012 interview of Sayed Jan and his son Samiullah by a U.S. Army Special Agent, apparently at Kandahar Airfield, as interpreted)

CID Exhibit 154, Page 4 (26 March 2012 Agent's Investigation Report summarizing a 17 March 2012 CID interview with Mr. [Redacted], who was shown a March 16 flight manifest, "concerning who he knew had been killed in his village")

CC Exhibit III? (1 April 2012 sworn statement evidently made by 1-25 Stryker Brigade Commander Colonel Todd Wood, who arrived at VSP Belamby at about 1:00 PM on March 11, at PDF Page 349)

Media reports from the Bales Article 32 hearing in November, 2012

Links to the Army's original (redacted) March 23, 2012, and final (redacted, then later unredacted) June 1, 2012 Bales Charge Sheets:

http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/unredacted_june_1_2012_second_bales_charge_sheet_from_record_of_trial_october_2015.pdf

<http://debatingchambers.com/wp->

entry above), is likely the woman Parmina Naim was describing when Parmina told CID the soldier *"with a white and red face"* who she saw at the Naim home *"knocked her brother's wife, [Redacted,] to the ground and sat on her to keep her from fleeing."*

This is a Pashto-to-English translation by [Lela Ahmadzai](#) of the public eyewitness account – detailing part of the same attack that Parmina's describing above – delivered by Parmina's older brother Habibullah Naim at the group meeting with President Karzai in Kabul on Friday, March 16th – Habibullah Naim's the only eyewitness who speaks in the hour-long online recording of that meeting:

"We were asleep in our home and did not know anything. The Americans then came to our yard. He shot the brother [Nazar Mohammad] of [Sayed Jan, Habibullah indicated, pointing to Jan seated beside him]; the women from this house [evidently Nazar Mohammad's] came to us. I was behind the [door] curtain. I saw his head light, running after the women. He was following the women (running after them). They shot first my old father [Mohammad Naim]. In a different room he was shooting at the children. The women told me: Haji is killed [presumably meaning either his father Mohammad Naim, who'd fallen unconscious after being shot, or Nazar Mohammad], run away. I said how can I run away? They said nobody's in the yard right now – just go out. I was waiting for my death. The women helped me to escape (over a wall). I'm very grateful for their help. Then after that he was shooting the kids in the head or in the stomach and also Rafiullah. Also he killed his [again pointing to Sayed Jan on his right] wife and his granddaughter was shot in the head, she can't talk – the 7-year-old girl [Zardana]."

At this point, President Karzai asked Habibullah Naim:

"Was the 7-year-old or the 11-12-year-old shot in the head?"

Habibullah replied:

"The 7-year-old. She hasn't spoken since being shot."

Then President Karzai asked Habibullah:

"The other one is your sister, who is getting better now?"

Habibullah replied:

"Yes, she is doing better. Yes, that one is my sister [Parmina, though the name of neither female was mentioned]."

[content/uploads/dod_redacted_panjwai_charge_sheet_6_1_2012.pdf](#)

<https://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/baleschargesheet.pdf>

For the URLs of media accounts describing other March 11 murders, see: http://debatingchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/thirteen_11_march_2012_zangabad_murders_described_by_reporters_for_which_no_one_has_been_charged_as_of_october_2015.pdf

Aside from Habibullah Naim – once, as quoted in the [3:40-4:30 AM](#) Timeline entry above – and the five wounded Alkozai civilians taken to Kandahar Airfield, evidently no one else from among the "30" people present at the Naim home during the attack (according to teenager Parmina Naim) was interviewed by U.S. Army CID agents.

Noorbinak/Robina, a young daughter of Nazar Mohammad and his second wife Maryam, testified by live video-feed at the Bales Article 32 hearing, at the request of the defense, about the murder of her father Nazar Mohammad and her 2-year-old sister Toraki/Tora, to which she was a witness, at the home just to the east of the Naim home. Yet U.S. Army CID agents evidently never interviewed 8-year-old Noorbinak/Robina (who told an Australian [SBS-TV program](#), from Kandahar Airfield's military hospital, as interpreted, that "*one entered the room and the others were standing in the yard, holding lights*"), or anyone else present at the Nazar Mohammad home that night.

Alkozai Ballistics Evidence

Ballistics evidence collected by the U.S. Army CID and the Afghan Uniform Police (the AUP, one unit of what's collectively known as the Afghan National Police, or ANP) places Robert Bales at the scene of the crime in the cow shed at the western side of Sayed Jan's Alkozai home (the cow was reportedly shot but survived), and possibly at another site (or sites) in one of the three Ibrahim Khan Houses of Alkozai.

5 spent rifle and 3 spent pistol shell casings that the Afghan Uniform Police found during the hour they spent investigating multiple crime scenes early on March 11, and turned over to U.S. Army CID agents on March 12 (after some resistance by AUP leadership at Kandahar Provincial HQ), apparently came from one of the Alkozai homes. A Firearms Examiner at the US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) determined that all 8 of those shells had been fired by a Bales weapon; redactions prevent confirmation of which home or village (though the village can be guessed with some certainty) those shells were retrieved from. Those 8 shell casings are apparently the only shell casings that Afghan officials (national Army or Police) retrieved from Ibrahim Khan Houses March 11 and transferred to CID. CID agents found 1 spent shell casing and 1 spent bullet at that location on their first and only ("expedient," but very well photographed and documented) crime scene examination on April 2nd. (As noted on CID Exhibit 41 at PDF Page 143, the AUP also collected two "Market Street

Classics" syrup packages – formerly, but not then, in stock at VSP Belamby – possibly at the Wazir home, which were also turned over to CID on March 12.)

The one-page draft Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) report about the killings, dated March 11, 2012, which summarized their 1-hour – reportedly and evidently, based on AUP and media photographs – early-morning investigation of the crime scenes, states: *"Before the arrival of the investigation team a number of casings were taken by the ANA."*

The "official" two-page, translated Afghan Uniform Police report about the killings, completed by March 12, 2012, states: *"The rest of the empty casings [aside from the 13 empty "American machine gun" and 5 empty "American pistol" casings the AUP recovered on March 11 from "the incident area" - meaning from both Alkozai and Najiban] were carried away by ANA before the investigation team arrived to that area."*

Neither AUP report provides any evidence to justify its statement that ANA soldiers (apparently before 7:00 or 8:00 AM that day) *"carried away"* spent shell casings from the crime scenes. Though, notably, an ODA 7216 NCO, who shared acting Team Sergeant duties with another Special Forces soldier (SFC X) after the ODA 7216 Team Sergeant was injured March 5, said this to the CC investigation about the ODA's experience working with ANA soldiers:

"I'll give you a couple of examples; whenever we'd get into fire fights, there would be ANA soldiers with empty [ammunition] mags. Others running around trying to pick up brass, because they would sell the brass at the bazaar."

At the eastern end of the Sayed Jan home, April 2nd, CID agents found three red stains on the west interior wall of Room 1, in which Sayed Jan's adult nephew and farmhand Khudaydad was sleeping. CID agents also photographed bullet holes in the metal door of Room 1, apparently made from the courtyard side of the door (Room 1's east-side exterior entryway had no door). Exhibit 214 at PDF Pages 825, 826, 827, 828, & 829 appears to show three 5.56mm rifle shots and one 9mm pistol shot through Khudaydad's door. Khudaydad was murdered in or near Room 1 that night. More suspected bullet holes were found in the door of Room 4, Rafiullah's room, three rooms to the west of Room 1. CID agents photographed two possible bullet holes in the half-panel exterior metal doors of that room (see Exhibit 214 at PDF Pages 846 & 850).

On April 2nd CID also found a 9mm pistol shell casing on the cow shed floor at the Sayed Jan home, that a Firearms Examiner at the US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory determined had been fired by the Bales-borrowed Heckler & Koch pistol (see Exhibit 214 at PDF Pages 859, 858, 854, 852, 840, & 836).

Thus, during the murder of one man and the wounding of one cow at the Sayed Jan home that night, evidently at least 7 (rifle and pistol) shots were fired – yet a maximum of only 9 shell casings and 1 bullet were retrieved, by Afghan and U.S. investigators, from all three homes making up Alkozai's Ibrahim Khan Houses, scene of multiple March 11 murders and injuries to the residents, and their animals (an unknown number of dogs, in particular).

Next door at Mohammad Naim's, just across a narrow driveway to the east of Sayed Jan's, CID agents on April 2nd found one 9mm pistol bullet lodged in a wall in Room 2 of the Naim home – in the back, northwest corner of that room, near where Sadiqullah Naim and his brother were crouching to hide in a cloth-covered alcove, and close to where a large bloodstain is visible on the floor, possibly from the murder of Rafiullah's grandmother Nikmarghah (see Exhibit 219 at PDF Pages 888, 887, 891, 886, 885, & 878). There were not enough distinctive markings on that pistol bullet, however, for the Army lab to ascertain whether it was, or was not, fired by the Bales-carried 9mm Heckler & Koch pistol.

[By the time the CID crime scene photographs were taken on April 2nd, the large Naim family had apparently abandoned that home, into which they'd recently moved, leaving miscellaneous belongings behind in Room 2, once Naim's bedroom, which was the only room with a door.]

9 *burned* shell casings that Afghan investigators found were clearly retrieved at the Mohammad Wazir home south of VSP Belamby – at least six of them in Room 4, because media cameras recorded them being photographed and then picked up and bagged by Afghans wearing gloves on March 11. Due to redactions, however, it's not clear whether shell casings from the gunshots that made 6 bullet holes in two doors at the Sayed Jan home, north of VSP Belamby, make up most of the remaining 8 (unburnt rifle and pistol) shell casings retrieved by the AUP on March 11, or whether those 8 spent casings were retrieved by AUP from another home or homes in the Ibrahim Khan Houses neighborhood (or elsewhere).

However, crime-scene and human injury evidence together account for a minimum of 18 gunshots (and almost certainly

more than 20 shots) being fired at Alkozai's Ibrahim Khan Houses that night – whereas a maximum of only 9 spent shell casings (all fired by a Bales-carried rifle or pistol) and 1 spent bullet were retrieved, from that location, for analysis by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory in Forest Park, Georgia.

In addition to the 7 shots (or more, since dogs were also fired upon) that crime-scene evidence indicates were fired at the Sayed Jan home that night, at least five people were shot and wounded, several by multiple bullets (according to Army personnel who treated them), and one woman was shot and killed, at the central Mohammad Naim home that night. (No intact ammunition was retrieved from the wounds of the five injured civilians shot at the Mohammad Naim home, during their treatment by U.S. Army personnel.) And at the home east of Naim's, Nazar Mohammad's dog was shot, and then Nazar Mohammad (who was shot twice, according to a witness) and his 2-year-old daughter Tora were killed, while Nazar Mohammad's young daughter Robina/Noorbinak was wounded, apparently by a bullet that was fired at her father, behind whom she was hiding.

The Centralized Afghanistan Government's Investigation(s)

In contrast to the description of the murder of a Naim family guest named "*Mr. Khudaidad, age 70,*" given in Parmina Naim's lone public interview, only a younger, middle-aged man named Khudaydad, a nephew and farmhand of Sayed Jan's, has been described as being killed at [Ibrahim Khan Houses](#) that night – in the home neighboring Naim's on the west. That younger Khudaydad is clearly included among the 16 U.S. Army Charge Sheet counts of murder to which Bales pleaded guilty in June, 2013. No public charges or other accounts seem to describe a 70-year-old Naim family friend named Khudaidad being murdered in the Naim home that night.

The CID's redacted [Report of Investigation](#), however, reveals a reference to a guest at the Mohammad Naim home, without naming him or her, being among those murdered that night. That reference is contained in the hopelessly inadequate Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) report – a 2-page document, originally written in Dari, that was considered "official" (presumably meaning final, despite one obvious error) by CID when the Dari-language version was received by the U.S. Army at 10:20 AM Monday, March 12, 2012, per CID Exhibit 34, Page 1. [The Afghan Uniform Police are one unit or component of a variety of national police units that are collectively known as the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANP also have a

Criminal Investigation Division.]

That AUP document contains, in its translated, redacted list (see below) of the "*Identities of those killed*" (listing 17 dead) both "*Khudaidad, son of [Redacted]*" and, in a separate entry, "*1 Unknown guest in [Redacted] house.*"

[A Major "Khudaydad" also happened to be the chief Afghan investigator of the crime for AUP's CID. AUP Major Khudaydad testified under oath at the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing via live video-feed that the AUP was able to spend only a total of one hour examining the crime scenes, reportedly at about 8:00 AM on March 11th – evidently due to the threat of Taliban attack and the hostility of the locals toward the AUP, who were seen as colluding against them with the Americans. One result of Major Khudaydad's inadequate, quickly-ended AUP investigation is that his repeatedly-stressed belief that these killings were not – or could not be – the work of one man lacked documentation, since the AUP evidently failed to collect, or were somehow prevented from collecting, available evidence – such as, at minimum, photographs of every vehicle that carried a murder victim to VSP Belamby's gate and parked just outside its walls on March 11.]

The "official" AUP report list of the "*Identities of those killed*" (translated March 12, 2012):

1. *Mohammad Dawood son of [Redacted]*
2. *Khudaidad son of [Redacted]*
3. *Nazar Mohammad son of [Redacted]*
4. *Payendo's Daughter (adult)*
5. *Robina daughter of () 6 years old*
6. *1 unknown guest in [Redacted] household*
7. *11 members of [Redacted] family that their identities are unknown, the majority of which were children and were killed"*

[No 6-year-old girl named "Robina" is included among the counts of murder to which Bales pleaded guilty in 2013. A 2-year-old girl named Tora/Gulalai, Robina's younger sister, and one of four daughters of Nazar Mohammad, is, however, included among those murder counts. The names of the six wounded who are listed in the "official" AUP report (one of whom should have been Nazar Mohammad's young daughter "Robina"/Noorbinak, shot in the leg) are redacted in the report included in the publicly-released CID Report of Investigation.]

Further confusing matters, Sayed Jan (Rafiullah's grandfather, who was not at home during the attack), was interviewed alone on March 15th, apparently for the first and last time, by a CID Special Agent (likely when Sayed Jan was visiting his

wounded grandchildren at the KAF military hospital). According to the agent's summary of the interpreted interview, Sayed Jan:

"...related he was the husband of Mrs. PAYENDO (Deceased); the brother of Mr. NAZARAKA (Deceased) and Mr. KHUDIDAD (Deceased); the uncle of Miss [Redacted] and Miss ROBINA (Deceased), who were both Mr. NAZARAKA's (Deceased) daughters; and the paternal grandfather of Miss [Redacted/Zardana] and Master [Redacted/Rafiullah.] Mr. [Redacted/Sayed Jan] stated his son/grandchildren's father was named [Redacted/Samiullah] (NFI), and was currently caring for guests and making funeral arrangements for their deceased family members. Mr. [Redacted/Sayed Jan] verbally consented to a search of his person for the purposes of collecting DNA (buccal swabs), indicating he would do anything he could to assist in this investigation. Ms. [Redacted] Linguist, SOTF-S, KAF, interpreted the conversation."

[“Mrs. Payendo,” the wife of Sayed Jan, was in fact the adult daughter of Payendo (her mother), 2470media learned in 2015, and is listed on the June 1, 2012 Army Charge Sheet as “Na’ikmarga”; “Nazir Mohammad” was Sayed Jan’s brother; “Mr. Khudidad” presumably means the Sayed Jan nephew and farmhand listed on the June Charge Sheet as “Khudai Day”. “Miss Robina” - if that means the 6-year-old daughter of Nazar Mohammad – survived with a leg wound, but her 2-year-old sister “Tora/Gulalai” was killed. (The names of the 23 casualties on the Army’s first, March 23, 2012 Bales Charge Sheet remain redacted, and some of those casualties were listed without a name.)]

Later, after the first Charge Sheet had been issued, and the Army Foreign Claims Commission had paid 22 victims' claims, CID interviewed Sayed Jan again, on April 12, 2012, this time alongside his adult son Samiullah, and asked again for “information regarding family members identification.” This time the CID summary of their interpretation of the interview states:

"Mr. [Redacted/Sayed Jan] said his wife who he identified a[s] Ms. Naik MARGA was one of the members of his family killed. Additionally, Mr. [Redacted/Sayed Jan] said his brother Mr. NAZARAQA was killed along with Mr. NAZARAQA's 3 year old daughter, Ms. LALEY. Mr. [Redacted/Sayed Jan] said his brother's other daughter, Ms. [Redacted/Robina/Noorbinak] was shot in the leg. [...] Mr. [Redacted/Samiullah] said the family members at home at the time of the incident were his mother, Ms. [Redacted/Nikmarghah,] his sister, Ms. [Redacted] of Alokozai, Afghanistan, his daughter, Ms.

[Redacted/Zardana] and his son, Mr. [Redacted/Rafiullah.] Mr. [Redacted/Samiullah] advised Ms. [Redacted] was in Pakistan and he was not sure of the time of her return."

On March 17, 2012, CID asked someone else (an Afghan whose identity is redacted), who may have been an English speaker, for information *"concerning who he knew had been killed in his village."* That man's account, probably given at the KAF military hospital, as interpreted and summarized by CID, names a male murder victim of unknown age (*"Mr. Simaka"*) who's not included among the victims charged to Bales:

"S[pecial]A[gent] [Redacted] showed a flight manifest, provided by SA [Redacted,] of the family members who had been flown to Kabul, Afghanistan [the Army withheld that March 16 manifest from the publicly-released ROI], to Mr. [Redacted]. Mr. [Redacted] said he knew all but two individuals on the manifest but only three had family members killed. The first person he identified was Mr. [Redacted/Mohammad Wazir] who had eleven family members killed. Mr. [Redacted] stated he did not know any of their names. Mr. [Redacted] identified the second person from the manifest as Mr. [Redacted/Sayed Jan] who had his wife (NFI), his brother (Mr. NAZARAKA), his nephew (Mr. SIMAKA), and his cousin (Mr. KHUDAIDAD) killed. Mr. [Redacted] identified the third person from the manifest as Mr. [Redacted/Mullah Baraan] who had his brother (Mr. DAWOOD) killed."

[This person evidently did not recognize Habibullah Naim, the only eyewitness who spoke at the meeting – as seen in the online recording linked in Sources – for the Naim family of Ibrahim Khan Houses, Alkozai (while Habibullah's father Mohammad Naim recovered from multiple gunshot wounds). There are two media references of note in connection with that report of a male nephew of Sayed Jan's being killed: One is an excerpt from an AFP audio recording of an account given to President Karzai over the phone by Rafiullah from his KAF hospital bed on March 11 or 12, in which Rafiullah is quoted as saying, referencing his *Great-Uncle* Nazar Mohammad: *"...he shot dead my uncle's son, his daughter."* The other is a PressTV (Iranian state television) media interview of Sayed Jan and two other men in July, 2012 that quotes Jan (perhaps confusing Sayed Jan with his brother Nazar Mohammad) as saying that Jan himself lost a *"newly born grandson"* who was *"shot in the chest."* (Sayed Jan's niece, his brother Nazar Mohammad's daughter Tora, Age 2-3, was shot in the head.)]

By 2:48 PM on March 12, 2012, CID had the "official" Afghan Uniform Police report translated into English, from its original Dari. Also on March 12, CID received the original Dari-

language "drafted" Afghan Uniform Police report – the one-page version dated March 11 that named no victims, and totaled 16 deaths, not 17.

The existence of many unexplained discrepancies in CID and other Army investigative documents seems to be a result of a U.S. investigation focused on and largely confined to personnel at U.S. military bases. Inexplicably, given its obvious flaws, indications are that it was the hasty Afghan Uniform Police investigation, or at least the AUP's sketchy listing of the dead and wounded – presented with an actual AUP "sketch" that placed one of two attacked villages ("Girandai") 2 KM from VSP Belamby, and showed no killings taking place north of the VSP – that U.S. Army CID investigators considered themselves bound by, or limited to, and appears to be what the U.S. Army's counts of murder and attempted murder were primarily based upon.

Incredible though it may seem – particularly given the invaluable, timely work of Kandahar city-based Afghan journalists that day – evidently neither the Afghan Uniform/National Police nor the Afghan National Army bothered to publicly document *any* testimony at all by Afghans who witnessed the shootings – though the ANA did record the testimony of ANA soldiers who were guarding VSP Belamby that night, and Habibullah Naim was publicly recorded on March 16th giving a 5-minute eyewitness summary to President Karzai in Kabul.

The AUP investigation was evidently, and logically, organized and supervised by the Kandahar Provincial Chief of Police (an appointee of the President of Afghanistan), then-Brigadier General [Abdul Raziq](#) (see [CID Exhibit 263](#), excerpted below) – who also seemed to have "consequence management," not evidence collection, uppermost in his mind – as the following sworn statement by a U.S. Army Colonel from SFAT (Security Forces Assistance Team) 25, Combined Task Force Lancer, based in Kandahar city (apparently at the Afghan government's Kandahar Provincial Headquarters, or KPHQ), spelled out to CID on May 30, 2012 (in CID Exhibit 263):

"I am the Senior Mentor for the Kandahar Provincial Chief of Police, BG [Redacted/Abdul Raziq.] In that role, I advise him on issues such as police professionalism, consequence management and administration of the provincial headquarters. Additionally, my team and I move with BG [Redacted/Raziq] when he travels throughout Kandahar Province. I was notified by Regional Command (RC) South (S) that an incident involving civilian casualties had taken place in Panjwa'i. I then informed the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP),

BG [Redacted/Abdul Raziq] who had already received reports from his sources about an incident. The PCOP decided to go to Panjwa'i to assist in the consequence management of the incident and asked us to assist in escorting him. Immediately after being informed of the incident, my maneuver squad escorted BG [Redacted/Raziq] and his Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) criminal forensics team to VSP Belambai. Once at VSP Belambai on 11 MAR 12, the crowd was remarkably hostile. As a result, I did not see the crime scenes. The AUP criminal forensics team was able to go to the crime scene that day but only had limited time at each, again because of the hostile environment. When we returned to Kandahar Provincial Headquarters (PHQ) [in Kandahar city] on 11 MAR 12, we received copies of the AUP report, the AUP photos of the crime scenes [many of those AUP photos were redacted, and other AUP evidence, along with all 87 pages of Afghan National Army "death scene photos" in CID Exhibit 181, make up part of the 1,300 pages that the Army entirely withheld from the version of the ROI it released to The News Tribune in 2014] and coordinated for US Army CID to come to PHQ to pick up the evidence."

Two months after Afghan and U.S. officials announced, within hours of learning of the overnight killing spree, that the number of dead was 16, something on the March 12 "official" Afghan Uniform Police list of 17 dead evidently changed – but, as further detailed below, that change was evidently *not* related to the AUP report's inclusion of "Robina" and an "unknown guest" among the murder victims.

On March 23, 2012, the U.S. Army had originally charged SSG Robert Bales with 17 counts of murder and 6 counts of attempted murder (23 victims, whose names were all redacted, and remain redacted, on the publicly-released Charge Sheet). The *next day*, a total of almost a million U.S. dollars (all Foreign Claims Act-authorized Title 10 funds), converted to the Afghanistan currency (Afghanis), was paid in cash at Kandahar Provincial Headquarters in Kandahar city, in close coordination with PCOP BG Abdul Raziq, to 4 Afghan heads of household, for their "22" dead and wounded – as thoroughly explained to the CC investigation by a U.S. Army soldier on the staff of 1-25 SBCT (Brigade) Commander Colonel Todd Wood at FOB Masum Ghar in Panjwai district.

That 1-25 SBCT soldier was the president of a 3-member Foreign Claims Commission (FCC) formed by the 1-25 Brigade to adjudicate the Panjwai claims. The 1-25 soldier and FCC president stated in an April 3, 2012 sworn statement, at CC PDF Page 355 (the statement excerpts below are ordered differently than they appear in the original), that the exact

number of "wrongful death" claims paid by that U.S. Army FCC on March 24, 2012 was 16 – not 17, as had been charged to SSG Bales just the day before by the 3-2 Infantry Division:

"Q: Of the 22 claims you paid to the four claimants in this case, how many were for wrongful death and how many were for injuries?"

"A: 16 wrongful deaths and 6 for personal injuries."

"Q: Who facilitated the meeting? Was that the governor [of the province] the whole way through?"

"A: My understanding is that [Kandahar Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP)] General Razziq had a fairly large interest in this, and he was able to organize this with [Redacted -] he is the STT [apparently meaning U.S. Security Transition Team (as in Iraq), or (U.S. Army) SFA, Security Force Assistance] team chief down at Kandahar. [...] The decision on payments went much higher than us and it was determined that we would make one settlement and that would be under Foreign Claims. [...] By Monday afternoon [March 19th, before any charges had been filed], we had conducted a rehearsal of the shura [meeting] in front of [Redacted.] By Tuesday, we had drawn the money and \$100,000 for solatia [condolence funds] as a "just in case" because we didn't want to get to the event and not be able to pay anyone for foreign claims because of the regulatory and legal restrictions with foreign claims; we had more flexibility with solatia. We also drew \$1,000,000 [one million US dollars] in foreign claims funds, which was authorized by US Army Claims Service. We were on standby until Friday [March 23rd, the day Bales was charged with 17 counts of murder and 6 accounts of attempted murder], when we found out that it was going to happen on Saturday. [...] So, we capped it at a \$50,000 rate for the wrongful deaths, which was not really attainable in Afghani [Afghanistan currency], so we came as close as we could to the \$50,000 [at a 45-47% exchange rate] so it was a round number in Afghani." [...]

"Q: What type of payments are foreign claims designed to be used for?"

"A: Foreign claims are used to compensate claimants where the US government may be liable. [...] We do this if we're in a foreign country and one of our Soldiers causes damage or death, we compensate those civilians who are affected. That payment is authorized by the Foreign Claims Act and is paid with Title 10 funds. Solatia is more of a condolence that's paid through a unit's O&M reparations and management funds.

That is not necessarily paid in every country; it's part of a cultural norm. So, if it is culturally accepted to pay a small sum of money as a symbol of remorse or sympathy for condolence, then we'll pay that. Here, in this district, we have the Pashtu[n] people and they do recognize this payment and we do use it down here and pay in money, or some type of cattle, or some other form of recompense. We were able to use solatia if we wanted to, but at the end of the day it was decided that we would use foreign claims." [...]

"Q: I was given your name as the point of contact to receive information on the condolence payments and the meeting during which those occurred with the Afghan families. Can you please describe the condolence payment meeting that occurred?"

"A: [...] *Prior to the shura, we had developed through various source documents a listing of possible claimants. We did that by using several reports: one of the reports was an ANP (Afghan National Police) CID (Criminal Investigations Division) report that we received from the PCoP, General Razziq [this is presumably a reference to AUP CID Major Khudaydad's "official" 2-page report received by the U.S. Army CID on March 12]. Another source was a list of attendees who went to Kabul and visited with President Karzai [the passenger manifest for that March 16th flight to Kabul is contained in the CID's ROI, but was withheld in its entirety from the redacted document the Army released in 2014]. We also used several other media documents that we were following at the time about who the people were that were either killed or injured and who their family members were, and what their relationships were to determine who proper claimants would be. As is with Afghan and Pashtu[n] custom, the head of household would receive any payments that were made from injuries, death, or property damage that occurs in their home or in their compound. Here, we actually paid these four claimants because they were the heads of household, not necessarily because they were the next of kin or spouse or the executor for an estate. For all the wrongful deaths, we ended up paying [redacted] total claims. We ended up not paying any personal damage claims for a few reasons: it was determined by the government officials that we would not be paying personal damage claims; and, during the claims settlements, none of the four claimants made any specific claims for any property damage. I don't know the reason for that, but we put in the settlement documents that that was now waived as part of the settlement agreement. So, we ended up not paying for any, though we were prepared to do so if we received any claims at the time. At the end of each meeting with the individual, we brought out the money and placed it in a box*

and gave them a few plastic bags. At the end of paying everyone, we sealed each box so that they couldn't be tampered with, ensured that their names were on the boxes, and ensured that they were in the hands of their claimants when they left. My understanding is that General Razziq and his guard force actually escorted them to their next destination. We had spoken about taking them to a local bank in Kandahar, but I don't know what exactly they did after that." [...]

"Q: Do you have any recommendations on what future KLE (Key Leader Engagements) or mitigation actions should occur?"

"A: *In my opinion, I think they need to get out there. I think the US CID needs authorization to get out to the site to look at it. We have a CONOP (concept of operations) for forces and we're prepared to assist with that operation, but it's been hung up for a while. That's something I just remembered: at the shura, one of the comments by one of the claimants was that they hadn't had anyone come and look at their house. No one had been out to collect any evidence and there was still blood on their floors. That's telling and it sends a message that, under normal circumstances, the first that a criminal investigation agency would do [would] be to go out there. I know there are a number of reasons why they haven't done that, but we're at a point where, every day that we don't go out there, evidence is diminished along with credibility and reliability are just lost. That's one of the things that I would say would be meaningful to the people that this impacted, that the US is actually conducting an appropriate criminal investigation. Plus, it would certainly help the case to collect any evidence for the investigation and subsequent trial, if there is any."*

Just as "consequence management" took priority over evidence collection for the U.S. Army officer corps, the U.S. Army provided unprecedented compensation to victims identified and selected behind the scenes (while Afghan eyewitness testimony went uncollected and undocumented), by "mentored" Afghan officials (mentoring that included receiving personal security on his travels in the region from the U.S. Army, in the case of Kandahar Police Chief Abdul Raziq), before U.S. Army criminal investigators even went beyond the perimeters of U.S. bases to visit the scenes of the crime.

One number unmentioned in the preceding account about the Foreign Claims Commission (FCC) compensation process is the amount of money the U.S. Army FCC paid for each *injured* victim. At the time, quoting two named Afghan sources, the

Associated Press reported that amount to be \$11,000 U.S. dollars per attempted murder (or a total of about \$66,000). To date that report does not seem to have been contradicted, and so may well be accurate (as was the *AP* report, in the same article, that \$50,000 was paid per murder victim).

If the *AP*-reported U.S. payment of \$11,000 for each of six *attempted* murders (\$66,000) is subtracted from the one million in U.S. Foreign Claims Act payments – or, to be precise, from the "**\$980,000, approximately**" in U.S. "condolence payments" made, according to [sworn testimony](#) (over prosecution objections to a defense inquiry) by 1-25 SBCT Colonel Todd Wood at the August, 2013 Bales Sentencing Hearing (Transcript Page 755) – the balance remaining for the compensation of "*wrongful deaths*" totaled \$914,000.

\$914,000, however, comes to **\$57,125** for each of the 16 murders to which Bales pleaded guilty in 2013 – *more* than the admittedly-capped amount (as described above) of **\$50,000** per wrongful death claim paid by the U.S. Army on March 24, 2012 (with some necessary rounding due to conversion to the Afghanistan currency, but with no additional property damage claims at issue here, as also described above).

In other words, \$50,000 per wrongful death claim – for the 16 wrongful death claims paid by the U.S. Army on March 24, 2012, according to the FCC President's sworn statement – amounts to \$800,000, not \$914,000 in compensation (after deducting the \$66,000 presumably paid for injured victims) – leaving an unexplained excess payment of **\$114,000**.

Or, if we assume that instead – in accordance with the 17 murder counts on the March 23rd Charge Sheet issued by the Army only the day before – 17 wrongful death claims were in fact paid on March 24, that would've totaled \$850,000, at \$50,000 each, still leaving (if that's what took place, and after deducting the \$66,000 presumably paid for injured victims) an unexplained excess payment of **\$64,000**.

Now that the belated (2015) release of CC investigation documents has confirmed that the amount the U.S. Army paid – on March 24, 2012 for each of 16 March 11, 2012 wrongful death claims – was capped at \$50,000, and revealed, apparently for the first time, that there were no property damages paid, perhaps the U.S. media will finally begin to ask some questions about the discrepancy between the total amount paid – which was confirmed in August, 2013 Army testimony to be "approximately" \$980,000 – and the amount of money that at least one sworn statement in the Army Command Climate investigation indicates was intended to be,

and in fact was, paid for (presumably) the 16 murders to which SSG Robert Bales pleaded guilty in 2013.

Eventually, more than two months after the U.S. Army paid \$980,000 U.S. dollars for 22 casualties (more or less at the direction of Afghan officials, it appears), the Army, on June 1, 2012, without meaningful explanation, reduced the murder counts charged to SSG Bales to 16, while leaving the number of attempted murders at 6 – bringing the Bales Charge Sheet into line with the number of claims paid on March 24, 2012 (22 – with the names of the victims again concealed on the Army's second publicly-released [Charge Sheet](#)).

The names of the 22 casualties charged to Robert Bales on June 1, 2012 (which may differ from those for whom compensation was paid in March, and/or from the names on the first, still-redacted March 23, 2012 Charge Sheet) were not publicly revealed until January, 2013 – after the November, 2012 Bales Article 32 hearing and subsequent developments. It was not until reporter Gene Johnson of the *Associated Press* obtained the names listed on the second Army Charge Sheet from the Bales defense team, and wrote [an article with each name included](#), that the public learned the identities of the 22 Panjwai victims whose deaths or injuries had been charged to Robert Bales ten months earlier. (Before January, 2013, only an [opinion piece](#) by CNN International correspondent Sara Sidner, and a [blog post](#) by Afghan *Al Jazeera* producer Qais Azimy had attempted to name every murdered Panjwai victim – though neither identified their Afghan source(s), and their matching lists differ from the AP's subsequently-released list of U.S. Army Charge Sheet-sourced names.) The names listed by the AP in January, 2013 are now confirmed to be the names on the June 1, 2012 Charge Sheet, because the Army finally left the names [unredacted](#) in a copy of the Charge Sheet it released to the media in 2015, as part of the Bales Record of Trial (between Transcript Pages 10 and 11, covering the January, 2013 Bales arraignment).

The names of the murder victims on the [June 1, 2012 Bales Charge Sheet](#) are those of one widow, three wives, four husbands, and eight children – not of *nine* murdered children, as both President Karzai and U.S. military spokesmen and sources said were among the dead within hours or days of the killings, and which the U.S. media, with a few belated exceptions, unquestioningly accepted and repeated as proven fact thenceforth.

The June 1, 2012 Army Charge Sheet's 16 murder counts also seem to be in conflict with United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) civilian casualty data, published in

February, 2013, as part of UNAMA's "Annual Report 2012; Protection of Civilians In Armed Conflict" document, covering all of Afghanistan.

With regard to the March 11, 2012 killings, UNAMA's final, year-end [2012 report](#) simply asserts – without naming the victims, showing its evidence, or describing its sources (redacted, anonymous, or otherwise), despite the U.S. Army-issued murder count of 16 and injured count of 6 publicly announced eight months earlier – that:

"UNAMA documented 17 civilians killed and five injured."

(In UNAMA's [mid-year](#) 2012 report, issued in July, 2012 – a month after the June 1, 2012 Army Charge Sheet reduced the SSG Bales murder charges to 16 – the UN agency stated, as part of two sentences devoted to the March 11, 2012 civilian killings in its mid-year report, at PDF Page 51, that: "a US soldier" was responsible for "killing 17, including three women and nine children.")

On Page 5 (Page 000011 of CID's overall PDF release) of the [redacted U.S. Army CID Report of Investigation](#) we see a belated public explanation, with regard to CID's numbered list of 27 victims (including two people, names redacted, who were robbed in Alkozai; the U.S. government, in connection with the alcohol and steroid use by Bales; and an unnamed Afghan truck driver who was kneed and punched by Bales in February), for the change in its Charge Sheet murder count. That explanation reflects, and highlights, the sourcing that was clearly relied upon by the U.S. Army for the identification (as to both the total count, and name and location specifics) of massacre casualties – for all casualties, that is, but those who happened to be brought inside a U.S. base (five Alkozai wounded).

In short, the U.S. Army CID's September, 2013 Report of Investigation blames the *Afghan police* for the murder miscount on a U.S. Army Charge Sheet that was issued more than 10 days after the killings, and a day before the U.S. Army paid almost a million dollars to survivors:

"Murder was unfounded for victim #23, as it was determined this was an error in reporting by the Afghan police."

"Victim #23" in the CID's ROI (see Page 4) is identified as a non-juvenile whose last name (with no known first name) is listed as "PAYENDO." (Many Afghans use only a single name.) In contrast, on the "official" Afghan Uniform Police report, as translated and included in the ROI, only a "Payendo's Daughter

(adult)" is listed (see above).

[Nikmarghah, the grandmother of Rafiullah, and mother of Samiullah, was the *daughter* of Payendo, Samiullah told 2470media in 2015. Nikmarghah was murdered in the Naim home that night, and is identified, only once, in the Afghan police report, by the listing that uses her mother's name: "*Payendo's Daughter (adult)*"]

If there was a later, revised Afghan Uniform Police, Afghan National Civil Order Police, or other official national police report, with an entry for simply "PAYENDO," it does not appear to be included in the CID Report of Investigation – either in the partially-released, or full original version of the document, judging by the ROI's list of exhibits.

The CID ROI, at Exhibit 107, also includes an undated "*Initial Belambai incident report from 205 Corps Atal*" (part of the Afghan National Army, or ANA). This ANA "incident report" consists of a hasty, one-page outline of the killings, with the names of just 6 male victims listed (one of whom was not killed; Sayed Jan, or "*Syid jaan*," was listed as killed instead of his nephew Khudaydad). That initial ANA report omits the Mohammad Dawood murder altogether, and states that five were killed (including 2 children) in Alkozai. CID received a translated copy of that report on March 20th. At that time CID was told by a Major that "*the foreign language report provided during the 17 March 2012 meeting was their final* [Ministry of Defense (MOD)] *report and this initial report may have numbers and totals that differ from the final.*" No translation of the final March 17th MOD report seems to be included in CID's publicly-released Report of Investigation.

To repeat a telling April, 2012 statement, included near the end of the Timeline above – made to BG Waddell's CC investigation by someone (likely the Deputy IJC Commander) at ISAF Joint Command (IJC) HQ assisting U.S. Army Lieutenant General Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti, IJC Commander – about the extent of efforts to obtain evidence by General Sher Mohammad Karimi, head of the Afghan National Army (and charged with investigating by President Hamid Karzai):

"*To make a long story short, we were able to fly [Afghan National Army] General [Sher Mohammad] Karimi and his delegation out to Kandahar [Airfield] and then they were able to catch a rotary wing from Kandahar to VSP Belambai. They were the[n] able to do their walk-about. I use the word walk-about instead of investigation; **they really did not do an investigation**, because from the reports and the discussions we have had with General Karimi, they really just talked to a*

couple of witnesses. The purpose of their visit was to do mitigation for the PoA [President of Afghanistan], and show the Government's face to the people of Belambai and in Panjwa'i."

[For more on the depth, or lack thereof, of the ANA investigation, despite their (publicly-withheld) guard interviews and photos of the bodies and/or crime scenes, see CID Exhibit 103, Pages 1-3, at PDF Pages 360-362.]

As [Colonel Todd Wood](#) made clear to the CC investigation, money quickly came to the rescue of both the U.S. Army – which failed, or didn't bother, to obtain and record for every crime scene the accounts of Afghans who witnessed part of this mass murder – and of the woefully inadequate Afghan National/Uniform Police and Afghan National Army investigations of the killings, which likewise, more inexcusably, failed to collect and document *Afghan* accounts of the crime:

"At the VSP, I made it around to the 20 to 30 people I know and expressed our condolences for the loss. [Afghanistan Border & Tribal Affairs Minister and 'southern security representative'] Ahsadullah Khalid's first question to me was, "What do we do next?" I asked him, "Well sir, what do you think we ought to do?" He said, "We need to get this crowd to quiet down, before we have another incident right outside the front gate." So he, Razziq, and Hamid went out and talked to the crowd. I asked him if he wanted me to go out there with him, and he said absolutely not. The senior leaders made three trips, back and forth, to the crowd. On the third trip, Ahsadullah Khalid released the bodies to go be buried. [Khalid pulled out his SAT phone](#) and he had about 4 different village elders and family members talk to President Karzai. Each one of them had probably a 10 to 15 minute conversation with president Karzai. Then Khalid had a Shura inside the ODA compound, and he took all the ANSF partners in there as well as village elders and family members. He conducted a Shura that lasted about an hour. He did not want any of us in the Shura. When the Shura was done, he said, "We've got this under control." "The crowd had dispersed and the bodies were going to be buried. And now it's a matter of some of the Shura members, district leaders to quiet things down." He told us that we all needed to leave. Then in small groups of PSD (Personal Security Details), we departed the area. That was on 11 March. [...] The next day [apparently March 13] we had a meeting with a bunch of the senior folks. [Afghan National Army General Sher Mohammad] Karimi was at the meeting, and he had a bunch of the family members present. He paid some money to at least three family members. I could not tell how much exactly, but I would say 2 to 3 thousand dollars in

Afghan currency. Then I was asked to leave the room so they could talk some more. They probably spent about an hour with the family members. That was at FOB Zangabad. About every day after that, we were prepping to conduct the condolence payments. Almost every day I had a conversation with the DCoP, Sardar Mohammad, General Habibi, and [Kandahar province Chief of Police BG Abdul] Razziq to find out when they thought it would be appropriate to establish the condolence payment time. The timing of this thing was more important than what I would have thought. They all said that if you do it too fast you will look like you are trying to sweep it under the rug; if you are more patient with it you will have better information, which was absolutely true. There was a tremendous amount of talk among the ISAF folk and SFAT [Security Force Assistance Team] chains and there was a tremendous amount of talk with the senior security partners and government's partners. They were trying to do the same thing we were doing in trying to find out [who] the senior leader in the tribes were so that we could pay them."

In the process, facts like the precise nature of what CID terms an "error in reporting" by the Afghan police fell by the wayside. And if the cited "Victim #23" ("PAYENDO") error is the cause of one murder charge against Bales being dropped, what happened to the murder charge for "official" Afghan Uniform Police report Victim #6, which lists "1 Unknown guest in [Redacted] house" as killed, in addition to Victim #2, which names "Khudaidad son of [Redacted]" as one of 17 killed? [This "unknown guest," barring an unprofessional interpretation by a SOTF-S Special Forces linguist at Kandahar Airfield's military hospital, could be the family "friend" described in CID's summary of the only public account to them – after CID had received the Dari-language AUP report – by wounded teenager and witness Parmina Naim.]

Moreover, as noted at the end of the Timeline above, it seems more likely than not that a failure to independently investigate, rather than highly coincidental "reporting errors," explains the existence of multiple March 11th shootings (and [the photograph](#) of an unidentified murder victim) – described at the time, by different Afghan journalists, for non-Afghan news outlets (*Bloomberg, The New York Times, Reuters, The Guardian, The Associated Press, and Agence France-Presse*) – whose never-named dead and wounded victims were clearly not charged to SSG Bales. Those Afghan victims – whose families and deaths, [as described](#), do not match those of the 16 [belatedly-named](#) victims Bales now admits to killing – seem to tell us that as many as 13 more civilians were murdered by an uncharged U.S. person or persons on March 11, 2012, in Panjwai district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan.